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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
What are the causes and consequences of the wide range of native-born reactions 
to migrants around the world?  With approximately 192 million people living outside 
their place of birth or citizenship (3% of the world's population),
1
 migration has become 
one of the most important international phenomena of the 21
st
 century. In the case of 
Latin America, emigration to developed countries has increased over 50 percent in the 
past ten years (Herrera 2005). And, even though the bulk of Latin American emigrants 
are leaving for developed countries, a significant amount of intra-regional migration has 
also occurred over the decades, with Peruvians and Ecuadorians emigrating to Chile, 
Paraguayans and Bolivians to Argentina, Nicaraguans crossing the border to Costa Rica, 
Central Americans moving to Belize, among others. This dissertation examines attitudes 
toward immigrants in the specific case of Latin America. 
During roughly the same time period as the surge in migration, the Latin 
American region also underwent watershed changes in its political development. At the 
end of 1977, all but two of the Latin American countries were under authoritarian rule of 
one sort or another. Thirty years later that situation has reversed itself, with at least 
formally democratic regimes now the norm. With the demise of authoritarian rule in most 
of the countries of the Southern Cone, the end of armed conflicts in much of Central 
America, and the political liberalization of Mexico during the 1990s, a critical question 
facing scholars of this democratization process is the durability and quality of democracy 
                                                 
1
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 2 
in the region. Having survived twenty years of oftentimes extreme economic volatility, 
persistently high levels of poverty and economic inequality, many scholars have 
proclaimed the region’s wave of democracy is here to stay with a return of military rule 
highly unlikely. But the quality of these surprisingly durable democratic regimes remains 
in question, with events of recent years raising even more doubts about the democratic 
legitimacy of many of the region’s political systems. 
With the confluence of these two unprecedented events over the past three 
decades – a significant increase in migration and a monumental shift in the political 
development patterns of the region that has seemed to finally cement democratic rule as 
the norm across most of the Americas, it is somewhat surprising that few scholars have 
explored the connection between democracy and migration.  
 Because there is an increasing flow of immigration not only in Latin America, 
but across different regions around the world, it is extremely difficult for governments to 
enforce policies that would stop immigration immediately. Immigrants, therefore, 
become a new minority group in host societies. How citizens react to these new 
immigrant groups is essential in understanding how citizens may treat each other in the 
future and how these relationships may affect the quality of democracy more generally. 
Hence, the central questions of this dissertation are: What are the causes and 
consequences of the wide range of native-born reactions to migrants around the world?  
Why is it that some citizens express positive attitudes toward foreigners, while many 
others want to kick all migrants out of their country? What do these attitudes, both 
positive and negative, imply for a world increasingly defined by the movement of people 
 3 
across national borders? My effort to answer these questions revolves around the 
connection between attitudes towards immigrants and more general democratic attitudes. 
While democracy is highly supported both in developed and developing countries 
(Klingemann 1999; Puddington 2009), an increasing number of citizens under democratic 
political systems also enjoy better protection of their rights and these provide a basis for 
democratic attitudes (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003). I contend that the attitudinal 
components of what many refer to as a democratic political culture contribute to a more 
migrant-friendly perspective among native-born citizens. This more welcoming 
environment in turn helps a democratic society more successfully manage a sudden influx 
of migrants than societies where anti-immigrant attitudes may in turn cause increased 
violence and threats to the rule of law and other critical features of democracy.  
 This chapter begins with a theoretical discussion of why support for democratic 
values may matter for attitudes toward migrants, followed by a brief discussion of Latin 
American migration’s increasing political saliency at the national, regional, and 
international levels. It continues with a discussion of what has not yet been reviewed in 
both democracy and migration scholarship. 2 This chapter concludes with a discussion of 
the research design where the strengths and weaknesses of each of the concepts and 
measures employed in this study are examined as well as the basis on which the findings 
of my research will be evaluated.  
                                                 
2
 Both Latin American emigration and immigration. Emigration refers to the ―exodus of people from their 
country of origin for settlement, usually permanently, in a new country‖ and immigration refers to the 
―movement of person across national borders for purposes other than travel or short-term residence‖ (9) in 
Messina, Anthony, and Gallya Lahav, eds. 2006. The migration reader: exploring politics and policy. 
Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
 4 
Why Does a Democratic Political Culture Matter for Immigration? 
Across the developing world, the massive influx of migrants, be they economic or 
political refugees, has historically placed tremendous pressure on a political system’s 
capacity to respond to the increased strain on its infrastructure. Often these increased 
strains have manifested themselves in citizens’ attitudes toward the emergent democracy 
itself, sometimes leading to calls for a more repressive response to the influx of migrants. 
For example, in one study, the relationship between immigration and authoritarian 
attitudes suggested that the fear of immigration had a significant effect on authoritarian 
attitudes (Seligson et al. 2006). That study concluded that the perception of a threat could 
have repercussions for the future of democracy since increasing levels of immigration can 
lead to an increase in political intolerance, activating authoritarian attitudes and thus 
supporting an authoritarian system. The study also pointed out that immigration brings 
positive elements to a democracy: immigrants stimulate commerce and capital, increase 
diversity, and introduce new ideas.  Therefore, if the receiving country closes its borders, 
it stands to lose all these elements, which are essential in maintaining a stable democracy. 
 As a result of the potential link between immigration and system stress, it is 
useful not only to understand how immigration affects citizens’ views toward democracy, 
but also how preexisting attitudes toward democracy might help prepare citizens to react 
to a dramatic increase in immigration in a more tolerant and democratic manner. By 
identifying the attitudinal correlates of more migration-tolerant citizens, scholars may 
also be taking an additional step in being able to better identify democratic attitudes in 
which democracy itself has a greater chance of survival. The fundamental thesis of this 
dissertation is that a strong democratic political culture matters for citizens’ positive 
 5 
treatment of foreigners because if anti-democratic responses to immigration escalate to 
the general population, it will likely erode social cohesion, increasing distrust and 
intolerant responses against minority groups that may erode the quality of democracy. 
This becomes especially relevant in today’s world where the movement of people across 
borders is becoming the more and more salient. 
 
Why is Migration Gaining Political Saliency in Latin America? 
Latin America, a region that until the 1950s was considered a point of arrival for 
many Europeans, today has become one of the leading sending regions in the world with 
an increase from an estimated 1.6 million emigrants in 1960 to close to 11 million in 
1990, suggesting an increase over 100 percent in the stock of Latin American emigrants.
3
 
By 2005, 28.3 million persons emigrated, which corresponds to 5.1 percent of the 
region’s population. At the same time, immigration in Latin America currently represents 
5.8 million persons or one percent of the population.
4
   
Furthermore, remittances have increased tremendously in the last decade reaching 
$69.2 billion by 2008 from $24.4 billion in 2002.
5
 These figures show how Latin 
American and the Caribbean has been the region with the most dynamic growth in the 
world in terms of reception of remittances: it accounted for 32.2 percent of the global 
total in 2002.
6
 In spite of the many challenges migrant workers and their families faced in 
2008 as a result of the global economic crisis, the reception of remittances remains an 
                                                 
3
 See, <http://faculty.randolphcollege.edu/bbullock/335pdf/pellegrino.pdf> 
4
 See, <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1199807908806/LAC.pdf> 
5
See, < http://www.sela.org/public_html/AA2K4/ING/docs/Poleco/migra/Di3.pdf> 
<http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=1910986> 
<http://www.ifad.org/events/remittances/maps/latin.htm> 
6
 Ibid 
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important source of economic revenue in the region. The economic impact that these 
remittances have had on millions of individuals is well documented, representing more 
than half the income of 30 percent of remittance recipients, helping to keep these families 
out of poverty.
7
 At the macroeconomic level, migrant workers continue to make a 
remarkable contribution to their home countries. Seven of the region’s nations receive 12 
percent or more of GDP from their families abroad, such are the cases of Haiti, Guyana, 
Jamaica, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala. In many of these countries, 
remittances have become the first or second revenue before exports, tourism, and foreign 
investment (UNDP 2009). 
Consequently, various political, economic, and social actors at different levels, 
including international organizations, governments, and civil society have come to 
recognize the political and economic significance that migration has attained in recent 
years. Not only a considerable number of publications on the subject matter are 
emerging, but also conferences at the national, regional, and international levels are 
proliferating. One example of migration’s international relevancy was revealed in former 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan’s statement, ―International 
migration is a fundamental attribute of our ever-shrinking world. Managing this 
migration for the benefit of all has become one of the great challenges of our age‖ (Kofi 
Anna, Dec 19, 2005).
8
 Not long after his proposal, the Belgian government offered to 
host the first Global Forum on Migration and Development that took place in July, 2007 
in Brussels and was followed by global meetings in 2008 and 2009 in Manila and Athens, 
respectively. Similarly, the International Organization for Migration (OIM) has played a 
                                                 
7
 Ibid 
8
 See, 
<http://www.gcim.org/mm/File/Kofi%20Annan%20speaks%20on%20migrants%20day%2018.12.05.pdf> 
 7 
more active role in the assistance and development of migration policy around the world. 
For instance, membership rose from 67 states in 1998 to 127 states in 2009; during the 
same time period, field location grew from 119 to more than 440 and active projects from 
686 to 2030, with much of its activity in Latin America.
9
 
At the regional level, South America is experiencing important transformations 
with regards to international migration policy since the 1990s. With a significant 
percentage of its population now residing in the developed world and, to a lesser extent, 
in neighboring countries, an ascending number of bilateral agreements are taking place 
between South American and European countries as well as between intra-regional 
countries, focusing on reciprocity and co-responsibility (Domenech 2008; Gómez 2004; 
Mármora 2009; Sandoval 2004). All these changes have been occurring in the process of 
regional integration, such as la Comunidad Andina de Naciones  and el Mercado Comun 
del Sur (MERCOSUR), and regional forums on migration as la Conferencia Regional de 
Migraciones, specifically known as el Proceso Puebla (1996) and la Conferencia 
Sudamericana de Migraciones (CSM) that have yearly met since 2000 (Domenech 2008; 
Sandoval 2004). As a matter of fact, I had the unique opportunity to attend the IX CSM 
meeting that took place in Quito, Ecuador in September, 21-22 of 2009. In this formal 
meeting attended by government officials representing 10 regional countries, the 
Declaration of Quito was put into effect.
10
  
At the individual level, migrants have become more knowledgeable of their rights 
and have played a more active role in demanding them. Specifically, there has been a 
propagation of various migrant organizations in receiving and sending countries that 
                                                 
9
 See, <http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/about-iom/organizational-structure/lang/en> 
10
 For a detailed understanding of the points covered during this meeting, refer to 
<http://www.senami.gov.ec/content/view/344/94/> 
 8 
concentrate their efforts in the assistance and protection of migrants and their families. 
From what used to be a concern over the brain-drain problem, now the focus is on the 
respect for migrants’ human rights (Domenech 2008, Mármora 2009). Therefore, there is 
a growing interest by members of civil society and governments in topics related to 
migration. For example, governments of forty five countries around the globe ratified the 
United Nations Convention related to ―Human Rights of Migrant Workers and their 
Families‖ that has been in effect since 1990. Eight of these 45 countries were from South 
America, corresponding to 80 percent of governments in the region (Mármora 2009, 28).  
Moreover, Conferences organized by members of civil society have taken place, such as 
―Jornadas Hemisfericas sobre Politicas Migratorias, carried out on a yearly basis since 
2006. The purpose of these Conferences is to voice members of civil society in themes 
related to migration.
11
 I also had the great opportunity to attend the III Jornada 
Hemisferica carried out in Quito, Ecuador in the days previous to the IX CMS meeting.  
Another example of migrants’ increasing visibility is that governments of sending 
countries have recognized the importance of granting voting rights to their citizens living 
abroad in their local elections (e.g., Colombia approves voting abroad in 1962, Peru in 
1979, Brazil in 1988, Argentina in 1993, Venezuela in 1998, Uruguay in 2005, Mexico 
and Ecuador in 2006). At the same time, these governments are regularizing many 
thousands of immigrants domestically, allowing the concomitant expansion of emigrants 
and immigrants rights (Mármora 2009, 25). The latest instance of foreigners’ 
regularization in Latin America occurred in Brazil with around 40,000 immigrants to be 
                                                 
11
 See, <http://www.migranteecuatoriano.gov.ec/content/view/2604/393/> 
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benefited by this measure. The majority among these immigrants originates from Bolivia 
(El Comercio 2009).
12
  
All of these events point to the emerging political significance that migration has 
gained in recent years with a more active role of several actors at various levels, going 
from a higher participation by international organizations, governments, civil society to 
the formal recognition and extension of civil, social, economic, political, and cultural 
rights of emigrants and immigrants. In short, migration is increasing its role in the world. 
In practical terms, many countries and regions around the globe, including Europe and 
the U.S. need migration to cover labor shortages in the agricultural, construction, and 
industrial sector, among others (Donato and Bankston 2008).  Other regions (e.g. Africa 
and Middle East), on the other hand, have faced wars or natural disasters that have 
produced a significant number of refugees in neighboring nations.  Hence, it becomes 
essential to understand what the sources of immigrant opinion are and how citizens treat 
foreigners because it can be seen as an indication of how citizens may treat each other in 
the future. Given the broadness of themes related to migration, in this dissertation, I focus 
on the impact of democratic values on pro-immigrant sentiment in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. This subject has been largely unstudied in the context of the developing world 
in both migration and democracy scholarship.  
 
What is Left Out From The Study of Migration and Democracy? 
While the study of migration has mainly centered on its economic, social, and 
cultural effects, little attention has been paid to its political effects. Economists have 
looked at the impact of immigration on citizens’ wages in host countries (Borjas 2003; 
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 See, <http://ww1.elcomercio.com/noticiaEC.asp?id_noticia=325443&id_seccion=5> 
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Borjas and Freeman 1992; Card 1990; Card 2001; Hatton and Williamson 2008) and as 
an important revenue source for the developing world in the form of economic 
remittances (Fajnzylber and López 2007; Wouterse and Taylor 2008). Sociologists and 
demographers have tended to focus on the impact of immigration on the cultural 
consequences in receiving countries (Blanco 2000; Huntington 2004; King 2000) or the 
impact of emigration on the erosion of family ties in sending states (Herrera and Carrillo 
2005; Salazar 2007). Political scientists, however, have devoted little attention to the 
political effects of migration, with most concentrating either on migration-policy in 
receiving countries (Weiner 1985; Zolberg 1981) or the political integration of migrants 
into their host political system (e.g., voting behavior of Latinos in the U.S.) 
(Ramakrishnan 2005; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001). The vast majority of this 
research has focused almost exclusively on the developed world without delving too 
much in its implications for the developing world.  
By the same token, the study of democracy in Latin America has moved forward 
from transitions, to consolidation, and most recently to the quality of democracy as it has 
proven to persist as a form of government in the region during the past three decades 
(Altman and Pérez-Liñán 2002; Beetham 2004; Hagopian and Mainwaring 2005; 
O'Donnell 2004a; Powell 2004). Scholars that examine the quality of democracy have 
mainly focused on the various dimensions of a ―good‖ democracy such as freedom, 
participation, competition, equality, rule of law, vertical and horizontal accountability, 
government responsiveness, and system support among the mass public (e.g., De Souza 
Briggs 2008; Diamond and Morlino 2004; Diamond and Morlino 2005; Hagopian and 
Mainwaring 2005; Hutcheson and Korosteleva 2006; O'Donnell 2004b; Schmitter 2004). 
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Yet the rapid increase in emigration rates across the region rarely enter into the 
discussion of what helps or hurts the move toward higher quality democracies. Nor does 
the more case-specific phenomenon of high immigration rates in developing democracies 
receive much consideration. Students of democracy, furthermore, have focused on the 
sources that affect positively or negatively citizens’ support for democratic values 
without paying too much attention to the implications of a strong democratic political 
culture. 
 
What is The Relationship between Democratic Values and Attitudes toward 
Immigrants? Theory: A Brief Account  
Traditionally, the literature on the formation and deepening of democratic values 
suggests that an increasing number of citizens under democratic political systems enjoy 
better protection of rights and these provide a basis for democratic attitudes (Peffley and 
Rohrschneider 2003). Similarly, democratic values have emerged across both the 
developed and developing world (Klingemann 1999; Puddington 2009; Inglehart 1988, 
1990, 1997). However, there has been little research on the implications of support for 
democratic values. 
In order to maintain stable democracies, not only is support for a democratic 
political system necessary, but also support for democratic values, such as political 
tolerance. More specifically, support for a democratic system does not necessarily mean 
that citizens are also tolerant toward minority groups who live under the same political 
system. While the majority of citizens support democratic rights, these same groups ―are 
usually considerably less likely to extend these rights to disliked groups‖ (Peffley and 
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Rohrschneider 2003, 243). Therefore, stable systems could be at risk when the rights of 
the minorities are not guaranteed, given that if the support for the system is very high and 
political tolerance is low, a society could become authoritarian (Seligson and Córdova 
1993). In addition, a possible outcome from high levels of system support is people’s 
unwillingness to criticize their government’s decisions whether they are right or wrong. 
This is seen as strengthening people’s national identity and developing a sense of ―blind‖ 
patriotism in which people tend to be less accepting of outsiders (Schatz, Staub, and 
Lavine 1999).  
Some researchers contend that intolerant attitudes could put at risk those who are 
the target of political intolerance by manifesting itself in a general increase of violence 
against ―unpopular‖ groups. Moreover, intolerance not only threatens established 
democratic systems, but it makes democratic transitions difficult by undermining the 
consolidation of democracy if citizens constantly target minority groups by for example 
denying basic human rights, supporting restrictive policies, and even responding in 
violent aggressive behavior against these minorities, undermining the social foundation 
of democracy (eg., Gibson and Duch 1993; Prothro and Grigg 1960; Sullivan, Pierson, 
and Marcus 1982).
13Citizens therefore must reconsider their differences toward ―disliked 
groups‖ in order to coexist harmoniously under the same political system (Marcus et al. 
1995). Political tolerance becomes a fundamental value for the consolidation of a 
democratic political culture, especially in countries where increasing levels of 
immigration have quickly turned immigrants into a ―disliked‖ group. 
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 For a more exhaustive study on political tolerance, see any of the works of Gibson and McClosky listed 
in the reference list. 
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Additionally, interpersonal trust is also significant because it allows for general 
interactions between individuals that come from dissimilar backgrounds and who hold 
different views and values, stimulating political tolerance (Córdova 2008). These actions 
are believed to reinforce democracy (Fukuyama 1995; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; 
Putnam 1993; Putman 2000; Uslaner 2002). For all of these reasons, citizens’ support for 
democratic values becomes essential for the acceptance (or rejection) of immigrants who 
have become an important social component in the democratic political system of 
receiving countries.  
Through extensive field research in Ecuador along with analysis of survey data 
collected across Ecuador and Latin America, I seek to tap into and understand how 
democratic values shape citizens’ attitudes toward migrants. 
 
Case Selection and Preliminary Evidence 
As mentioned above, Latin America has become one of the leading sending 
regions in the world with approximately 28.3 million persons living abroad by 2005. At 
the same time, despite its lower levels of immigration compared to emigration levels, 
Latin America still faces intra-regional migration of about 5.8 million persons.
14
 Recent 
literature on migration, however, mainly focuses on the effects of migration in the 
advanced industrial world, while the subject of intra-regional immigration in the 
developing world remains little studied, with the exception of the large number of 
migrants to the oil rich states of the Middle East. 
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 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1199807908806/LAC.pdf 
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Source: World Values Survey 2000
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Figure 0.1. How about people from other countries coming here to work.  
Which one of the following do you think the government should do? 
 
 
Figure I.1 shows a global view toward immigration policy by using data from 
World Values Survey 2000; more specifically, how citizens feel toward foreigners 
coming to work in their home countries. Latin American nations clearly stand out as 
having comparable immigrant perceptions to traditional immigration countries, such as 
Canada and the United States, and more recently, Spain. In fact, Latin American 
countries generally demonstrate more positive views toward immigration policy than do 
the United States, for instance. 
Argentina and Chile show that no less than 45 percent of their populations believe 
that people from other countries should come as long as jobs are available. Mexico 
reveals the highest anti-immigrant sentiment out of the six countries, depicted by a 
significant number of its population (19 percent) agreeing to prohibit people from other 
countries to work in Mexico. These results may reflect some of the issues this nation 
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currently faces in terms of ―transit migration.‖ Mexico has gradually become a country of 
transit for many migrants from Central America (e.g., Guatemala, Nicaragua, and 
Honduras) as a way to get to the United States. But because of the strengthening in 
security measures in the Mexican-American border, many of these migrants end up 
staying in Mexico (Cruz 2004; El Comercio 2010).
15
 
In this dissertation, my objective is to examine attitudes toward immigrants in 14 
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, explained more extensively in the 
following section. In addition, one of the goals of this research is to study in more depth 
immigrant perceptions in one country, Ecuador, as this country is experiencing both sides 
of the same phenomenon (emigration and immigration); these points of exposure allows 
the researcher to have more leverage in establishing the causal mechanisms of the 
relationship between democratic support and immigrant opinion. This study examines the 
attitudes of Ecuadorian citizens as well as Ecuadorians emigrants. In the latter case, my 
intention is to evaluate if Ecuadorians emigrants show more positive attitudes toward 
foreigners in the country of origin given their condition as immigrants themselves in host 
societies. One would expect that immigrants by working and living in more developed 
societies will acquire new ideas and behaviors. If their experiences are positive, these 
individuals may be expected to have a greater support for democratic values and, in turn, 
a positive opinion toward immigrants in their country of origin. All these ideas will be 
tested in the Chapter focusing on Ecuador. 
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 See, http://www.elcomercio.com/noticiaEC.asp?id_seccion=5&id_noticia=345745 
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Data and Methods 
In this project, I attempt to incorporate attitudes toward immigration as a key 
subject in public opinion research on democracy in the context of the developing world, 
by combining the best of both quantitative and qualitative research. As it is widely 
accepted, quantitative methods allow for a more powerful theory testing and external 
validity relying on larger number of cases (King, Keohane and Verba 1994; Lijphart 
1971). In contrast, quantitative research allows for theory development and internal 
validity with its focus on the analysis of smaller number of cases. With fewer cases, 
greater knowledge of each case is possible (Collier 1995; Mahoney and Goertz 2006; 
Tarrow 1995). This study, specifically, relies on a multi-method approach that combines 
the analysis of public opinion data with semi-structured interviews. 
 
Quantitative Strategy 
Because of the lack of a systematic approach of the literature on the consequences 
of a strong democratic political culture, this dissertation seeks to examine, for the first 
time, public opinion data from 14 countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region 
through the implementation of various statistical techniques. The survey data come from 
data collected by the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt 
University. The AmericasBarometer 2008 dataset by LAPOP includes over 40,000 
responses about political attitudes and behaviors of citizens in twenty-four Latin 
American and Caribbean countries as well as the United States and Canada. The 
restricted sample (including migration questions), however, consists of 24,255 
respondents. 
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As a member of LAPOP, I had the unique opportunity to include two questions 
directly related to this research. Both of these questions were included in national surveys 
of the United States, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, El Salvador, 
Mexico, Panama, Dominican Republic, Belize, Venezuela, Uruguay, and Costa Rican 
and three more questions in the specific case of Ecuador. These questions were carefully 
reviewed by the LAPOP team and were pre-tested on the field in every country 
mentioned above, a procedure that has as an objective to ensure that respondents 
understand clearly the question. I personally carried out pre-tests at the initial stages of 
the questionnaire design in the Dominican Republic (December 2007). The survey items 
related to immigration included in these data are: ―To what degree do you agree that the 
(country) government provides social services such as healthcare, education, housing, to 
foreigners who come to live or work in this country? Strongly agree, somewhat agree, 
neutral, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree” and “Would you say that the people 
who come to live here from other countries do the jobs that (country’s citizens, e.g., 
Jamaicans) do not want to do, or generally take jobs away from (country’s citizens)?”   
Both measures have several advantages. For example, these items measure the 
degree of acceptance of immigrants in one’s country. One disadvantage is that it does not 
specify an immigrant group. But the fact that respondents are free to choose the 
immigrant group they see as most relevant in their daily lives render these items more 
accurate.  
By the same token, as one of the goals of this research is to examine the case of 
Ecuador in more detail, I use the Ecuadorian 2008 LAPOP dataset which includes three 
extra items related to attitudes toward immigrants. The following questions ask: “the 
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problems of crime in Ecuador are deteriorated or improved by the people from other 
countries who come to live here?,” “Would you say that the Ecuadorian culture is 
generally weakened or enriched by the people from other countries who come to live 
here?” and “Would you say that it is good or bad for the Ecuadorian economy that 
people from other countries come to live here?” 
 
Qualitative Strategy 
The high-quality standard LAPOP employs on its surveys guarantees that the 
public opinion data is free from some of the issues often found when doing public 
opinion research in Latin America (Seligson 2005). Still, there are many limitations 
inherited in quantitative research that weakens its analytical leverage (Zaller 1992; Zaller 
and Feldman 1992). A more qualitative approach offers an effective way to address some 
of these issues by allowing an extensive analysis of what are individuals thinking when 
they provide answers.  
With the purpose of gaining more theoretical leverage in migrants’ perceptions 
toward democracy and migration in Ecuador, several semi-structured interviews were 
carried out to complement the public opinion data analyses. The qualitative methods 
employed consist of semi-structured interviews with citizens (migrant organization 
leaders, Ecuadorian migrants, their families and friends back in Ecuador) in Ecuador.
16
 
Other fieldwork activities include informal interviews with taxi drivers, restaurants 
owners, employees, etc.  
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 Fieldwork activities were approved by Vanderbilt IRB on September 2008 (IRB #080958). A copy of the 
approval notification can be found in Annex A1. 
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Even though the bulk of the research included in this dissertation relates to field 
research in Ecuador (explained later), I also did fieldwork in Europe, as part of a larger 
project.
17
 This approach includes various semi-structured interviews and one group 
interview that were carried out in Spain, mainly in Madrid and Murcia, two cities where a 
high percentage of Ecuadorian migrants reside (Table I.1.).
18
 
 
Table 0.1. Interviews Carried Out During Nov. and Dec. 2008 and April 2009 in Spain 
 
Face to Face Formal Interviews 
 Madrid Murcia Total 
Males 14 3 17 
Females 11 9 29 
Total 25 13 37 
 
 
During the first stage of fieldwork in Spain, in November 2008, I held several 
interviews with females (7) and males (10) and one interview with the head of the 
National Secretariat for Migrants (SENAMI) in Madrid. In December 2008, I held four 
formal interviews with females and two with males and one group interview with middle-
aged women in Murcia (5). During the same visit, I also was able to interview the 
president of the Federation of Ecuadorians in Murcia. Finally, in April of 2009, I 
interviewed few other Ecuadorians (3 males and 3 females) and the president of the 
Ecuadorian Association of Llano Grande in Madrid. 
                                                 
17
 Overall, fieldwork in Madrid and Murcia took place in November-January 2008 and March-April 2009. 
18
 The figures for Madrid and Cataluña correspond to approximately 34.87% and 17.80% respectively, of 
the total Ecuadorian migrant population in Spain. See Herrera, Gioconda, Alicia Torres, Alberto Valle, 
Alexander Amezquita, and Susy Rojas. 2006. ECUADOR: Las cifras de la migración internacional. Quito: 
UNFPA and FLACSO. 
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The collection of these data, in fact, sparked my interest in investigating further 
the sources of immigrant opinion in Latin America. Given that the original goal of my 
research in Europe was the better understanding of the impact of migration on migrants’ 
political views and behaviors and how these views affect those left behind, the bulk of the 
questions asked were aimed toward this purpose.
 
Few interviews dealt with questions on 
immigration in Ecuador, as they were not asked directly, but rather respondents willingly 
provided opinions related to this subject.  These interviews helped me tremendously to 
gain greater knowledge on how citizen’s exposure to migration themselves had an effect 
on their views of immigrants in their country of origin (Ecuador). In addition, I 
maintained numerous informal conversations with individuals and groups of all 
socioeconomic levels during my fieldwork. The topic of these talks, as well as that of the 
formal interviews, was their views toward their host country, the differences they 
perceived between their host countries and Ecuador, and their influence on those left 
behind. Therefore, by carrying out research in Spain - in the process of interviewing 
Ecuadorian migrants - I also established contacts with those left behind in Ecuador. This 
procedure facilitated a final set of interviews with their families and friends during the 
summer of 2009 and other individuals that helped me understand in more depth this topic 
(Table I.2). 
The second stage of fieldwork took place in the Ecuadorian provinces of 
Pichincha, Loja, Azuay, and Cañar. Fieldwork activities in Ecuador were concentrated in 
various cities dealing with high rates of emigration as well as of immigration. I held 
fifteen interviews with common Ecuadorian males and females; and an interview with the 
mayor of Deleg in the province of Loja. A total of twenty interviews were also carried 
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out with common citizens in the provinces of Azuay and Cañar, including one priest of 
small town, Giron, in the province of Azuay and the sub-mayor of the city of Cañar 
(province of Cañar). 
 
Table 0.2. Interviews Carried out During Summer of 2009 in Ecuador 
 
Face to Face Formal Interviews 
 Loja Azuay Cañar Pichincha Total 
Males 13 7 4 4 28 
Females 6 8 1 6 21 
Total 19 15 5 10 49 
 
 
Written Interviews Administered to University Students  (Quito) 
Male 57 57 
Females 93 93 
Total 150 150 
 
 
Likewise, several members of the National Secretariat for Migrants (SENAMI) in 
Cuenca (capital of province of Azuay) and Quito were interviewed. Further, I decided to 
administer written-interviews to students of the Central University of Ecuador in Quito to 
improve my understanding of immigrant opinion among this portion of the population. 
Around 150 interviews were obtained from females and males of about 22 years old, on 
average. In few cases, students were 17-19 or 27-30 years old.  The collection of these 
data allowed me to untangle some causal mechanisms behind the hypotheses formulated. 
Some of the questions employed during these interviews parallel those shown in the 
description of the quantitative data. Fieldwork in Ecuador took place from the beginning 
of August to the end of September, 2009.  
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The implementation of qualitative methods has many advantages, such as an in-
depth analysis and interpretation of the meanings of various concepts one is trying to 
understand. In this case, it will deepen my understanding of how a strong democratic 
political culture may prepare citizens to react in a more tolerant manner. More 
importantly, approaching the study of migration through the implementation of both 
quantitative and qualitative analysis will help to minimize inaccurate and incomplete 
explanations (Brady and Collier 2004). 
 
Chapter Overview 
 Chapter Two reviews scholarly literature related to public opinion toward 
immigrants in developed democracies and establishes the theoretical framework of the 
importance of democratic values for the sustainability of democracy through its impact 
on such citizen’s attitudes as a positive reaction to a sudden influx of immigrants. I 
conclude with the hypotheses that derive from the theory. 
Chapter Three focuses on the impact of support for democratic values on attitudes 
toward immigrants in Latin America. Given that not much systematic research has been 
done on the effects of support for democratic values in general and rather the focus has 
usually been on what affects these attitudes, the purpose of this chapter is to introduce a 
general analysis of the consequences of a strong democratic political culture in the 
Americas. I present the empirical analyses and a general discussion of the relationship 
between democratic values and immigration in the region. 
Chapter Four concentrates on the analysis of four countries: Argentina, Chile, 
Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic. Through a historical review of migration flows 
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and migration policy in these countries, in addition, to a brief overview of economic and 
political development, my desire is to bring about a better understanding on how context 
matter for immigrant opinion.  
Chapter Five concentrates on the analysis of Ecuador as it presents a unique 
opportunity to study this phenomenon from its various dimensions. The objective of this 
chapter is to provide both quantitative and qualitative evidence for the impact of 
democratic support on immigrant sympathy in the specific case of Ecuador, a country that 
has experienced simultaneously a significant exodus of its population to the developed 
world (e.g., United States, Spain, and other European countries) and in a lesser extent to 
neighboring countries (e.g., Chile). 
Chapter Six concludes with a discussion of the broader implications of this 
research. The discussion addresses the potential benefits that democratic values have for 
democratic quality in the region as well for the reduction of social conflict and distrust 
that can stem from increasing immigration in an unstable economic and political context.  
Through an extensive analysis of what affects the formation of attitudes toward 
immigrants, I hope to elucidate the reasons of why maintaining and strengthening a 
democratic political culture in Latin America is fundamental, especially when many of 
these democracies still face many other challenges at present.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
DEMOCRACY AND IMMIGRATION 
 
 
A democratic citizen is one who believes in individual 
liberty and who is politically tolerant, who holds a 
certain amount of distrust of political authority but 
at the same time is trustful of fellow citizens, who is 
obedient but nonetheless willing to assert rights 
against the state, who views the state as 
constrained by legality, and who supports basic 
democratic institutions and processes 
(Gibson, Duch, Tedin 1992, 332) 
 
An initial conceptual step is to recognize that 
immigrants are neither strangers nor outsiders to 
their new communities  
    (Bach 1993, 170) 
 
 
 
 The study of immigration from the political science perspective has focused, for 
the most part, on the long and difficult process of immigrant political integration into a 
new culture, the economic and political system (Ramakrishnan 2005; Ramakrishnan and 
Espenshade 2001) or on migration policy in receiving countries (Weiner 1985; Zolberg 
1981). Research from this standpoint, however, has paid little attention to the 
consequences that growing levels of immigration pose to democratic stability or to the 
consequences of democratic support for citizens’ attitudes toward migration.  
 Given the understudied connection between immigration and system stress, it is 
useful not only to comprehend how immigration impacts citizens’ feelings toward 
democracy, but also how preexisting attitudes toward democracy might help prepare 
citizens to respond positively and democratically to a dramatic increase in immigration. 
By evaluating what factors generate more migration-acceptant citizens, researchers may 
also be taking an extra step in the identification of democratic attitudes. As stated in the 
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first chapter of this dissertation, besides countless well-known benefits of a strong 
democratic political culture for democracy, support for democratic values matters for 
citizens’ favorable reception of immigrants because it paves the way for a peaceful 
cohabitation between diverse groups that reside under the same political system, reducing 
social conflict. This in turn increases the quality of democracy, especially in a world 
increasingly characterized by the movement of people across borders. 
 Starting with Almond and Verba’s (1963) seminal work on the Civic Culture, 
many subsequent studies sustain the idea that support for democratic values is necessary 
for the development, maintenance, and consolidation of democracy (e.g., Dahl 1971; 
Dahl 1989; Dahl 1998; Inglehart 1988; Wildavsky 1987). Some of these values, 
according to Robert Dahl, include (1) belief in the legitimacy of the institutions of 
democracy (public contestation and participation); (2) belief in the vertical relationship 
between government and the governed; (3) confidence in the capacity of the government 
to deal effectively with the country’s problems; (4) high political and interpersonal trust; 
and (5) belief in the possibility and desirability of political cooperation in conjunction 
with a belief in the legitimacy of conflict. In short, a strong political culture depends on 
citizens’ beliefs of their relationships vis-à-vis the government as well as with their 
fellow citizens. And, as it has been well established, without all these elements that are 
essential for a democracy, the quality of well established democracies may be eroded. In 
the context of Latin America, the quality of these democracies may be further corroded 
because of widespread problems of corruption and crime that affect this region, 
decreasing the legitimacy of these democracies. 
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 When a significant arrival of immigrants takes place in receiving countries, it is 
extremely difficult for these governments to enforce policies that would stop immigration 
immediately (Andreas 1998-1999); immigrants, therefore, become a new minority group 
in host societies. From the perspective that sees the quality of a democratic system tied in 
important ways to how it treats its minority groups, then, it becomes crucial to understand 
variations in the manner immigrants are viewed and treated by native-born citizens. The 
fundamental thesis of this dissertation sees a democratic political culture, where citizens 
profess widespread support for democratic values, as an important determinant of how a 
society responds to a sudden influx of migrants. With a democratic political culture, the 
response to immigrants is one that seeks ways to successfully incorporate the migrants 
into the existing society and allow them to contribute to the betterment of the country as a 
whole. In situations where citizens do not exhibit high levels of support for the basic 
democratic values that make up a democratic culture, migrants will be more likely to face 
rising levels of nativist hostility, opposition to any government efforts to help migrants in 
their new country, and a heightened possibility of calls for authoritarian solutions to the 
―migrant problem.‖ When citizens express systematic hostile anti-immigrant attitudes, 
then, the quality of democracy further diminishes, especially in a region already touched 
by high levels of crime and corruption as it is that of Latin America. 
  It has been argued that if the perception of threat is intensified, it may trigger 
citizens’ ―authoritarianism‖ by eliciting intolerant attitudes among the citizenry (Stenner 
2005). And, in the context of high migration levels, it is not surprising that foreigners 
may be regarded as a threat to society’s values, background, culture, traditions, among 
others. This is the reason that high levels of support for democratic values matter in the 
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context of sudden surges of immigration because citizens are more likely to be prepared 
to react in a more tolerant and democratic fashion instead of engaging in aggressive 
behavior, including denial of basic human rights, endorsement of restrictive policies, and 
xenophobic responses (e.g., violent physical attacks against foreigners), undermining the 
foundations of a democratic society (Merolla and Zechmeister 2009). Thus, a strong 
democratic political culture enhances the quality of democracy because individuals will 
be willing to defend democracy and democratic values even amid dramatic unexpected 
events, such as high immigration surges.  
 This chapter attempts to incorporate attitudes toward immigration as a key subject 
in public opinion research on democracy. It begins with a scholarly literature review 
related to public opinion toward immigrants in industrial democracies, followed by the 
theoretical framework of the consequences of strong democratic political culture for the 
acceptance of minority groups in developing democracies. This chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the significance of this relationship for democracy in Latin America.  
 
Public Opinion19   
 Public opinion data across the developed world suggests a higher number of 
citizens support stricter limits on immigration. In 2006, 42 and 49 percent of the 
population in Spain and the United States, respectively, agree to impose limits on 
immigration compared to 22 and 39 percent in 1999, according to the World Values 
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 Clarke et al. (2001) emphasize the importance of public opinion because when immigration becomes a 
significant political issue, those attitudes have important policy implications, as shown in the cases of the 
United States, France, and most recently the European Union in general. Also, Money (1999) argues that 
―regional immigrant settlement patterns ensure that interest group disputes play out mainly at the level of 
gateway communities, whereas immigration policy making occurs at the national level. Thus, policy 
making may reflect either client politics or broader interest group demands, but policy shifts are likely only 
when immigrant communities becomes swing districts at the national level, causing national parties to 
pursue pro or anti-immigration voters‖ in Cornelius and Rosenblum (2005, 107). 
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Survey.
20
 These signs of public discontent appear to have manifested themselves in 
stricter immigration policy around the world. For instance, the latest migration policy 
implemented in the European Union allows the detention of undocumented migrants for 
up to 18 months before deportation (El Comercio 2008; New York Times 2008). Most 
recently, at the time of this writing, a new legislation was approved by the Arizona’s 
House of Representatives and signed by the governor. It authorizes the police to arrest 
foreigners suspected to be illegal (New York Times 2010).
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 It is worth noting that if an 
issue is salient, such as immigration, it is more likely that citizens take that issue into 
consideration on election day by holding officials accountable for their preferences 
(Haider-Markel 1999; Tatalovich and Daynes 1998; New York Times 2010).
22
  
Although an increasing wealth of literature focuses on the formation of attitudes 
toward immigrants (see, e.g., Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Palmer 1996; Citrin et al. 
1997; and most recently Ward and Masgoret 2008; Wilkes et al. 2008), a related literature 
explores the formation of attitudes toward minorities and how perceptions of difference 
affect people’s views of immigration as a whole. For instance, Morris (2000) is the first 
scholar to test inter-minority conflict theory in the U.S. context; this theory argues that 
there is a relationship between spatial proximity and animosity between racial and ethnic 
groups. Morris’s findings, however, did not support the theory; instead, they showed that 
African Americans who lived in areas with a large Asian population were more 
supportive of immigration and therefore more likely to vote against Proposition 187, a 
California initiative (November, 1994) that denies public services to undocumented 
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 See, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ 
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 See, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/15/us/15immig.html?pagewanted=1&sq=arizona%20 
immigration&st=cse&scp=1 
22
 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/17/world/europe/17barking.html 
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immigrants, such as health care and public education. Similarly, Fetzer (2000), in his 
study of attitudes toward immigrants in the United States, France, and Germany, 
demonstrated that cultural marginality—that is, belonging to a minority group—increases 
positive opinions toward immigrants.  
On the other hand, some research, surprisingly, indicates that Hispanic Americans 
living in areas with large illegal immigrant populations are more hostile to liberal 
immigration policies and often more likely to support individualism and patriotism than 
their Anglo-American counterparts (Burns and Gimpel 2000; De la Garza, Falcon, and 
Garcia 1996; Hood, Morris, and Shirkey 1997). By the same token, white voters in 
counties with large Latino populations demonstrate a stronger support for restrictive 
immigration policies, such as Proposition 187 (Tolbert and Hero 1996) .Yet other studies 
find no evidence for differences in opinion toward immigrants by race. Indeed, the 
majority of citizens have negative views toward immigration regardless of their ethnic 
self-identification (Chandler and Tsai 2001). In addition, in ethnically diverse 
neighborhoods residents of all races tend to be more distrustful of each other, even when 
one belongs to the same ethnic group (Putman 2007). 
Several investigations find that instead of personal economic conditions shaping 
opinions toward immigrants, it is beliefs about the national economy, concerns over 
taxes, and widespread negative feelings toward immigrants that galvanize restrictionist 
opinions. More specifically, those who believe that the national economy is stagnant or is 
not doing well are those who express negative views toward immigration (Burns and 
Gimpel 2000; Chandler and Tsai 2001; Citrin et al. 1997; Espenshade and Hempstead 
1996; Pantoja 2006). Other studies, however, demonstrate that concerns over national 
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identity are more of a driving force of negative opinions than concerns over economic 
interests (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004). 
Furthermore, people are more likely to have negative views toward immigrants 
and to support more restrictive policies when they have to compete for jobs, especially 
lower-wage jobs (Borjas 1999; Borjas 1989; Gang, Rivera-Batiz, and Yun 2002; Mayda 
2006; O'Rourke and Sinnott 2006; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Tucci 2005). In contrast, 
others argue that rather than stemming from direct job competition, immigrant attitudes 
are a product of one’s socioeconomic level; in general, individuals with higher levels of 
education are more likely to have positive views toward immigrants, irrespective of 
whether immigrants pose a threat to their jobs (Harris 2002, Pantoja 2006). In the case of 
Europe, people with higher education are generally more supportive of all types of 
immigration. This research concludes, therefore, that there is little connection between 
fears of labor market competition and negative views toward immigrants (Hainmueller 
and Hiscox 2007). 
 Similarly, people with more education are significantly more likely to accept 
other cultures, placing an important value on cultural diversity, and to believe that 
immigration benefits the national economy as a whole than those with less education 
(Gang, Rivera-Batiz, and Yun 2002; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Harris 2002; Haubert 
and Fussell 2006; Pantoja 2006; Tucci 2005; Ward and Masgoret 2008; Wilkes, Guppy, 
and Farris 2008). The implications of this research for our understanding of attitudes 
toward immigration in developing countries are worrisome, because the absolute number 
of poor, less-educated people is prevalent in these countries. If these findings hold 
regardless of the country’s development level, then we might expect to find widespread 
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anger and resentment toward immigrants in most developing countries, and such anger 
and resentment may quickly transform into a loss of support for the political system 
itself.  
 In order to understand better the role of contextual factors, besides individual 
level characteristics, researchers have also looked at the impact of the state of the 
economy, namely, economic development and unemployment rates; and the composition 
of the foreign population. Specifically, negative attitudes toward immigrants tend to be 
more pronounced in places with a large proportion of foreign born residents and where 
economic conditions are less prosperous (Gang, Rivera-Batiz, and Yun 2002; Kunovich 
2004; McLaren 2003; O'Rourke and Sinnott 2006; Quillian 1995; Semyonov, Raijman, 
and Gorodzeisky 2006; Wilkes, Guppy, and Farris 2008). Moreover, the 
institutionalization of laws and policies that address certain ethnic traditions or cultures 
are found to have an influence on citizen tolerance of minorities (Weldon 2006). Thus 
far, studies of public opinion in developed societies indicate that citizens vary 
substantially in their views toward foreign-born citizens (Lapinski et al. 1997; Simon and 
Lynch 1999; Simon and Sikich 2007). 
 Research on attitudes toward immigrants has mostly been concentrated in 
established democracies with very little attention to the context of the developing world 
(Orces 2009). Furthermore, citizens’ views on democracy rarely enter into the discussion 
of what influences citizens’ acceptance (or rejection) of foreigners. In the following 
pages, I will argue that support for democratic values, that is, support for a strong 
democratic political culture is in fact a central part of the puzzle explaining attitudes 
towards immigrants. This study attempts to contribute to both migration and democracy 
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scholarships by providing, for the first time, a comprehensive examination of the effects 
of individual and national level characteristics on attitudes towards immigrants in Latin 
America, a region where intraregional migration has gone largely ignored, despite being 
an increasingly common feature of Latin America’s demographics over the past forty 
years.  
  
Theory: Support for Democratic Values and Pro-Immigrant Sentiment 
Why is a strong democratic political culture important for both understanding 
attitudes towards immigrants and helping the move toward higher quality democracies 
amid high levels of migration in host societies? Because citizens are more likely to accept 
the presence of foreign-born residents when they express strong support for democratic 
values such as political support, interpersonal trust, political tolerance, belief in 
democratic legitimacy, and respect for human rights, among others (Norris 1999). In 
contrast, if citizens express low support for these values, the more likely they will reveal 
systematic hostile attitudes against foreigners, that in turn, may generate an environment 
supportive of authoritarian responses to the migration question (Hetherington and Weiler 
2009; Merolla and Zechmeister 2009; Stenner 2005). As mentioned in the beginning of 
this chapter, authoritarian responses become especially relevant when social cohesion is 
threatened by citizens’ aggressive behavior toward foreigners. These actions will lead to 
a profound social conflict that will prevent the move toward higher quality democracies, 
particularly in the context of weak democracies such as those found in Latin America and 
the Caribbean. This is the reason that citizens’ support for democratic values matter for 
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the betterment of the quality of democracy because citizens will be prepared to react in a 
more tolerant and democratic manner amid high migration inflows.   
  Democratic values refer to those underlying components of a democratic political 
culture related to the relationships between individuals within a society, such as political 
tolerance and interpersonal trust. However, citizens’ views toward democracy more 
generally may also be important factors shaping an individual’s views toward migrants.  
Following Norris et al.’s (1999) conceptualization of democratic political support and the 
five dimensions they see as forming the basis for this concept -- political community, 
regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions, and political actors, I explore 
both the role of specific attitudinal elements of a democratic culture as well as the 
varying effects of each component of democratic political support on views toward 
foreigners.   
It is important to note that Norris et al.’s five dimensions of a democratic political 
society may behave differently with respect to an individual’s views toward immigrants. 
For instance, it is plausible that a person who has high levels of support for democracy in 
principle, which theoretically may be the basis for more positive attitudes towards 
immigrants, may have very negative views of regime performance, and these negative 
attitudes likely produce negative attitudes toward immigrants. Put differently, an 
individual could support democratic principles and democracy as a system of 
government, but still be very critical of its political institutions and authorities, and these 
two sets of attitudes could have contradictory effects on that person’s views toward 
immigrants. Given the more fundamental nature of support for democracy and 
democratic principles, I view these as likely to trump other political system attitudes with 
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respect to how they help us understand attitudes toward immigrants. These ideas will be 
further explored in the following pages.  
The remainder of this chapter first examines research on the various dimensions 
of democratic political support highlighted by Norris et al (1999). I then focus on each 
individual element and discuss the theoretical link to an individual’s views towards 
immigrants. I continue with an assessment of how political tolerance and interpersonal 
trust may affect attitudes towards foreigners. Next, I highlight the important role that 
context plays in understanding reactions to immigrants and outline the theoretical impact 
of a country’s levels of democracy and economic development. I conclude with a 
discussion of the implications of democratic values for the acceptance of foreigners and 
the prospects for high quality democracies. 
 
Why is Democratic Political Support Important? A Multidimensional Concept 
 Democratic political support involves various dimensions such as support for the 
political community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions, and 
political actors (Dalton 2004; Dalton 2006; Easton 1965; Easton 1975; Easton 1976; 
Norris 1999).
23
 This section begins with a brief literature review of each of the 
components of democratic political support, followed by the theoretical assessment of 
each of these dimensions on immigrant sympathy. 
 Research on the first level of democratic political support, namely, support for the 
political community suggests that citizens’ degree of attachment to their political 
community reinforces democracy (Linz and Stepan 1996; Rustow 1970). If an individual 
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  David Easton (1965, 1975) concentrates in the analysis of political support by taking into consideration 
three dimensions: support for the political community, the regime, and the authorities. 
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feels a weak attachment to his/her political community, it also ―implies a weak 
commitment . . . to the values and procedures that are central for that political system‖ 
(Moreno 2008, 3). Yet except for a limited number of studies, there is little empirical 
evidence on support for the political community across time and across nations and how 
it relates to support for democracy (Davidov 2009; Klingemann 1999; Moreno 2008; 
Smith and Jarkko 2001) 
 Conversely, there are ample indications of a worldwide increase in support for 
democracy as the best form of government—even in countries where problems of 
corruption and violence are widespread (e.g., Nigeria, Ghana, Zambia, Haiti, Guatemala, 
ex Soviet nations) or where democracy is weakened by domestic and international 
turmoil, exemplified by the crisis in Honduras.
24
 Citizens across these nations continue to 
demonstrate fairly high levels of support for democracy in the abstract (e.g., Bratton and 
Mattes 2001; Pharr and Putnam 2000; Rose and Mishler 1996).
25
  
 Despite an evolving scholarship substantiating various dimensions for democratic 
political support, the remaining components of this support (i.e. satisfaction with 
democracy, support for democratic political institutions, and support for political actors) 
appear in decline. This pattern does not come as a surprise in developing democracies 
because these countries still face internal problems—high levels of unemployment, 
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 On June 28 of 2009, President Manuel Zelaya attempted to hold a referendum to run for reelection albeit 
the Supreme Court’s refusal. Former President Zelaya, however, decided to go ahead with the referendum 
that challenged the Supreme Court’s decision. Later on, this institution ordered the detention of Zelaya by 
the military, even though it was also unconstitutional. Zelaya was arrested by the army at his home on the 
same day the referendum was intended to take place and sent into exile to Costa Rica. Zelaya attempted to 
reenter the country several times following his expulsion and finally entered the country on September 21, 
under the protection of the Brazilian Embassy. In the aftermath of the coup d’etat in Honduras, many 
countries around the world condemned this event. At the time of this writing, Porfirio Lobo was elected as 
the new president of Honduras. Zelaya, on his part, left Honduras to reside in the Dominican Republic, 
while the government granted amnesty to those members of the military who participated in the coup.  See 
a detailed treatment of this case at www.infolatam.com 
25
 For a variety of studies on this subject in Latin America, see www.lapopsurveys.org 
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corruption, crime and violence, to name a few. Yet erosion for this support is further 
registered in established democracies, namely, the United States, Britain, Canada, and 
France, among others (Dalton 2004; Dalton 2006). Does a global decline of democratic 
political support put democracy at risk? Some argue that with low levels of this support, 
democracy is undermined (Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki 1975). Mounting evidence 
on this subject, however, suggests that critical citizens in fact help strengthen their 
systems, by allowing for the adaptation of democracy to citizens’ shifting demands 
(Dalton 2004; Norris 1999), in contrast to the belief that democracy is at risk.  
 What do all these mean for democracy amid high levels of immigration? I 
suggested in the beginning of this chapter that support for democratic values matters 
because democratic citizens will respond in democratic ways to dramatic, unexpected 
events such as a sudden influx of immigrants. Such responses will, in turn, reduce the 
likelihood to allow a permissive environment of anti-democratic responses, sometimes 
galvanized during hard economic and/or political times (Merolla and Zechmeister 2009). 
And, in the case of democratic political support, one would anticipate that citizens’ 
higher democratic support will lead to a more sympathetic view toward foreigners 
because citizens understand that democracy is important for the protection of minority 
rights even if these minority groups may be unpopular.  
 However, democratic political support is not a unidimensional concept as 
explained above, but rather consists of different elements that have opposite effects on 
immigrant opinion. As noted, individuals may score differently on these dimensions, with 
each reflecting distinct views towards immigrants as well. I will continue with a 
discussion of the theoretical expectations of each of the components of a democratic 
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political support: support for the political community, support for democracy in principle, 
and support for democracy in practice, that is, satisfaction with the way democracy 
works, support for institutions, and political authorities (Dalton 2004; Dalton 2006; 
Easton 1965; Easton 1975; Easton 1976; Norris 1999) and their linkage to immigrant 
opinion. 
 
Support for the Political Community  
Why is support for the political community important for the presence of 
immigrants in host societies? With an intensifying arrival of foreigners in receiving 
countries, citizens may express different attitudes toward their political system. Indeed, 
national identity is seen as belonging to an imagined political community ―because the 
members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members... yet 
in the minds of each lives the image of their communion‖ (Anderson 1983, 6; also see 
Blank, 2003). Yet, immigrants do not belong to this nation and a reaffirmation of 
immigrants’ perception as ―outsiders‖ is at play (Sniderman et al. 2000).  
Nationalism and patriotism are understood as two different dimensions of national 
identity. While nationalism ―supports homogeneity within society, blind obedience, and 
idealized excessive valuation of one’s own nation; patriotism supports heterogeneous 
structures within the society and a critical distance to the state and the regime‖ (Blank 
and Schmidt 2003, 306). Following this logic, nationalistic attitudes lead to a feeling of 
national superiority and a belittling of minorities and outsiders (Hechter 2000; Kosterman 
and Feshbach 1989; Sniderman et al. 2000). Also, citizens who hold their nation very 
high may be uncritical of their political institutions and authorities, thus, accepting 
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political decisions whether they are right or wrong (Meloen 1999; Schatz and Staub 
1997; Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999).
26
 
Patriotism, in contrast, is expected to increase tolerant attitudes provided that 
―patriotic citizens‖ are more conscious and more critical of their political system, 
especially if their leaders’ actions may pose a threat to democratic norms (Adorno et al. 
1950; Schatz and Staub 1997). For them ―the nation is not idealized, but is instead 
evaluated from the basis of a critical conscience‖ (Blank and Schmidt 2003, 291).  Most 
importantly, the endorsement of authoritarian attitudes is widely rejected and rather 
support for democratic values is essential (Blank and Schmidt 2003). Both of these 
concepts have not only been distinguished theoretically, but also empirically (Davidov 
2009). The relationship between national identity and attitudes toward immigrants leads 
us to expect that an elevated blind attachment of citizens to their nation (nationalism) will 
lead to negative views toward foreign born residents. On the contrary, higher levels of 
patriotism will lead to positive views toward this group because ―patriotic citizens‖ 
understand the importance of social cohesion.
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 Social Identity theory has served as a powerful instrument to explain much of attitudinal and behavioral 
denigration against particular groups as well as the rise of nationalism. It stems from various works by 
Tajfel and Turner (1979; 1986) and Tajfel (1981) and conjectures that the discrimination toward out-groups 
allows individuals to form and maintain positive social identities based on their in-group membership.  
Someone whose social identity or in the case of a nation—political identity, is threatened will most likely 
strengthen his/her identity through a positive differentiation of the in-group and a devaluation of the out-
group. For a detailed review on this literature, see Brown (2000). Likewise, SIT has been useful to develop 
theories of ethnocentrism (Kam and Kinder 2007; Kinder and Kam 2010). There is also an extensive 
literature on various group threat theories that originated from Blumer’s (1958) theory of racial attitudes. 
He attempts to give a comprehensive explanation of racial prejudice. Other variations of group threat 
theories include realistic group threat theory that states that members of the dominant group believe that 
they are entitled to certain resources, and when those resources are threatened by a minority group, 
dominant group members are likely to respond with hostility. In contrast to GTT, these theories emphasize 
that hostility toward out-groups is the result of a ―real threat.‖ Specifically, there is a real competition over 
resources (Bobo 1988; Bobo and Hutchings 1996). Some scholars have stretched this idea to symbolic 
threat theory which contends that not only a threat over economic resources is present, but also a threat to 
the values, morals, and traditions of the dominant group (Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears 1988). All of these 
theories have been extended to explain anti-immigrant sentiments (Chandler and Tsai 2001; Citrin et al. 
1997; Quillian, 1995) 
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In this section I have examined how the two dimensions of national identity – 
nationalism and patriotism - may be related to attitudes toward immigrants in receiving 
democracies. Next, I look at how support for democracy in the abstract and support for 
specific dimensions of a democratic political support are also strongly related to attitudes 
toward immigrants. 
 
Support for Democracy Principles and in Practice 
In addition to a citizen’s attachment to her political system, she will also exhibit 
varying degrees of support for democracy’s basic principles (Bratton and Mattes 2001; 
Norris 1999; Pharr and Putnam 2000; Rose and Mishler 1996). With the global increase 
in democracy over the past three decades, more and more citizens of these new 
democracies have come to understand the virtues of a democratic political system; for 
instance, the protection of citizens’ political rights and civic liberties—the right to vote, 
to be elected, to compete; the freedom of association, expression; and the requirement 
that elections are free and fair, etc. But how specifically can a citizenry cognizant of these 
rights contribute to democratic government? Rights consciousness contributes to 
democracy because it results in ―greater demands by the citizenry for the advancement 
and protection of individual and collective political, social, and economic rights‖ 
(Gibson, Duch, and Tedin 1992, 344). In the case of immigrants, nationals will react 
more favorably toward migration because they understand that a crucial dimension of 
democracy is the protection of minority’s rights. I anticipate, therefore, a positive direct 
relationship between support for democracy in the abstract and favorable views toward 
immigrants. 
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Democratic political support is also expressed by citizens’ satisfaction with the 
way democracy works, support for democratic political institutions, and support for 
political authorities. Given that citizens in democracies develop the notion of certain 
rights vis-à-vis their political institutions and authorities, they expect to enjoy the same 
rights as every citizen living in the same political system (Almond and Verba 1963). Why 
is this relationship important? Citizen relationship with political authorities is significant 
because a rights-conscious population represents ―an important check on the exercise of 
arbitrary power by governmental authorities‖ (Almond and Verba 1963, 483), that is, 
citizens will be willing to defend democratic governance while holding their authorities 
accountable. Likewise, elevated levels of rights awareness ―constrain institutions within 
democracies; they define citizens as active participants in governance, not as passive 
recipients of governance‖ (Gibson, Duch, and Tedin 1992, 345). Therefore, a more 
rights-conscious citizenry will encourage the push toward higher quality democratic 
societies.  
As indicated in the beginning of this section, an increasing scholarship reveals a 
decline in citizen satisfaction with democracy and a widening distrust in political 
institutions (e.g., legislatures, political parties, armed forces, etc.) and political leaders 
across countries. Individuals’ growing dissatisfaction is seen as a result of their shifting 
demands for better quality democracies (Dalton 2004; Dalton 2006; Norris 1999). Those 
most dissatisfied with the way their democracy is working are more likely to pursue 
extralegal forms of political participation while more formal modes of participation are 
more common among those who trust the government and are supportive of the regime 
(Almond and Verba 1963; Inglehart 1997; Putman 1993).  
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Besides new, potentially more violent, modes of political participation, another 
consequence of growing levels of dissatisfaction with democracy in practice is an 
increase in opposition to foreign-born residents. A common expression of this dynamic is 
―If democracy can’t deliver for me, why should ―outsiders‖ be allowed to make things 
even worse!‖ The foreign-born are seen as competitors for scarce resources while placing 
tremendous pressure on the political system’s capacity to respond to natives’ shifting 
demands. The same dynamic holds for those who distrust their political institutions and 
authorities: the more natives mistrust their main political institutions and leaders, the less 
likely they will tolerate the presence of immigrants. One reason for these unsympathetic 
feelings toward immigrants is that as citizens’ growing dissatisfaction with the 
performance of political institutions as well as their political leaders intensifies, the more 
they will blame their misfortunes on ―outsiders‖ because immigrants may become, in 
citizens’ view, the cause of these political institutions and actors’ underperformance.  
On the other hand, if citizens recognize that their institutions and governmental 
authorities are capable of satisfying their demands and if they relate the instrumental 
value of democracy with a ―working democratic political system,‖ then, individuals will 
be less opposed to ―outsiders‖ entitlement to resources and a peaceful life under the same 
regime. Citizens’ satisfaction with democracy in practice (including institutions and 
leaders) generates a more accepting culture for the arrival of immigrants because a 
working democracy proves to satisfy citizens’ needs and those of foreign born residents. 
 In short, democratic political support as expressed by support for the political 
community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions, and political 
actors has different consequences on how citizens view foreigners. I suggested that 
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individuals’ higher attachment to their political community will translate into either 
positive opinions toward immigrants when related to patriotism and negative opinions 
when related to nationalism. Similarly, a higher support for democracy in the abstract and 
in practice (including trust in political institutions and actors) will lead to favorable views 
toward immigrants because natives understand that one of democracy’s main features is 
the protection of minorities’ rights.   
 In this section I looked at the relationship between different dimensions of 
democratic political support and attitudes toward immigrants. Next, I evaluate two 
democratic variables I consider are central in the discussion of a strong democratic 
political culture: political tolerance and interpersonal trust, and how they are related to 
pro-immigrant sentiment. 
 
Why is Political Tolerance Important?  
Support for a democratic system does not necessarily mean that citizens are 
tolerant toward minority groups who live under the same political system. While the 
majority of citizens support democratic rights, these same groups ―are usually 
considerably less likely to extend these rights to disliked groups‖ (Peffley and 
Rohrschneider 2003, 243). Therefore, stable systems could be at risk when the rights of 
the minorities are not guaranteed, given that if the support for the system is very high and 
political tolerance is low, the society could become authoritarian (Seligson and Córdova 
1993). In addition, a possible outcome from high levels of system support, as already 
discussed in the previous section, is people’s unwillingness to criticize their 
government’s decisions whether they are right or wrong. This is seen as strengthening 
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people’s national identity and developing a sense of ―blind patriotism‖ in which people 
tend to be less accepting of outsiders (Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 1999).  
In order to maintain stable democracies and accelerate the move toward higher 
quality democracies, not only is support for a democratic political system necessary, but 
also needed is support for democratic values, such as political tolerance. If political 
tolerance, understood as the respect of citizens’ right to express themselves politically 
whether we agree with them or not, is absent  
 
―the marketplace of ideas is constrained, and competition among 
ideas cannot flourish. Without such competition, citizens may be denied 
the opportunity to support the political movements of their choice, 
political freedom may be lost, and democratic accountability may be 
undermined. Thus, the activities that must be tolerated in a liberal 
democracy are, at a minimum, those involving political competition— 
organizing, taking one’s message to the people, competing in elections, 
etc‖ (Gibson 2006, 23).  
 
 
 
 Some researchers contend that intolerant attitudes could increase and could put at 
risk those who are the target of political intolerance (Gibson and Duch 1993; Prothro and 
Grigg 1960; Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus 1982). Intolerant attitudes have important 
implications as ―such attitudes and behaviors may threaten the very fabric of democracy 
by singling out particular groups as second-class citizens, which may lead to treatment 
and policies that deny equal rights and equal protection‖ (Merolla and Zechmeister 2009, 
12). Citizens therefore must reconsider their differences toward ―disliked groups‖ in 
order to coexist harmoniously under the same political system (Marus et al. 1995; 
Stouffer 1955). This is the reason that political tolerance becomes a fundamental value 
for the consolidation of a democratic political culture, especially in countries where 
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increasing levels of immigration have quickly turned immigrants into a ―disliked‖ 
group.
27 
 
 Usually, political tolerance is thought as a belief that is linked to a larger set of 
views about democratic political institutions and processes. For example, citizens who 
believe in the main institutions of majority rule in which the protection of the rights of 
minorities is institutionalized, they are more likely to tolerate ethnic minorities (Weldon 
2006) as well as their most despised political enemies (Gibson 2006). A corollary to this 
statement is that high levels of political tolerance will lead to a higher acceptance of 
foreign born citizens in spite of the fact that this group has turned out to be particularly 
unpopular. This section continues with the analysis of social trust. 
 
Why is Social Trust important? 
Social trust represents one of the main elements of social capital theory, which 
refers to the social connections, networks, and interpersonal trust that take place in 
communities and how these affect the way democracy works (Putnam 1993, 1995, 2000). 
Putman suggests that civic participation and interpersonal trust strengthen each other. For 
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 Along the lines of research on tolerance, there has been an increasing literature on authoritarianism 
suggesting that negative attitudes toward foreigners or immigration policy are the product of citizens’ 
authoritarian predispositions, which refers to citizens’ strong preference for conformity and uniformity 
(Feldman 2003; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and 
Prior 2004; Stenner 2005). Logically, immigrants are the epitome of difference, therefore, more likely to be 
perceived as a threat to social norms and values (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; 
Marcus et al. 1995). Stenner (2005) argues that authoritarianism becomes germane especially when social 
cohesion is threatened; more specifically, when the culture appears to be segmented by a growing presence 
of foreigners. Furthermore, authoritarianism, according to her, is harmful when the ―out-group is 
denigrated‖ and the ―ingroup is glorified.‖ In the case of foreigners, these are viewed as a threat to society’s 
traditions, eliciting intolerant attitudes among the citizenry. It is worth noting that authoritarian 
predispositions and attitudes are two different concepts, but strongly linked. While authoritarian 
predispositions refer to steady predispositions that tap into the extent to which an individual/s values group 
unity and obedience in contrast to individual autonomy and diversity, authoritarian attitudes  are more 
broad opinions related to moral, political, and racial intolerance (Merolla and Zechmeister 2009, 77). The 
extent to which an individual holds authoritarian predispositions will predict levels of authoritarian 
attitudes. 
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the purpose of this study, I will focus on social trust and its influence in pro immigrant 
sentiments. 
Numerous definitions of ―social trust‖ can be found in the literature; for instance, 
Newton (1999) defines social trust as ―the belief that others will, so far as they can, look 
after our interests, that they will not take advantage or harm us‖ (170). According to this 
author, trust is built upon imperfect knowledge as a person does not know how the other 
is going to react. In his words ―trust involves a leap of faith‖ (171). Therefore, social trust 
is an important component of democracy because it allows for general interactions 
between individuals from dissimilar backgrounds and who hold different views and 
values. Specifically, a determinant characteristic of trust is that it takes place among 
individuals that may not know each other, but nonetheless may be willing to cooperate 
and participate collectively, while nurturing political tolerance (Córdova 2008), another 
fundamental democratic value discussed in the previous section. These actions will, in 
turn, strengthen democracy (Fukuyama 1995; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Putnam 1993; 
Putman 2000; Uslaner 2002).  
Social trust and civic participation also become germane vis-à-vis political trust. 
If citizens do not engage in civic activity, they may feel incapable of any political 
influence, and in turn, these feelings may cause a state of helplessness that can stimulate 
pessimism and distrust toward political authorities, governmental institutions, and the 
regime in general (Putnam 2000). Furthermore, under conditions of conflict or crisis (as a 
result of an external event), distrustful citizens may also harbor hostile attitudes toward 
those that they do not necessarily know because conflict or crisis may produce an 
environment of permanent suspicion among individuals. Merolla and Zechmeister 
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(2009), for instance, suggest that less trust could actually turn out to be positive because 
as citizens increase their sense of cautiousness, they may feel more efficacious and more 
secure, even though if these feelings do not solve the conflict. Yet less trust will induce 
individuals to ―become relatively more hostile toward out-groups, intolerant, and punitive 
under the security crisis condition. In other words, individuals will become more 
authoritarian in times of crisis‖ (30), and following this logic, a sudden influx of 
immigrants may be perceived as a crisis. Putnam (2007) found that in the long run, 
ethnically diverse societies will have important cultural, economic, and developmental 
outcomes. In the short run, nonetheless, immigration will tend to diminish social capital. 
How do the benefits of interpersonal trust relate to immigration? A reasonable 
outcome of low levels of trust, under conditions of conflict, is to react unfavorably 
toward the sudden arrival of foreigners because, as noted, immigrants may be perceived 
as a threat to society’s traditional values, backgrounds, etc. 28  For that reason, general 
interpersonal trust is of great value for the nourishment of pro-immigrant sentiments 
because citizens who are more trustful are generally more likely to give positive 
evaluations of groups that have traditionally faced discrimination, are more supportive of 
the legal order in society, and more likely to contribute to causes that help the less 
fortunate (Uslaner 2002). Therefore, an implication of trust on citizens’ attitudes is their 
willingness to accept the presence of foreign born residents given that immigrants may be 
viewed as a vulnerable group, in particular when they are new in the receiving society. 
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Most of the explanations related to hostility toward outgroups have relied on the perception of threat of an 
individual or group that is different in one characteristic or another from oneself (or group), leading to 
exclusionary attitudes towards foreigners (Kunovich, 2004; Quillian 1995; Raijman and Semyonov 2004; 
Semyonov, Raijman, and Yom-Tov 2002; Semyonov et al. 2004). According to this approach, 
discriminatory attitudes and prejudice against the out-group population can be a result of threats posed to 
the individual or the group in the economic and the social arena (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Sniderman and 
Carmines 1997). There is a considerable literature on the sources of racial prejudice (Allport 1954, Blumer 
1958, Bobo and Fox 2003; Bobo and Hutching 1996, Sniderman and Carmines 1997, among others) 
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As a result, I anticipate that high levels of interpersonal trust will lead to more favorable 
views toward immigrants and immigration. 
 Now that I have examined the relationship between political tolerance, 
interpersonal trust, and attitudes toward immigrants, I turn to an individual’s context as a 
source of reasons for his/her immigrant attitudes. I argue that not only do individual level 
characteristics matter, but also the economic and political environment within which one 
finds oneself explains these attitudes. I conclude this chapter with an evaluation of the 
impact of some national level characteristics such as economic development and 
democracy on immigrant perceptions. 
 
Does context matter? Economic Development and Democracy 
There has been a great deal of attention paid to the effects of contextual factors on 
regime type, such as economic development. Indeed, one of the main tenets of 
modernization theory is that as a country develops, the social structure becomes complex, 
labor processes commence to require the cooperation of employees, and various groups 
surface and organize (Lipset 1959; Lipset 1981). Consequently, the political system 
under question is no longer able to govern because the society has become too complex 
to control through authoritative means. More specifically, when modernization takes 
place, technological development increases freedom of information, civil society is more 
likely to emerge, while authoritative modes of government become less effective. In 
short, modernization will lead to an ongoing differentiation and specialization of social 
structures that result into a diversification of political structures that opens the way for 
democracy. The cycle of this modernization process is industrialization, urbanization, 
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education, communication, mobilization, and culminating with political incorporation 
(Boix and Stokes 2003; Epstein et al. 2006; Lipset 1959; Lipset 1981).  
Furthermore, evidence suggests that once a country is democratic, economic 
development will prevent its breakdown (Przeworski et al. 2000; Przeworski and 
Limongi 1997). Therefore, economic development seems as an important factor for the 
persistence of democracy as a system of government. How, then, does economic 
development lead to pro-immigrant sentiment? All else equal, citizens that reside in 
prosperous countries will be more likely to view immigrants favorably as economic 
development will reduce conflict over resources, mitigating the perception of immigrants 
as a threat. Similarly, if development influences democratic processes and for that matter 
strengthens democracy, it is also feasible that citizens in developed countries will become 
socialized into a stronger democratic culture and thus even if they themselves hold less 
than democratic views, the effect of these undemocratic views on attitudes towards 
immigrants will be softened by the democratic culture surrounding them.  
The actual levels of democracy in a country likely provide a better reflection of 
the political culture of that society. Beyond the well known and commonly accepted 
minimalist Schumpeterian approach to democracy which states that ―the democratic 
method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decision in which 
individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the 
people’s vote‖ (1976, 269), scholars of democracy have come to understand that 
democracy is much more than just elections. Democracy is the institutional arrangement 
under which individuals’ rights are protected, under which individuals ―have multiple, 
ongoing channels for expression and representation of their interests and values, 
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including diverse, independent associations, and movements, which they have the 
freedom to form and join‖ (Diamond 1999, 35; also see Schmitter and Karl 1991; Dahl 
1971; Dahl 1989; Dahl 1998, Dahl 2006). There are countless reasons to believe that the 
level or quality of democracy in a country will lead to more favorable views toward 
immigrants, precisely because citizens in high quality democracies understand that every 
person living under the umbrella of democracy needs to be protected. 
 In short, individual and national level characteristics matters in the formation of 
immigrant opinion. I have argued throughout this chapter that support for democratic 
values are essential for the acceptance of immigrants in host societies because citizens 
will be prepared to react democratically even when dramatic events take place, such as an 
unexpected influx of immigrants. I included into the discussion my theoretical 
expectations of the relationship between the different components of democratic political 
support and immigrant opinion. The following hypotheses derived from the theory: 
 
H1. Individuals with higher support for democratic values, such as 
political tolerance and interpersonal trust, are more likely to view 
immigrants positively. 
 
H2. Citizens who support democracy in the abstract and in practice will 
reveal more favorable views toward immigrants.  
 
H3. Individuals with higher levels of patriotism will exhibit more 
favorable views toward immigrants.  
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H4. Alternatively, individuals with elevated levels of national pride will 
demonstrate negative opinions toward immigrants. 
 
H5. Countries with higher levels of economic development and democracy 
will have higher averages of pro-migrant sentiments than less developed 
and democratic countries.  
  
             To sum up, support for democratic values matter for the acceptance of 
immigrants in host societies, especially in a world increasingly characterized by the 
movement of people across borders. In the following chapter, my objective is to provide 
descriptive statistics of the main variables.  It concludes with the empirical testing of the 
strength of these relationships through the implementation of multilevel techniques. 
 
 
 
 
 
 51 
CHAPTER III 
 
DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND IMMIGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
              More than 20 million Latin American and Caribbean people reside 
       outside their country of birth. Some three-quarters are in the  
       United States; many of the remainder are in Argentina, 
       Venezuela, Spain and Canada. Intra-Latin American migration  
       to other Latin American countries is also increasingly important;   
       including Central Americans moving to Mexico, Colombians to 
       Ecuador and movements in both directions between Paraguay 
       and Brazil.  
                                                            (OECD 2009, 7) 
 
  
 What is the impact of democratic values on attitudes toward immigrants and what 
does this mean for a world increasingly characterized by migrations? In the previous 
chapter it was argued that the relationship between citizens’ support for democratic 
values and attitudes toward immigrants will be better understood by taking into account 
citizens’ attitudes towards democracy. Specifically, I argued that a strong democratic 
political culture is important for a more accepting culture when a sudden influx of 
immigrants occurs, especially because it is extremely difficult for governments of 
receiving countries to enforce policies that would stop immigration immediately 
(Andreas 1998-1999). Consequently, immigrants become an important new minority 
group in host societies. The way in which this new group is treated matters because if 
anti-democratic attitudes prevail among the general population, it may create a 
permissive environment of violent responses against foreigners, undermining social 
cohesion while eroding the quality of these democracies. 
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This chapter explores the sources of citizens’ attitudes toward immigrants in the 
context of the developing world and tests the various ideas discussed in the previous 
chapter. To the best of my knowledge, no researchers have yet systematically examined 
attitudes toward immigrants in Latin America. This omission is not surprising as 
theoretical propositions regarding attitudes toward immigration have mainly assumed that 
immigration takes place only in developed countries. In fact, much of migration 
dynamics happen at the intra-regional level, in particular within regions that have been 
touched by civil wars, natural disasters, political and economic instability (OECD 2009). 
For example, the civil war in Sudan has generated a significant number of refugees in 
neighboring countries such as Chad and Uganda, both countries known for their low 
levels of development (Wihtol de Wenden 2009). By the same token, the economic and 
political instability in Latin America illustrated by the case of the armed conflict in 
Colombia has produced a humanitarian crisis that has resulted in one of the largest 
displaced populations in the world, with an estimated 3 million Colombians living 
outside their place of origin (USCRI 2006) and with a significant number of these 
emigrating to neighboring countries such as Ecuador and Venezuela. 
Even though there is a growing movement of people across borders, no 
substantive studies have examined the consequences that growing levels of immigration 
pose to democratic stability or to the consequences of democratic support for citizens’ 
attitudes toward migration in developing countries. In this chapter, I focus on an 
empirical assessment of the determinants of attitudes toward immigrants across Latin 
America, a region where the topic of immigration remains largely unexplored. 
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This chapter starts with a discussion of the dependent variables (i.e., attitudes 
toward immigrants) and their measurements, followed by a description of the main 
explanatory factors. It concludes with the empirical assessment of the sources of pro-
immigrant sentiments in Latin America through an analysis of both qualitative and 
quantitative data. 
 
Opinions toward Immigrants in Latin America 
Prior literature on public opinion toward immigrants and immigration indicate 
that a significant number of citizens in developed countries have negative opinions 
toward immigrants (Lapinski et al. 1997; Simon and Lynch 1999; Simon and Sikich 
2007). For example, recent public opinion data indicates that in 2006, 42 and 49 percent 
of the population in Spain and the United States, respectively, agree to impose limits on 
immigration compared to 22 and 39 percent in 1999. Similarly, there was a slight 
increase in the percentage of the Australian population (from 39%-41%) who agree with 
this same statement in a 10 year period (1995-2005).
29
  
In the case of developing countries, very little systematic research has been 
conducted on this subject.  By employing data from 14 countries in Latin America I am 
in a position to examine, for the first time, attitudes toward immigrants by taking into 
account both individual and country level characteristics (e.g., economic development 
and a country’s levels of democracy). 
 
 
 
                                                 
29
 See, www.wordvaluessurveys.org 
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Dependent Variables  
The survey items related to immigration included in these data are: ―To what 
extent do you agree that the government should provide social services such as 
healthcare, education, housing, to foreigners who come to live or work in this country? 
Strongly agree, somewhat agree, neutral, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree.” 30  
Figure III.1 illustrates the percentage of the Latin American population that 
responded to this item. Almost 52 percent of the LAC population strongly or somewhat 
agrees that the government should provide social services to foreigners, while 15 percent 
feels neutral and 33 percent strongly or somewhat disagree with this statement. These 
preliminary results suggest that the majority of Latin Americans view immigrants 
positively when related to the provision of governmental services, in contrast to the 
majority of citizens in developed nations. The following item tapping into attitudes 
toward immigrants asks “Would you say that the people who come to live here from other 
countries do the jobs that (country’s citizens, e.g., Jamaicans) do not want to do, or 
generally take jobs away from (country’s citizens)?” In this instance, Figure III.2 
demonstrates that the majority of Latin Americans (58%) view immigrants as a threat to 
local employment opportunities (taking jobs away from natives), while 42 percent believe 
that foreigners accept the jobs that citizens decline.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
30
 This variable was recoded into 0 to 100 scale in order to simplify the analysis in this study 
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Figure 0.1.  Support for Governmental Services for Immigrants in Latin America 
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Figure 0.2. Perception of Immigrants in the Domain of Job Security in Latin America 
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 Among  those individuals who reveal positive attitudes toward immigrants in both 
questions, Table III.1 shows that around 31 percent of the Latin American and Caribbean 
population seem to somewhat or strongly agree with the provision of governmental 
services for immigrants while at the same time believe that immigrants take jobs that 
citizens do not want. Around 28 percent of Latin Americans, on the other hand, display 
negative immigrant opinions in both measures, suggesting that the difference between 
both pro and anti-immigrant sentiment is relatively small. Only 13 percent of the 
population expressed neutral feeling toward foreigners. 
 
 
 
Table 0.1. Percentage of Population that Scores High in Both Measures of Immigrant 
Sympathy 
 
Support for 
Governmental Services 
for Immigrants 
  
 
Total 
Immigrants Take 
Jobs 
From Citizens 
Immigrants Take 
Jobs Citizens Do 
Not Want 
Strongly Disagree 17% 4% 21% 
Somewhat Disagree 11% 4% 15% 
Neutral 8% 5% 13% 
Somewhat Agree 12% 16% 28% 
Strongly Agree 8% 15% 23% 
Total 56% 44% 100% 
Source: Americas Barometer 2008 by LAPOP 
 
 
 
What are the advantages of these immigrant opinion measures? Both measures 
have several advantages. For example, these items measure the degree of acceptance of 
immigrants in one’s country by tapping, I will argue, two distinct dimensions of attitudes 
toward immigrants.
31
 The first variable taps citizens’ views of the role of the government 
vis-à-vis immigration, while the second variable gauges, more directly, the degree to 
                                                 
31
 The Cronbach’s Alpha for both variables is 0.32, which offers evidence for this position. 
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which natives view immigrants affecting their lives, by explicitly looking into 
immigrants’ impact on scarce resources such as jobs. One shortcoming is that these 
questions do not specify an immigrant group. But, the fact that respondents are free to 
choose the immigrant group they see as most relevant in their daily lives render these 
items more accurate. In the following section, the relationships of various indicators of 
strong democratic political culture and both dimensions of immigrant opinion will be 
presented, enhancing our understanding of the theoretical expectations exposed in 
Chapter II. 
It has been established that attitudes toward immigrants remain particularly 
negative in the developed world (Lapinski et al. 1997; Simon and Lynch 1999; Simon 
and Sikich 2007). Here, some of our preliminary results suggest a widespread pro-
immigrant sentiment in the Latin American context. This general view, however, 
conceals important variations at the country level, as illustrated by Figure III.3. Note that 
Bolivia emerges as the country with the lowest pro-immigrant sentiment in Latin 
America with an average of 45.2 points in a 0 to 100 scale, followed by Ecuador (49.3) 
and Guatemala (50.1). On the other side of the continuum, Uruguay is the country with 
the highest level of pro-immigrant sentiments with an average of 66.2 points on the same 
scale. Similarly, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Belize, and the Dominican Republic show 
positive opinions toward immigrants with an average above 60 points. It is noteworthy 
that the differences across countries are statistically significant and that these averages 
have been controlled for the main SES variables, such as gender, age, education, wealth 
and size of city-town in the country of destination. 
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Figure 0.3. Support for Governmental Services for Immigrants by Country 
 
 
 
Pro-immigrant sentiments, when measured by respondents’ perceptions of 
foreigners’ impact on the job market, vary widely by country.32 Figure III.4 shows that 
77.2 percent of the population in Costa Rica thinks that immigrants do not take jobs from 
citizens, the country with the highest pro-immigrant sentiment in the sample. On the 
other hand, Ecuador is the country that demonstrates the lowest level of pro-immigrant 
sentiment with only 29.2 percent of its population claiming having these positive views. 
                                                 
32
 It is worth noting that the number of countries for this variable was reduced to 10, excluding Venezuela, 
Chile, Argentina, and Belize. 
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Put differently, Ecuador is the country with the highest anti-immigrant sentiment in the 
sample when related to job availability. Some of the fieldwork carried out in Ecuador 
during the summer of 2009 echoes these negative opinions: 
 
 
 
―I think that they [immigrants] are occupying a position that should 
go to Ecuadorians. In other words, they are taking away our few 
sources of employment available for Ecuadorians.‖ 
Interviewee C13, Quito, Ecuador 
(Author’s translation) 
 
 
 
―The people who come to our country affect our workers because 
foreigners offer cheap manual labor and businesses prefer these 
people than our own Ecuadorians in order to save money...‖ 
Interviewee D6, Quito, Ecuador 
(Author’s translation) 
 
 
 
―It is harmful for Ecuadorians because these people are working in 
jobs that we could work and I think that there is a disloyal 
competition because they work for less, diminishing the value of 
manual labor‖ 
Interviewee E14, Quito, Ecuador  
(Author’s translation) 
 
 
 
Most of the countries in the sample reveal percentages below the midpoint with 
only Uruguay (50.7%), the Dominican Republic (62%), and Costa Rica exceeding these. 
As in the previous section, these percentages were controlled for the main SES variables.  
In order to tease out some concerns with regards to the notion that pro-
(anti)immigrant sentiment, especially when related to job availability, is driven by 
unemployment rates rather than attitudes toward democracy more broadly, I also included 
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in Figure III.4 unemployment rates for all the countries in the sample in order to have a 
preliminary idea of how they are related to each other.  
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Figure 0.4. Perception of Immigrants Taking Jobs that Citizens Do Not Want by Country and 
National Unemployment Rates 
 
 
 
First, we notice that Ecuador, the country with the lowest pro-immigrant 
sentiment in the sample also reveals one of the highest unemployment rates (8.7%), 
suggesting that perhaps there is some connection between unemployment and anti-
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immigrant views when related to job availability. However, countries such as the 
Dominican Republic, Uruguay, and Guatemala, show the exact opposite relationship, 
with the Dominican Republic displaying the highest unemployment rate of 15.5 percent 
but also the highest pro-immigrant sentiment after Costa Rica. Uruguay also exhibits the 
same pattern, with more that 50 percent of the Uruguayan population manifesting pro-
immigrant sentiments while experiencing high levels of unemployment of 7.6 percent. 
On the other hand, Guatemala, one of the countries with the lowest pro-immigrant 
sentiments, also shows very low unemployment rates. Are there reasons to believe that 
there are other factors that explain pro-(anti)immigrant sentiment when related to job 
availability besides unemployment rates?  
With the evidence provided so far, it appears that the majority of Latin American 
citizens demonstrate fairly positive opinions toward immigrants when related to the 
provision of public services, such as healthcare, education, and housing. However, when 
examining the perception of immigrants taking jobs that natives do not want, the majority 
of Latin Americans responded negatively. Perhaps foreign-born residents are perceived 
as a threat over scarce resources such as employment and in the context of Latin 
America, it does not come as a surprise because of the many economic and political 
problems the region continues to experience. Nonetheless, unemployment rates do not 
appear to explain the whole picture, but rather open further discussion of other possible 
factors that influence the formation of immigrant opinion. I turn next to address some of 
these other factors. 
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The Role of Context on Opinions Toward Immigrants 
Even though in Chapter II, the role of context was briefly discussed, in here, I 
expand on the theoretical and empirical connection between context and individual level 
responses to migration. A growing literature on immigrant opinion highlights the impact 
of community and country level characteristics, such as the effect of the state of the 
economy, namely, economic development and unemployment rates; and the composition 
of the foreign population (Gang, Rivera-Batiz, and Yun 2002; Kunovich 2004; McLaren 
2003; O'Rourke and Sinnott 2006; Quillian 1995; Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 
2006). In here, I continue exploring the effects of economic conditions (i.e., economic 
development), but at the same time introduce a central element, levels of democracy, to 
the discussion of a strong democratic political culture, largely overlooked in the past. I 
evaluate in the following paragraphs the impact of both economic development and 
democracy levels on the formation of attitudes toward foreigners.  
 
Economic Development and Levels of Democracy 
One cannot fully understand people’s views toward foreigners without taking into 
consideration how context influences their opinions, particularly in an environment of 
high economic and political instability as is the region under analysis. For instance, it has 
been argued that the wealthier the population of a country is, the smaller the percentage 
of its population that is likely to be in competition with immigrants, because wealthy 
countries have fewer citizens employed in manual-labor jobs (Quillian 1995). And, as 
prior research indicates, usually migrants are thought to be in direct economic 
competition with low-wage employees and manual laborers (e.g., Borjas 1989; Borjas 
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1999; Mayda 2006; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Yet, a recent report of the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development argues the opposite (OECD 2009). 
As the result of the 2008-2009 economic crisis of a magnitude not seen since the 
Great Depression, all regions of the world faced a pronounced decline in their GDP 
levels. Recent data from the World Bank (2010) show that after almost a decade of strong 
performance,  GDP growth in Latin America and the Caribbean declined from an average 
of 5.5 to 3.9 percent between 2007 and 2008, and fell even further in 2009 (2.6%). The 
OECD projected Latin American’s GDP to decrease by another 1.3 percent in 2010. This 
event will provoke an increase of 7 percent of poverty in the region, adding 39 more 
million persons to the overall number of existing poor Latin Americans (El Pais, 2009).
33
 
The implications of these figures are somewhat disturbing for our comprehension of 
immigrant opinion in Latin America; if poor people are added to the already 
underprivileged population, that would suggest that more Latin American citizens will be 
vulnerable to job loss and economic deprivation that, in turn, will result in the deepening 
of hostile attitudes toward foreigners.  
In addition, another country level characteristic that I consider central in 
understanding the formation of immigrant opinions is a country’s levels of democracy. 
As noted, democracy is the institutional arrangement under which individuals’ rights are 
protected, under which individuals ―have multiple, ongoing channels for expression and 
representation of their interests and values, including diverse, independent associations, 
and movements, which they have the freedom to form and join‖ (Diamond 1999, 35). 
There are countless reasons to believe that the level of strength of democracy in a nation 
                                                 
33
 See 
<http://www.elpais.com/articulo/economia/crisis/anulara/anos/lucha/pobreza/America/Latina/elpepueco/ 
20091130elpepueco_14/Tes> 
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will lead to more favorable views toward immigrants, precisely because citizens in 
democracies understand that the rights of every person living under the umbrella of 
democracy need to be protected. 
Table III.2 shows the levels of economic development and democracy by country. 
Notice that Chile, Uruguay, and Costa Rica emerge as the countries with relatively high 
rates in both measures, in sharp contrast to Guatemala, Ecuador, and Bolivia- countries 
that score at the lowest end. 
 
 
 
Table 0.2. Economic Development and Democracy in LAC 
Economic Development 
(GDP per capita Index)
 
* 
Level of Democracy 
(Inv. Freedom  House Index) ** 
Argentina .828 Chile 12 
Chile .799 Uruguay 12 
Mexico .781 Costa Rica 12 
Costa Rica .772 Panama 11 
Uruguay .768 Belize 11 
Brazil .74 Brazil 10 
Dominican Republic .736 Argentina 10 
Panama .723 Dominican Republic 10 
Belize .712 Mexico 9 
Venezuela .7 El Salvador 9 
El Salvador .661 Ecuador 8 
Guatemala .638 Bolivia 8 
Ecuador .629 Guatemala 7 
Bolivia .557 Venezuela 6 
*National wealth is measured using the UNDP’s GDP index. This index is based on gross domestic product 
per capita in purchasing power parity terms in US dollars. The index can take values between 0 and 1.  For 
details on how this index was constructed see UNDP’s Human Development Report 2007/2008  
**Freedom House Index 2007 is a composite measure of a country’s level of democracy. It includes two 
measures of democracy: political rights and civil liberties. Both measures contain numerical ratings between 
1 and 7 for each country with 1 indicating the ―most free‖ and 7 the ―least free.‖ Here, following LAPOP’s 
approach, both measures were inverted and combined into an index with lower values indicating ―less free‖ 
and higher ―more free.‖ See www.lapopsurvey.org 
 
 
 
As a matter of fact, economic development and democracy are highly correlated 
(0.66), indicative of how richer countries are generally more democratic (Przeworski et 
al. 2000). Thus, I anticipate that pro-immigrant sympathy will be higher in wealthier and 
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more democratic nations (as those exposed above) than in those that are poorer and less 
democratic.  
 
Empirical Assessment34 
This study attempts to contribute to the literature on sources of attitudes toward 
foreigners by providing, for the first time, a systematic assessment of the determinants of 
pro-immigrant sentiment in Latin America, a region where the subject of immigration has 
not received proper attention. More specifically, by using data from 14 Latin American 
countries, I am in a position to examine the extent to which citizens’ support for 
democratic values matter for immigrant-peaceful reception. 
 
Main Independent Variables and Country Level Characteristics35 
The main independent variables included in the following empirical analysis are: 
national pride, patriotism, support for democracy in principle, satisfaction with 
democracy, legitimacy of core political institutions, support for the current president 
administration, political tolerance and interpersonal trust, all of which were examined 
theoretically in Chapters II. Economic development and level of democracy are level 2 
variables. 
 
                                                 
34
 A description of the data is found in Chapter I 
35
 All the variables included in the model (independent and control variables) were recoded from their 
original scale (1-4, 1-5, 1-7; 1-10) into a scale from 0 to 100 for the purpose of simplifying interpretation. 
For a more detailed description of all the variables included in the index in this section, see the appendix. 
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Control Variables 
36
 
The analysis in here also takes into account some control variables, such as the 
traditional socio-demographic factors: age (measured in years), education (years of 
education), gender (recoded into female = 1, male = 0), city size (measures size of cities 
from smaller to larger), occupation (unemployed=1, working=0, other=1),  authoritarian 
attitudes (support for iron fist government=1, participation of all=0), threat from a 
minority (1-100), prejudice (1-100), perception of national and personal economic 
situation (1-100), impact of media (1-100), perception of personal insecurity (1-100), role 
of the State as a proxy for ideology (1-100), and the degree of connection to a migrant 
network (1-6). 
 
Analysis  
 First, descriptive statistics are calculated: means for continuous and frequencies 
for dichotomous variables. Second, since the first dependent variable is a continuous 
variable, it would be appropriate to apply an ordinary least squares (OLS) linear 
regression model and a logistic regression model for the second dependent variable (a 
dichotomous variable) to estimate the effects of the predictor variables. However, 
because the purpose of this study is to evaluate not only the impact of individual-level, 
but also country-level characteristics, a multilevel statistical procedure is employed here, 
that allows the simultaneous modeling of explanatory factors at both levels (De Leeuw 
and Meijer 2008; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008; Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). 
                                                 
36
 The literature on migration considers these variables important determinants of the formation of attitudes 
toward immigrants. I decided to include these variables to assess the strength of my theoretical propositions 
while controlling for other factors the literature considers relevant. 
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 Multilevel modeling differs from standard regression techniques in its ability to 
partition variance among multiple levels and obtain appropriate point estimates and 
confidence intervals accordingly. In this study, as noted, individuals are level one of the 
analysis and countries are level two. A more formal representation of the model 
employed in this study includes variables of my interest, allowing their slopes to vary 
across countries as described by the following equation: 
 
 
(1) Yij=  0 + 1(national pride)ij + 2(patriotism)ij + 3 (support for democracy in 
principle)ij + 4(satisfaction with democracy)ij + 5(legitimacy)ij + 
6(governmental efficacy)ij + 7(presidential approval)ij +  8(political 
tolerance)ij +  9(interpersonal trust)ij +  10… 22 (control variables)ij + eij 
 
 
 
where Y stands for the dependent variable to be explained (i.e., support for governmental 
services for immigrants and the belief that immigrants do not take jobs from citizens), 0  
is the intercept which refers to the value that Y assumes when the covariates have a value 
of 0, 1(national pride)ij to 23(wealth)ij are the coefficients for each of my independent 
variables included in the model and eij stands for the residual, or more specifically, the 
variation in Y that is not explained by the model. This equation specifies a model for 
individuals i within countries j, which is a better suit for cross-national survey data. It 
takes into consideration the residuals for both individual and country level characteristics 
independently, dividing the error between both levels and allowing for a random-
intercept that accounts for the country-specific error element (Raudenbush and Bryk 
2002) 
Because country-level characteristics are included, the specific country-level 
equation for the model intercept is as followed: 
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(2) 0j = γ00+ γ01*( GDP per capita index)ij + u0j 
 
(3) 0j = γ00+ γ02*(DEMOCRACY)ij + u0j 
 
 
Where γ00 in equation 2 is the country level intercept and γ01 is the effect of economic 
development on the model intercept ( 0j). Likewise, notice in equation 3 where γ00 is 
the country level intercept and γ02 is the effect of democracy on the model intercept 
( 0j). 
Table III.3 displays some descriptive statistics of the main variables analyzed in 
this dissertation. The mean for the independent and control variables ranges anywhere 
from 40 to 89 in a scale of 0 to 100; perceptions about the national economy show the 
lowest mean, and the highest mean corresponds to national pride. On scale from 0 to 6, 
the mean for migrant connection is of .08 and of 2.9 for the size of the city on scale of 1 
to 5 (smallest to largest). The mean for wealth is of 4.2 on a 0 to 9 scale.
37
 Similarly, age 
and education exhibit a mean of 40 years and 9 years, respectively.  
In addition, women make up 52 percent of the sample and men make up 48 
percent. The unemployed population is of 5.2 percent, but is actively looking for a job 
compared to 53 percent that is already in the labor force. Close to 71 percent of Latin 
Americans support a government with the participation of all, whereas only 29 percent 
support a government with an iron fist. Finally, the level 2 variables are GDP index with 
a mean of .71 on a 0-1 scale and the inverted combined Freedom House Index shows a 
mean of 9.5 on a 6-12 scale. 
                                                 
37
 The ―wealth‖ index consists of a count of household assets and access to basic services at the household 
level. The list of assets in the survey includes durable goods, such as a TV set, a refrigerator, a car, and a 
computer, and access to basic services like clean water and sewage inside the house. For a more detailed 
description of this index, see www.lapopsurvey.org 
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Table 0.3. Summary of Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Factors: 
          Full Sample (N = 25,755) 
 
Individual and National Level Characteristics 
Descriptive Statistics* 
Mean Std. Deviation 
 
Independent Variables  
 
 
Support for the Political System    
   Support for the Political Community 
          National Pride  
 
88.90 
 
(22.40) 
          Patriotism   79.33 (24.51) 
   Support for Democracy in Principle 72.85 (28.44) 
   Support for Democracy in Practice 53.17 (23.69) 
   Legitimacy of Core Pol. Institutions  44.53 (23.40) 
   Perception of Governmental Efficacy 46.00 (27.01) 
   Presidential Approval  55.45 (24.87) 
Political Tolerance  53.25 (28.22) 
Interpersonal Trust  58.36 (29.67) 
 
Control Variables  
 
 
   Threat from a Minority 45.16 (33.53) 
   Prejudice 56.04 (37.85) 
   Role of State 70.22 (23.65) 
   National economic satisfaction 40.01 (22.86) 
   Personal economic satisfaction 47.66 (20.61) 
   Media effects  80.64 (30.49) 
   Perception of personal insecurity 41.65 (31.01) 
   Migration Connection Index (0-6) .86 (1.53) 
Socioeconomic Demographic Variables 
   Age  
 
39.58 
 
(16.10) 
   Education  9.31 (4.63) 
   City size (from smallest to largest, 1–5) 2.9 (1.55) 
   Wealth (from 0-9) 4.2 (1.96) 
 Percent Observations 
   Gender                      Male 
                                      Female 
48.11 
51.89 
(12,391) 
(13,364) 
   Occupation               Unemployed 
                                       Working 
                                       Other 
5.28 
53.17 
41.55 
(1,276)         
(12,844)  
(10,037 )        
Authoritarian Attitudes           Iron Fist 
                                                     Participation for all 
28.79 
71.21 
(6,699) 
(16,571) 
 
National Level Characteristics 
 
Mean 
 
Std. Deviation 
   GDP Per Capita Index .71 (.10) 
   Freedom House 2007 Added Scores (6-12) 
   (Inverted) 
 
9.5 
 
(1.84) 
* All the variables were recoded into 0-100 scale unless indicated otherwise 
Source: AmericasBarometer 2008 by LAPOP 
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Results38  
Figure III.5 shows that both the individual characteristics of respondents and 
context—the wealth of the nation, measured by GDP per capita—affect attitudes toward 
immigrants in Latin America and the Caribbean. Each variable included in the analysis is 
listed on the vertical (y) axis. The impact of each of my variables of interest on pro-
immigrant sentiment is shown graphically by a dot, which if located to the right of the 
vertical ―0‖ line indicates a positive effect, and if to the left of the ―0‖ line, a negative 
effect.  If the effects are statistically significant, they are shown by confidence interval 
lines stretching to the left and right of each dot that do not overlap the vertical ―0‖ line (at 
.05 or better). If they overlap the vertical line, the effects are statistically insignificant. 
The relative strength of each variable is indicated by standardized coefficients.  
First, we observe that a strong political culture, gauged by support for democratic 
values and democratic political support, does have an impact on how citizens view 
immigrants. In this case, higher support for democratic values leads to a higher support 
for governmental services such as education, healthcare, housing, etc., for immigrants. 
When one looks at democratic political support specifically, (i.e., support for the political 
community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions, and political 
actors, Norris 1999), all its components become statistically significant with the 
exception of patriotism, which is shown by the confidence interval that overlaps the 
vertical line. 
National pride falls in the predicted direction, whereas an intriguing finding, but 
one inconsistent with my expectations, is the negative effect of support for democracy on 
attitudes toward immigrants. This result may be explained by the possibility that when 
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 To have a better idea of the strength of the effects, see full models in the Appendix 
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citizens are asked if democracy is the best form of government compared to other 
alternatives, citizens may be thinking of their political system itself (regardless if it is 
fully democratic or not), sustaining certain arguments related to how some measures of 
system support have a problematic association with democratic norms. Among the 
components of democratic political support, perception of governmental efficacy is the 
one that reveals the strongest effect on pro-immigrant sympathy, followed by satisfaction 
with the way democracy works, presidential approval, and support for core political 
institutions.  
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Figure 0.5. A Multilevel Analysis of the Determinants of Pro-Immigrant Sentiment in LAC: 
The Impact of Economic Development, 2008 
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More evidence suggests that interpersonal trust and political tolerance increase 
favorable opinions toward foreigners. These findings substantiate research on how crucial 
is the role that democratic values play in reducing social conflict. As mentioned 
throughout this dissertation, interpersonal trust and political tolerance are essential for 
democracy because they increase citizens’ willingness to cooperate and undertake 
collective action despite their differences in opinions, traditions, backgrounds, etc. 
(Córdova 2008; Gibson 2006). 39 
Moving on to the examination of alternative accounts of immigrant opinion, key 
among these are the positive effects of a satisfactory perception of the national and 
personal economic well-being. Similarly, the degree of connection to a migrant network 
increases pro-immigrant sentiment that suggests that those who stayed behind better 
understand the issues that come with migration. In other words, citizens who are exposed 
to migration in one way or another will be more sympathetic of those that find 
themselves in the same situation. On the other hand, the perception of threat from a 
minority and prejudice decreases sympathetic attitudes, adding evidence to prior 
literature on these two concepts (e.g., Allport 1954, Blumer 1958, Bobo and Fox 2003; 
Bobo and Hutching 1996).  
Moreover, the extent of exposure to the media, that is, the degree of citizens 
watching news on television diminishes pro-immigrant sentiment. This finding supports 
                                                 
39
 I anticipate some criticism with regard to my approach of explaining pro-immigrant sympathy with 
political tolerance. Some may argue that I am trying to predict tolerance with tolerance. However, after 
carrying out correlations between both of my dependent variables and the political tolerance index, 
evidence suggests that there is no association between both concepts. In addition, I also carried out 
correlations between each of the components of the political tolerance index and pro-immigrant sentiment. 
None of the correlations reached levels above 0.07. I went a step further to reduce some of these concerns 
by employing a factor analysis that suggest that while both items pertaining to each construct of immigrant 
opinion load quite strongly on the first factor, political tolerance loads mainly on the second factor, 
substantiating my argument that immigrant opinion and political tolerance gauge two different concepts.  
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the notion that more exposure to the media involves more visibility of immigrants’ 
impact in the country and, as a result, people are influenced negatively (Chávez 2001; 
Izquierdo 2005; Orcés 2009). These results became statistically significant after 
controlling for perception of insecurity. 
 When looking at the SES variables, only age and unemployment reached 
statistical significance. Older individuals and the unemployed express lower levels of 
pro-immigrant sentiment compared to those that are in the work force, substantiating the 
negative effects of economic deprivation (e.g., Gang, Rivera-Batiz, and Yun 2001; Tucci 
2005). Finally, note in Figure III.5 that economic development, measured by the GDP per 
Capita Index, has a significant positive impact on pro-immigrant sentiment (e.g., Quillian 
1995; Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006). Latin Americans who live in 
wealthier states, on average, render support for governmental services for immigrants.  
Figure III.6 illustrates how the wealth of each country under examination 
influences views toward foreigners after controlling for individual level characteristics. 
For instance, Argentina is the richest nation in the region in terms of GDP per capita, 
according to the Human Development report by UNDP 2007/2008, and surfaces as the 
country with the highest support for governmental services for immigrants, in sharp 
contrast to Bolivia, the country with both lowest GDP per capita and pro-immigrant 
sentiment in the sample. Taking all these results together, the analyses carried out so far 
suggest that if a citizen from Bolivia with a given set of socio-economic characteristics 
were to move to Argentina, ceteris paribus, and none of his/her individual characteristics 
were to change, his/her support for governmental services for immigrants would be at 
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least 16 points higher than if this individual were to remain in Bolivia.
40
 These findings 
give a pretty good idea of how context matter. Notice, furthermore, that apart from 
Bolivia, none of the countries in the sample present levels of pro-immigrant sentiment 
below the midpoint. 
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Figure III.6 also shows that Ecuador stands out as the country with both the 
lowest economic development and pro-immigrant sentiment after Bolivia. This case 
becomes particularly relevant as Ecuador, a country with a population of 14 million, is 
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 According to Freedom House 2009, Bolivia, a country of around 10 million inhabitants is considered 
partly free with a score of 3 in both political rights and civil liberties, which denotes less in both indicators. 
For more information, see www.freedoomhouse.org 
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both a recipient and producer of immigrants and emigrants concurrently. It is estimated 
that 1 million to 1.5 million Ecuadorians have left the country (IOM 2009), while 
receiving approximately 600,000 displaced Colombians as the result of the armed conflict 
in this nation.
41
Not only considerable numbers of Colombians are entering the country 
but also Peruvians and most recent Cubans are becoming significant minority groups in 
Ecuador. This finding is worrisome because Ecuador remains one of the poorest countries 
in the region in the midst of high migration surges, suggesting that a more hostile 
environment against foreigners will be more likely. Within this context, social conflict 
may be galvanized, resulting in a further erosion of Ecuadorian democracy, which is 
already hindered by high levels of corruption and violence. This case will be explored in 
more detail in Chapter VI. 
Passing on to the analysis of the next dependent variable, the belief that 
immigrants do not take jobs from citizens, Figure III.7 shows that both individual level 
characteristics and a country’s level of democracy matter when explaining pro-immigrant 
sentiment in Latin America and the Caribbean. Here, contrary to our previous results, the 
only key variables among democratic values and democratic political support that 
reached statistical significance are satisfaction with the way democracy works, support 
for core political institutions, presidential approval, and interpersonal trust, all of which 
increase the probability of having pro-immigrant sympathy. 
 When examining alternative explanations of immigrant opinion, most of the 
variables did not yield statistically significant results. Prejudice and the extent to which 
citizens are connected to a migrant network both decrease and increase respectively the 
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 See, 
http://www.elcomercio.com/solo_texto_search.asp?id_noticia=220231&anio=2010&mes=3&dia=21. 
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probability of having positive views. In this model, in contrast to the previous one, the 
perception of insecurity becomes significant. As Latin Americans perceived heightened 
levels of insecurity, the less likely citizens are to believe that foreigners take the jobs 
citizens do not want, indicative of the linkage that citizens usually make between the rise 
of criminal activity with the rise of immigration (Palmer 1996). A surprising finding is 
the role of the state (as a proxy of ideology). It is believed that individuals who are 
considered more liberal vis-à-vis the role of the State are more likely to be in favor of 
immigration. In this analysis, the opposite is true: higher support for the role of the state 
decreases the probability of having favorable views toward foreigners. 
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Figure 0.7 . A Multilevel Analysis of the Determinants of Pro-Immigrant Sentiment in LAC: 
The Impact of Democracy, 2008 
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The results also exhibit the importance of socio-demographic factors. Wealth and 
higher levels of education increase the probability of having positive views toward 
immigrants, which highlights the dominant role that education plays as a mitigating 
factor of intolerant attitudes (Golebiowska 1995; Orcés 2008; Seligson, Córdova, and 
Moreno 2007). On the other hand, those who live in bigger cities are less likely to have 
pro-immigrant sentiments. The higher concentration of immigrants in metropolitan areas 
explains the lower probability of viewing them positively. Foreign-born citizens are 
perceived as a threat, especially in regard to job security given that the dependent 
variable gauges the belief if foreigners take or not jobs from citizens.  
Finally, Figure III.7 and III.8 bring to light the importance of democracy for a 
strong democratic political culture. The levels of democracy matter when explaining pro-
immigrant sentiment in this region. Indeed, both Figures suggest that Latin Americans 
who live in more democratic states, on average, tend to believe that immigrants do the 
jobs that citizens do not want. Put differently, the more democratic a nation is, the less 
likely its citizens will support the notion that immigrants take jobs from natives, a 
commonly accepted view. It is noteworthy that levels of democracy when related to 
individuals’ support for the provision of governmental services for foreigners did not 
yield statistically significant results. I leave this outcome open for future research in this 
topic putting particular emphasis on the possible multidimensionality of attitudes toward 
immigrants, as discussed in the beginning of this chapter. 
In Figure III.8 we observe that the most democratic countries and where the 
likelihood for higher pro-immigrant sentiment is registered are Uruguay and Costa Rica. 
Guatemala, in contrast, emerges as the less democratic nation in the constricted sample 
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and the one with the lowest probability of having positive opinion toward immigrants.
42
 
For example, Uruguay and Costa Rica are considered ―free‖ by the Freedom House 
organization with scores of 1 in both political rights and civil liberties, which is the 
highest rank on these indicators. 
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As previously noted, in this dissertation these values were recoded, combined, and 
inverted so that higher values indicate higher levels of democracy. Taking all these 
results together, this analysis shows that if a citizen from Guatemala with a given set of 
                                                 
42
 According to Freedom House 2009, Guatemala, a country of around 13,700 million inhabitants is 
considered partly free with a score of 3 in political rights and 4 in civil liberties, which denotes less 
political rights and civil liberties. For more information, see www.freedoomhouse.org 
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socio-economic characteristics were to move to Uruguay or Costa Rica, other things 
being equal, and none of his/her individual characteristics were to change, the probability 
of this person to have positive opinions toward foreign born residents would be at least 
32 percentage points higher than if this individual were to remain in Guatemala. These 
results are remarkable and validate further the significance of democracy as a system of 
government. Democracy allows for the deepening of a democratic political culture in 
which the protection of minorities is pivotal. Support for democratic values, therefore, 
reinforces social cohesion that makes the peaceful cohabitation of different minority 
groups (including foreigners) more likely. This, in turn, enhances the likelihood of stable 
democracies as well as increases the move toward higher quality democracies.  
In the following pages, I will proceed with an in depth analysis of pro-immigrant 
sentiment in carefully selected countries. Chapter IV focuses on the cases of Argentina, 
Chile, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic. Included are the history of migration and 
migration policy of these countries and how they have affected immigrant opinion 
overtime. Chapter V devotes a detailed study of attitudes toward foreigners of Ecuadorian 
citizens in Ecuador and Ecuadorians citizens in Europe. The chapter incorporates 
qualitative research carried out in Europe and Ecuador (2008-2009). With both of these 
chapters I hope to elucidate further on the role that a strong democratic political culture 
plays in the formation of immigrant opinion. In Chapter VI, I conclude by summarizing 
my findings and discuss their implications and possible avenues for future research on 
this subject. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
INTRAREGIONAL MIGRATION: THE CASES OF ARGENTINA, CHILE, 
COSTA RICA, AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
 
 
“Sixty percent of migrants in Latin American 
 originated from the region itself” 
(ECLAC 2006, 21). 
 
 
 
Conventional wisdom suggests that the majority of migration flows in the past 
several decades have been from ―South to North,‖ from developing countries to 
developed ones. While it is true that many international migrants follow this pattern, lost 
in much research on migration over the past thirty years is the fact that a significant 
majority of migration is best characterized as either ―intra-South‖ or ―intra-North‖ 
migration (UNDP 2009). International migration rates from developing to developed 
states have continuously been overestimated. According to the UNDP 2009 report on 
Human Development and Mobility, ―only 37 percent of migration in the world is from 
developing to developed countries. Most migration occurs within countries in the same 
category of development: about 60 percent of migrants move either between developing 
or between developed countries‖ (21).43 What this implies for research on migration is the 
presence of a far more complex and nuanced set of migrant-host country dynamics than 
previously thought.  
In the case of Latin America, immigration is not a new phenomenon. It has 
always existed, starting with la Conquista and succeeded by the independence of Latin 
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 The remaining 3 percent move from developed to developing countries 
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American states that welcomed an important flow of European immigrants from the 
middle of the XIX to the beginning of the XX century. This type of migration had its 
genesis in the many political and economic problems Europe faced during that time as 
well as the active migrant recruitment policies of some Latin American governments. 
Movements across countries later became exemplified by intraregional migration that 
was primarily fluid on Latin American borders. This was known as ―seasonal migration‖ 
due to its continuing characteristic of migrants going in and out of neighboring countries 
(Pellegrino 2003).  
The majority of migrants in the region moved and still move in search for better 
jobs opportunities, particularly in the agricultural sector. Immigration took place in rural 
areas mostly and later on substituted urban emigration (Pellegrino 2003; Lara Flores 
2008).
44
 Migrants have also moved to escape from declining political stability (UNDP 
2009). For example, Costa Rica has received a significant number of Nicaraguan 
immigrants throughout the last half century, many from which were weather refugees, 
including the aftermath of the Nicaraguan earthquake of 1972 and the Hurricane Mitch in 
1998. Another example is Colombians moving to neighboring countries (i.e., Venezuela, 
Ecuador, and Panama) going from 600,000 in 1990 to 700,000 by 2000.
45
 Furthermore, 
Argentina, a country that was the main recipient of European migration, now has become 
the favorite destination for Bolivians, Paraguayans, Chileans and Uruguayans. According 
                                                 
44
 It is noteworthy that while the Latin American region was characterized by immigration in the beginning 
of the XX century, by the end of the century, emigration has become the main trend in the region. Yet 
intraregional migration indicates a current tendency for augmentation (UNDP 2009) 
45
 See www.unhcr.org 
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to ECLAC, by 2000, 60 percent of migrants in Latin America originated from the region 
itself, representing an estimated 3 million persons.
46
 
In the following pages, I will explore the development of migration flows and 
migration policies in four countries in Latin America: Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, and 
the Dominican Republic. I will include a discussion on how political and economic 
events fueled migration rates across these countries and how support for democratic 
values influence the way citizens view fellow Latin Americans immigrants. I conclude 
with a multivariate analysis of the sources of pro-immigrant sentiments in these countries 
and the corresponding discussion of the main findings.  
 
ARGENTINA 
 
Migration Flows  
Argentina has a long history of migration, with a significant number of Europeans 
arriving in the middle of the XIX century to the turn of the century—an estimated 7 
million persons left Europe to take economic advantage of a prosperous Argentina (Lara 
Flores 2008, Solimano 2003). After 1940, the European migration wave was slowly 
replaced by immigration from nearby countries. The first migration flows to Argentina 
after World War II came largely from Bolivia, Chile, and Paraguay (1946-1950). These 
flows were low in numbers.  
The immigration patterns intensified from 1956 to 60 as a response to a shortage 
in manual labor (specifically in the agricultural sector), resulting from the many 
developments in certain Argentinean economic sectors. Accordingly, it attracted a great 
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 www.eclac.org. International Migration. 
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number of foreign labor ready to fill the economic void (Bendini and Steimbreger 2008; 
Marshall and Orlansky 1983; Zalles Cueto 2002).  
Nonetheless, it is impossible to understand migration flows to Argentina without 
taking into consideration the context in each of the sending nations that gave a way to 
these flows. For instance, a civil war in Paraguay (in 1947), succeeded by the 1954 coup 
d’état and the installation of the Alfredo Stroessner’s dictatorship (1954-1989) generated 
a significant number of political exiles (Marshall and Orlansky 1983; Sondrol 1992; 
Sondrol 1997). Bolivia, on the other hand, experienced a revolution and the Agrarian 
Reform in 1952. These events had a detrimental impact on the economy and produced a 
significant number of economic migrants (Eckstein 1979; Garcia Arganaras 1992; Mann 
1989). In Chile, the economy slowed down during 1956-1960, especially in the 
agricultural and construction sectors, also stimulating emigration rates (Marshall and 
Orlansky 1983).  
The following years, Argentina was characterized by a decline in Chilean 
migration, but an increase in that from Paraguay and Bolivia. Even though this type of 
migration has remained high until recent years, Chilean migration gained more 
significance by 1970s as the result of the economic and political instability that the 
country was facing, most notably, with the instauration of the Pinochet dictatorship in 
1973. These events spurred the emigration of many political exiles.
47
  
Argentina became the main destination for Bolivians, Paraguayans, Chileans, and 
Uruguayans until the 1990s (Benencia 2008; D’Andrea 2007). Most recently, 
immigration to Argentina has become more diversified in its nature. In the last three 
years there were approximately 700,000 persons that seek residency in the country, which 
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 See, <http://www.freedomhouse.org> 
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is over ten times the figure in the first few years of 2000. It is believed that most of this 
migration results from the great economic development that Argentina has experienced in 
recent times, attracting migration especially from less prosperous nearby countries. A 
case in mind is that of Bolivia with almost 233,464 immigrants by 2001, according to the 
census of that year.
48
 Moreover, for the first time in decades, Paraguayans in Argentina 
have become greater in numbers than Bolivians. By the beginning of 2000, there were 
only 7000 Paraguayans residing in Argentina. By the end of the decade, in 2008, this 
number reached 290,000, more than a 4000% increase rate.
49
 
Lately, Colombians have become a more salient group in Argentina, going from 
only 500 at the beginning of 2000 to 5500 by 2008, an unexpected phenomenon. An 
explanation to rising levels of Colombian immigration is the worsening of the internal 
conflict in Colombia which has been accompanied by economic degradation. At the same 
time, there has been a tendency for higher numbers of Peruvians with approximately 
140,000 and Chinese making up 35,000, a figure that is believed to be underestimated as 
many of them are in conditions of irregularity in Argentina.
50
   
Most recently, the new flow of migration has been characterized by the arrival of 
Africans. Even though this type of migration is not intra-regional, it is the more and more 
gaining notoriety. According to a Reuters’ report,  
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 See, <http://www.indec.gov.ar> 
49
 See, <http://ningunhumanoilegal.wordpress.com/2009/02/09/argentina-inmigrantes> 
50
 Ibid 
 85 
There are now more than 3,000 African immigrants 
living in Argentina, up from just a few dozen eight 
years ago. The number of asylum seekers each year has 
risen abruptly, to about 1,000 a year, and a third of 
them are African…We're seeing a steep increase in the 
number of Africans coming to the country and seeking 
asylum…Africans are expected to come to Latin 
America in increasing numbers…We’re seeing a stable 
trend and it’s still growing (Reuters, 2009).51 
 
In short, Argentina has a long history of migration flows.  At one point it was 
characterized by European migration mainly. At the present, however, the country is 
receiving migrants largely from nearby countries such as Bolivia, Chile, and Paraguay. 
But in order to understand recent migration trends in Argentina, it is important to look at 
the context in which these migration flows took place. We continue with the assessment 
of economic and democratic developments in Argentina and their relationships to 
migration. 
 
The Role of Context 
Argentina experienced unstable economic conditions during the 1980s. It started 
with the hyperinflation that lasted all the way through the first few years of the 1990s. In 
1992, Argentina introduced a new currency which was fixed into a one to one ratio with 
the US dollar. All these events permitted Argentina to reach economic stability that made 
it more attractive for migrants (D’Andrea 2007). However, by the end of the decade, with 
the devaluation of the new currency—―el peso‖— at the beginning of 2001, and an 
increase in foreign debt, the Argentinean economy collapsed and resulted in deepened 
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 See, 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5AF0AG20091116?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=1162
1> 
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economic, social, and political crises, affecting migration flows. The crisis of 2001, 
specifically, resulted in high unemployment rates and structural poverty, not seen since 
its foundation (Damill, Frenkel, and Juvenal 2003; Damill, Frenkel, and Rapetti 2005).  
The Argentinean economy has been in a process of recovery since 2005. An 
example to the solid economic stability Argentina has and continues to experience relates 
to the somewhat positive response to the 2008 global economic crisis. The Argentinean 
economy did not suffer the extent to which other nations and regions around the globe 
did. In fact, despite the economic deceleration Argentina experienced during 2009 after 
persistent economic growth for six years, it is expected full economic recovery by 2010.
52
  
Albeit the economic volatility and political problems that have defined Argentina 
throughout the years, it remains a net immigration country that attracts the largest number 
of migrants in the region. It represents around 5.6 percent of the total population, with the 
majority originating from neighboring countries (OECD 2009). 
Furthermore, in terms of democracy, according to Freedom House 2009, 
Argentina is an electoral democracy with scores of 2 in both political rights and civil 
liberties, which represents elevated levels of democracy. Specifically, the Freedom House 
Index is a composite measure of a country’s level of democracy that, as noted, includes 
two measures: political rights and civil liberties. It consists of numerical ratings between 
1 and 7 for each country with 1 indicating the ―most free‖ and 7 the ―least free.‖ 
Argentina’s scores of 2 denote the significant steps that Argentina is taking toward a 
more consolidated democracy. Yet this country continues to cope with problems of 
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 See, <http://www.infolatam.com/entrada/cepal_argentina_evito_la_contraccion_per-17807.html> 
 87 
corruption (e.g., variety of corruption scandals during the last two Kichners’ 
administrations).
53
  
Argentina was ranked 106 out of 180 countries surveyed in Transparency 
International’s 2009 Corruption Perception Index, bested by Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, 
Colombia, and Peru, in the Southern Corn and solely doing better than Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Paraguay, and Venezuela, countries well known for their corruption levels.
54
 These 
events also put strains on migration flows. 
 
Argentinean Migration Policy: A Brief Overview  
 Argentinean migration policy has been colored by periods of both overture and 
restrictive procedures. For instance, in 1876, after a year of debate, Law No. 817 better 
known as the ―Avellaneda Law‖ was implemented. Under this law, the General 
Department for Immigration was created under the tutelage of the Ministry of Interior. 
This law was liberal, permissive, and open to foreign born residents and it highlighted the 
need for agricultural labor in particular (Novick 2008, 135-137). Over the next decades, 
with the end of the Peronist Era—an era of greater power of the State—a period of 
political precariousness characterized Argentina. It started with the coup d’etat and the 
installation of the military dictatorship from 1976 to 1983. During this period, an 
environment of highly repressive political control was established at all levels of 
Argentinean social and political life and eventually manifested itself into a restrictive 
migration policy reform (Domenech 2007). This reform was better known as the ―Videla 
Law.‖ Through these years, the general idea of the government was to move from an 
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open migration policy to a more regulatory policy, favoring ―qualified migration,‖ that is, 
migration from urban areas as well as that of professionals (Novick 2008).   
 One of the main features of the Videla Law (1981) was to prohibit undocumented 
immigrants the access to health services and education, obligating officials to denounce 
immigrants’ situation to public authorities (Novick 2008, Domenech 2007). It is worth 
noting that by 1980, Argentina had a population of 28 million, with approximately 6.8% 
of the foreign population, and from which, 39.6% corresponded to immigrants from 
neighboring countries. By 2001, Argentina had a population over 36 million people, with 
a foreign population of 4,2%, a clearly lower percentage than in previous years, but with 
more than 60% of migrants from neighboring countries (in Novick 2008, 137-141). 
 Because of declining economic conditions during 2000s, Argentina shifted from 
being a traditionally receiving migrant nation to a sending nation, with a significant 
number of its population leaving in search for better lives and labor conditions. 
According to the OECD (2009), nearly 500,000 Argentineans emigrated to other 
countries by 2001, which represents 1.8% of the general population (16). Therefore, the 
Argentinean government felt the need to reform migration policy and for the first time in 
its history, the right to migrate became officially recognized under the new Law of 
Giustiniani (2004). During this period, migration policy turned to be more open, liberal, 
and inclusive. This law restored some rights for immigrants, denied under the previous 
law (e.g., access to education and health services). The main goal of current migration 
policy is the promotion of immigrants’ socio-economic integration (Novick 2008, 
Domenech 2007).  
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CHILE 
 
Migration Flows 
In contrast to Argentina, Chile does not have a history of immigration. Rather its 
significance has grown in recent years, with considerable immigration flows from 
Argentina and Peru, and in a lesser extent from Bolivia, Ecuador, and Colombia. A 
reason for Chile’s increasing attractiveness as a country of destination for immigrants 
from nearby countries has been an improvement in Chilean political and economic 
indicators. These factors have rendered Chile as one of the most stable democracies in the 
region compared to other Latin American countries that instead have experienced 
deterioration in those same indicators (Aranda and Morande 2007; Martínez 2003; OCED 
2009).  
 Chile has been mainly a net emigration country due to the lengthy Pinochet 
dictatorship that generated a significant number of political exiles. It is estimated that 
until 1990 the number of emigrants was anywhere from 400,000 to 500,000 (Martinez 
1997; 2003). Accordingly, Chile remained an unattractive place for immigrants during 
that period (Mujica Petit 1999). By 2000, the bulk of Chilean emigrants represented 
around 4.1 percent of the total population, paradoxically, with Argentina as the main 
country of destination. It is calculated that around 207,380 Chileans live in Argentina, 
followed by 75,843 in the United States and less than 30,000 in other countries such as 
Sweden, Canada, and Australia (OCED 2009, 20). Other sources, furthermore, indicate 
that overall, Chileans residing abroad constitute anywhere from 800,000 to 1,000,000 
(Stefoni 2002, 127). 
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 Going back to the discussion of immigration from nearby countries, since 2002, 
Chile has seen an unprecedented influx of immigrants with approximately 185,000 
persons from neighboring countries, most notably from Peru and Argentina (Martinez 
2003, 15). Other accounts point to 250,000 immigrants living in Chile (Stefoni 2002, 
127). Indeed, the Argentinean population represents around 26 percent of the total foreign 
population while the Peruvian population consists of 21 percent. Notwithstanding 
elevated levels of Argentinean immigration, Peruvians are estimated to be the fastest 
growing group in Chile, with an increase of over 395 percent rate over the period from 
1992 to 2002 (Martinez 2003, 32). In 1998, according to la Direccion Nacional de 
Migraciones del Ministerio del Interior, Peruvians chose the United States as the first 
destination (194,054 persons), followed by Chile (159,353 persons), Bolivia (39,651 
persons), and Argentina (27,601). During the first months of 1997 around 157,815 
Peruvians entered Chilean soil (Mujica Petit 1999, 58).
55
 Recent data (Census 2002) 
indicates that there are close to 37,860 Peruvians residing in Chile.
56
  
 Bolivians, Ecuadorians, and Colombians, on the other hand, only represent 6, 5, 
and 2 percent, respectively, of the foreign population. Bolivians, for instance, went from 
10,919 in 2002 to approximately 18,000 at the present, which is an increase of only 41 
percent compared to the 395 percent increase rate of Peruvians, note above. Colombians, 
furthermore, is the most current group with a tendency to augment as a result of the 
worsening situation of the armed conflict in Colombia. From only 1514 Colombians in 
1992, by 2002 they represented over 4000 residents in Chile (Aranda and Morande 2007, 
61-76; Martínez 2003).  
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 In brief, even though Chile does not have a history of immigration, today is one of 
the nations with the highest immigration rates in the region, due to its solid economic and 
democratic development. Next, the role of context is examined in more detail. 
 
The Role of Context 
It is noteworthy that 10 years after the demise of the long military regime of 
General Pinochet (1973-1989), Chile became one of the most successful economies in the 
region with an average GDP growth of 7.2 percent per year from 1988-1997, real wages 
growing at a rate exceeding 5 percent per year, a decline in unemployment from almost 
20 percent during the 1980s to 6 percent by 1997, and an inflation that reached 5 percent 
rate in 1997-1998 (Edwards and Edwards 2000, 183). In recent years, Chile continues to 
be stable economy. For instance, Chile had an average growth rate of 5 percent from 
2002 to 2007. Likewise, inflation remained low with and average of 2.9 percent during 
the same five year period.
57
 It is not until the 2008 global crisis that Chile experienced a 
slow down in economic growth, but it is expected to grow 4.5 percent by the end of 2010, 
according to ECLAC.
58
 This permanent economic growth had made of Chile a country of 
attraction for migrants. 
 Similarly, in terms of democracy, Chile has undergone a continuing improvement 
in democratic indicators. According to Freedom House 2009, Chile reached a score of 1 
in both political rights and civil liberties, mirroring those in well known established 
democracies such as the United States, Canada, and European countries.
 59
 Some allude 
Chilean success to continuing government efforts to fight corruption. In fact, Chile is the 
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nation with the lowest levels of corruption in Latin America, ranking 25 out of 180 
countries, according to the Corruption Perception Index 2009.
60
 Furthermore, in 2005, 
Chile passed a series of reforms that repealed any remaining prerogatives from the 
military rule, which restored the right of the president to remove top military 
commanders. By the same token, the Chilean Congress passed a series of anti-corruption 
and finance laws that contributed to better governance, and accordingly, allowed Chile to 
gain a reputation of one of the best-governed countries in the region.
61
 
 
Chilean Migration Policy: A Short Overview 
 During the XIX century, Chile promoted non-restrictive migration regulations, 
facilitating border crossing, with very few restrictions. It is not until the end of World 
War II that Chilean migration policy became more structured. Still, Chile remained an 
unappealing place of destination compared to neighboring Argentina. As previously 
noted, the country did not attract many immigrants until the aftermath of the Pinochet 
dictatorship when an ongoing economic growth took place (Mujica Petit 1999). 
 The first law related explicitly to issues of migration was Law No. 1.094, better 
known as the ―First Immigration Law‖ in 1975. This law embarks a comprehensive legal 
approach to migration in terms of length of stay, types of visas, pertinent authorities, 
etc.
62
 A number of modifications has been introduced since then. In 1996, Law 
No.19.476 modified migration issues related in particular to asylum and refuge by 
recognizing the principle of no devolution of those demanding asylum or refugee status 
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and decriminalizes illegal entrance for this group.
63
 In 1998, Law No. 19.581 created a 
category of entry for those immigrants that come from neighboring countries through the 
establishment of a ―Neighborhood Border Card‖ (Tarjeta vecinal fronteriza), allowing 
entry and exit for those who presented the card.
64
  
 Still, Chile’s administration in terms of migration policy has and continues to 
remain unclear. In 2000, through the publication of a memoir by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Chilean government recognized the lack of public policy when related to 
issues of migration (Aranda and Morande 2007, 64). Migration appears to have been 
addressed more bilaterally, that is, country specific. For instance, a bilateral relationship 
with Peru dates back to 1929, establishing the freedom of movement between the two 
neighboring countries. From that point forward, citizens of these nations exercise safe-
conducts to transit with a duration of 6 months.  
 Because of a sudden influx of Peruvian migrants to Chile by the end of the 1990s, 
more restrictive procedures were put in place. For example, when the ―Neighborhood 
Border Card‖ (Tarjeta vecinal fronteriza) was created in 1998, Peruvians were excluded 
from this category, leading to a rise in illegal migration. The government of Peru 
protested in light of these measures and from 1999, it was established that Peruvians no 
longer needed a visa for entry. Moreover, an amnesty in 1998 and 2008 regularized a 
significant number of undocumented immigrants where an estimated 20,000 immigrants 
are believed to benefit from these measures. In fact, Peruvians make up most of this 
group.
65
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COSTA RICA 
 
Migration Flows 
 Unlike Chile, but similar to Argentina, Costa Rica is another country that has a 
long history of migration. After its independence, the Costa Rican government promoted 
immigration, in particular from Europe. Its objective was to emphasize Costa Rican 
identity as a ―white‖ nation while downplaying migration from other regions. With the 
construction of the railroad and United Fruit Company’s (UFCo) banana production at 
the beginning of XX century, foreign labor in Costa Rica was urgently needed 
(Alvarenga 2008, Castro 2008). While the government preferred mainly European 
migration to support the country’s booming agricultural activities, most Europeans settled 
in urban areas and dedicated themselves to other jobs. As a result, the Costa Rican 
government felt the need to bring other types of migrants (e.g., from China and the 
Caribbean). Some data suggests that from 1864 to 1984, the foreign population consisted 
primarily of Nicaraguans, Jamaicans, and Panamanians, and at last by Europeans 
(Alvarenga 2008, 12). In addition, foreign born residents went from representing only 2.6 
percent of the total population in 1892 to 6.2 percent in 1927, most of which were Afro-
Caribbean and Nicaraguans (Castro 2008, 26). 
 During the 1930s, because of the low demand for labor as a consequence of the 
economic crisis of the Atlantic Region, the promotion for European migration lost its 
relevancy and rather fueled pronounced anti-immigration, resulting in massive 
deportations of members of undesired groups. Consequently, in 1936, the Costa Rican 
government officially started regulating labor migration (Alvarenga 2008). 
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 The aftermath of World War II brought back to Costa Rica the dream of a 
―whiter‖ nation as many Europeans once again saw Central America as a possible 
destination. Italy, specifically, faced a sharp economic decline during the 1950s which 
generated a significant number of emigrants. Costa Rica opened its doors to around 3,000 
Italian farmers (Alvarenga 2008, 20). In subsequent years, this type of immigration 
diminished and it was not until 1980s and 1990s that Cost Rica had a significant influx of 
immigrants from neighboring Nicaragua (Castro 2008). Much of this new migration 
pattern resulted from the political and economic instability Nicaragua experienced 
throughout the Somoza and Sandinistas’ regimes as well as devastating natural disasters 
(e.g., 1972 earthquake, hurricane Mitch in 1998) (Morales 1999).  
 Nicaraguans primarily worked and still do in the coffee and banana industries. 
From 1927-1950 Nicaraguans represented 2.4 percent of the total population. By 1973 it 
had descended to 1.2 percent, but again leveled up to 1.9 percent by 1984. Still, the 
highest flow of Nicaraguans occurred in 2000 with more than 200,000 residing in various 
Costa Rican regions. This number represents almost 6 percent of the total population 
(Castro 2008, 26-30).  
 The overflow of Nicaraguans to Costa Rica in recent years has resulted in a 
variety of responses by the Costa Rican government, such as the authorization of 
Nicaraguan children in the educational system, the use of public health services, and the 
incorporation of Nicaraguans into various economic activities. Despite an overall 
acceptance of Nicaraguan migration, some allusions have been made to the potential 
problems this massive influx could generate: 
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The problem originates when immigration starts to exceed 
productive and social possibilities in the recipient country 
to integrate all the immigrant population. It could be that 
this country is close to it or that it has already reached that 
point, especially when we take into consideration the 
indicator of unemployment which is higher among 
Nicaraguans than Costa Ricans and the rest of immigrants  
 
 (Morales 1999, 8. Author’s translation). 
 
 
 To sum up, Costa Rica has a long history of migration with its highest peak of 
Nicaraguan migration during the last decade as the result of the many political and 
financial problems this neighboring country keeps on experiencing. The following 
section, analyses the role of context in Nicaragua and Costa Rica to further our 
understanding of the question of intra-regional migration in Latin America. 
 
The Role of Context 
 To better understand Nicaraguan migration, it is worthwhile to explore regional 
context within which these migration patterns exist. During the 1980s, Central America 
initiated a process of economic liberalization. Each of the countries promoted and 
diversified their economies, making the domestic economic environment more open to 
foreign investment. Despite the many advances that these countries made to ameliorate 
their economies, growth rates remained low. Costa Rica was one of the few countries 
(along with Panama) that responded better to these economic adjustments. For instance, 
more than 50 percent of new jobs were created in the formal sector, in sharp contrast to 
nations such as El Salvador and Nicaragua, two countries that were unable to generate 
even 10 percent of the jobs in the same sector (ECLAC 2003).  
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 Besides the worsening of economic and political indicators in Nicaragua, this 
country also faced the most devastating natural disasters in Central American history. In 
1972, Nicaragua endured one of the worst earthquakes up to that time. It caused 5.000 
deaths, more than 20,000 were injured, and over a quarter million of Nicaraguans were 
left without homes (New York Times, 1973). Further, in 1998, Hurricane Mitch left the 
country in ruins and generated a significant number of environmental (climate) refugees 
(Morales 1999). 
Costa Rica, on the other hand, continues to demonstrate consistent levels of 
economic and political stability, despite some recent concerns with its deterioration in 
human development indicators and an increase in violence (UNDP 2008). According to 
Freedom House 2009, Costa Rica received a score of 1 in both political rights and civil 
liberties (represents higher democracy levels) similar to those in well known established 
democracies. In terms of corruption, however, Costa Rica has been hindered by many 
corruption scandals. It ranked 43 out of 180 countries in the Corruption Perception Index 
in 2009.
66
 Still, it remains one of the most stable democracies in the region, making it an 
attractive destination in Central America as evidenced by the highest percentage (9.5%) 
of immigrants in the region (OCED 2009, 25). 
  
Costa Rican Migration Policy: A Short Overview 
 As noted, Costa Rica stressed the desire to bring mostly European migration at the 
end of the XIX century, directing many laws toward this goal. Even though there were no 
restrictions on immigration in 1871, in successive decades many laws were introduced to 
select particular migrant groups designated by the government. For example, in 1897, 
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specific ethnic groups were forbidden from entering Costa Rica, such as Chinese, Arabic, 
Armenian, among others (Alvarenga 2008).  
 Subsequent migration policy aimed at the same concept of selective immigration. 
In 1930, the Costa Rican government created ―El Registro de Identificacion 
Inmigratoria,‖ with the sole purpose of registering individuals who entered and exited the 
country. All immigrants were required to have an immigration identification card that 
was renewable every two years. If any individual entered the country without the 
appropriate documentation, this person was subject to deportation. Nonetheless, these 
measures were not applied equally to all foreigners, reinforcing the differences made 
between ―desired and undesired‖ migration (Alvarenga 2008).  
 In 1998, the Costa Rican government declared a general amnesty to legalize any 
undocumented individuals who came from other Central Americans countries. This 
measure was mainly implemented as a response to the many consequences brought by 
hurricane Mitch throughout the region. The amnesty, with duration of six months from 
February 1
st
 to July 31
st
 of 1999, mainly focused on providing more opportunities and 
better living conditions to those affected by the natural disaster (Morales 1999, 13-15). 
Most recently, the Costa Rican government, as Chile did, recognized the lack of explicit 
public policy when related to issues of migration (Gatica 2008, 135). 
Even though Costa Rica is primarily a country of destination, in recent years, 
emigration is becoming more normal, especially to the United States. It is estimated that 
around 87 000 Costa Ricans live abroad (OCED 2009). These figures demonstrate in 
some ways the difficulties of the country’s political system capacity to meet Costa Ricans 
demands, in addition to dealing with high immigration rates. 
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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
 
Migration Flows 
Unlike the other countries in this study, the Dominican Republic has a long 
history of migration with a single country—Haiti— deeply embedded in Dominican 
society. Therefore, one cannot understand this subject without taking into consideration 
how context has defined Haitian migration in various aspects of Dominican political, 
economic, and social standards.  
The Dominican Republic has faced persistent domestic conflicts, foreign 
occupation, and authoritarian regimes. For example, Haiti occupied the Dominican 
Republic for 22 years (1822-1844) leaving a legacy of confrontation between both states 
(Moya 1992). Similarly, in the beginning of the XIX century, Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic were occupied by the United States. During this period (1916-1924), North-
Americans made investments in much of the Caribbean agricultural sector and in 
particular in sugar cane plantations, creating a need for agricultural labor. Consequently, 
guest programs were put in place for Haitians to live and work in the Dominican 
Republic. 
 But it was not until 1919 that a massive immigration of Haitians took place. This 
cross-border movement was known as a seasonal agricultural migration, very much like 
the braceros in the United States during the mid 1900s.
67
 Haitian migrants worked 
mainly cutting sugar cane and resided in bateyes (communities where Haitian immigrants 
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reside specifically to work cutting sugar cane).
68
 Likewise, they were subject to 
temporary contracts and limited to working/living in certain geographic areas. After the 
contract completion, Haitians were obliged to return to their home country. This 
situation, however, resulted in a significant number of undocumented migrants because 
many of them chose to stay instead. Furthermore, the conditions under which Haitians 
worked were deplorable, underpaid, precarious; not much different from what happens 
nowadays (Moya 1992; Reyes-Santos 2008; Vairac 2008).  
 After the U.S. occupation, the Dominican Republic experienced a period of 
relative peace until General Trujillo came into power establishing a dictatorship for over 
30 years (1930-1961) and bringing with it a pronounced anti-Haitian sentiment. During 
this period, Haitians were portrayed as invaders posing a threat to Dominican culture, 
identity, traditions, economy, etc. More specifically, Trujillo institutionalized ―anti-
Haitian‖ ideology in much of every aspect of Dominican politics and society, which 
allowed the legitimization of nationalism and his authoritarian rule (Lozano 2008, Lilón 
1999). Such anti-immigrant discourse led to the justification of the killing of thousands of 
Haitians in 1937. Some estimates suggest that total deaths ranged anywhere from 1000 to 
35,000 (Reyes-Santos 2008, 21): 
Trujillo’s government put an end to the occupation of land 
with the killing and expulsion of Haitians in the Fall of 1937. The 
massacre targeted peasants, agricultural laborers, domestic 
employees and little Haitian traders in small towns and rural areas, 
but it did not target those working at sugar cane fields, that way the 
continuity of sugar production was guaranteed. After the massacre 
and during many years after, the only work available for Haitians 
that cross the border was the cutting of sugar cane.  
(Moya 1992, 20 Author’s translation). 
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Seasonal migration continued in subsequent years. Estimates of how many 
Haitians reside in the Dominican Republic today are insufficient, however. According to 
Wilfredo Lozano (1992), approximately 60,900 to 117,898 Haitians engaged in 
Dominican agriculture from 1987 to 1988. Later calculations, suggest that numbers may 
be as high as 500,000 (Lozano 2008, 32). Other sources give a more conservative number 
of only 56,583 Haitian migrants residing in Dominican soil by 2002 (OCED 2009).
69
  
Anti-Haitian sentiment has prevailed throughout Dominican Republic’s political 
history. In the aftermath of the military coup in 1963, which led to civil war and U.S. 
involvement, a new constitution was established with Joaquin Balaguer elected as 
president in 1966. During his regime and subsequent administrations, the anti-Haitian 
discourse continued. A great example of how anti-immigrant sentiment mired 
Dominican’s political life was the election of 1996. The campaign against presidential 
candidate Peña Gomez was based largely on his ethnic background. The election was 
heavily charged with Haitian antagonism and racism (Lozano 2008).   
It has been widely recognized that Haitians migrate to the Dominican Republic in 
search of better living and working conditions. Over the last decade, new Haitian 
migration, unlike previous waves, is characterized by individuals who come from Haiti’s 
urban areas. This type of migration has remained stable overtime (Silié, Segura, and 
Cabral 2002). Yet the ongoing abuse/mistreatment of Haitian immigrants continues to 
tarnish Dominican Republic’s international reputation, especially since no public policy 
has been implemented to address this issue. According to Freedom House 2009, the 
situation has worsened:  
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 Other immigrant groups reside in the Dominican Republic, but in a significant lesser extent than that of 
Haitians. For example, according to the OCED report, there are around  3,091 Venezuelans, 2,227 
Spaniards, 1,973 Cubans, 1,920 Puerto Rican, and others (16 528). 
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In 2007, a small, center-right political party filed a court case 
to strip citizenship from Sonia Pierre, a Dominican-born 
activist for Haitian rights, but backed down under 
international pressure. Several violent incidents against 
Haitians flared in Dominican towns close to the border in 
October 2008, with civilians chasing and beating Haitians—
resulting in a number of deaths—despite the authorities’ 
efforts to protect some of the migrants. The situation is 
exacerbated by poor economic prospects in the Dominican 
Republic, which has intensified competition for work among 
local and migrant populations‖ (Freedom House 2009).  
 
Further, with the devastating earthquake in Haiti that took place in January 2010, 
it is not surprising that Haitian migration will remain dynamic as the result of the 
worsening of living conditions in this country. Time projections to fully rebuild Haiti are 
estimated in no less than ten to fifteen years, according to the United Nations.
70
 In short, 
Haitian migration to the Dominican Republic does not seem to slow down any time soon. 
 
Role of Context 
Albeit the Dominican Republic progress toward higher levels of democracy since 
the downfall of authoritarian rule, the country has not reached democratic consolidation. 
It scored 2 in both political rights and civil liberties, according Freedom House 2009. The 
country also grappled with many episodes of corruption, with the most recent scandal 
under Fernandez’s administration. Therefore, it is not unexpected that the nation ranked 
99 out of 180 countries in the Corruption Perception Index 2009, bested by other nearby 
countries such as El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, and Jamaica.
71
  
                                                 
70
 See: < http://www.un.org> and  < http://www.sabanews.net/en/news205664.htm> 
71
 www.transparency.org 
 103 
In economic terms, the Dominican Republic has been doing well even after the 
2008 crisis. Real GDP growth was -0.7 percent in 2003 and by 2007 it grew to almost 11 
percent, a significant increase in just a few years. Similarly, the inflation rate was low 
since 2005 (4.19%), reaching macroeconomic stability (Seligson et al. 2008, 3). 
Moreover, the Dominican Republic is one of the very few countries that endured the 
2008 crises. In contrast to many other nations that experienced economic deterioration, 
the Dominican Republic grew by 2.5 percent in 2009 and it is expected that it will reach 
3.5 percent growth by 2010 (ECLAC 2009).
72
  
It is noteworthy that the Dominican Republic is also a country of emigration, with 
approximately 13 percent of its population (around 750,000) currently living abroad. 
Dominicans have mostly emigrated to the United States (633,267) and in a lesser extent 
to European countries, namely, Spain and Italy (OECD 2009). 
 
Dominican Migration Policy: A Short Overview 
 Throughout Dominican history, migration policy has largely been colored by a 
racist discourse. Haitians’ status has primarily been highlighted as ―non-Caucasians,‖ 
thus, giving a way for a series of justifications for their ill-treatment by various sectors of 
Dominican society (Vairac 2008). Its maximum expression was reached by the massacre 
of 1937, already mentioned in the previous section. Much of migration policy in the 
Dominican Republic has been directed toward guest worker programs for the agricultural 
sector. Following the aftermath of the 1937 massacre, an ongoing seasonal agricultural 
migration prevailed under various agreements (i.e., 1952, 1959, 1966, 1978, and 1979). It 
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facilitated cheap labor, most notably, working in sugar cane plantations. The last 
agreement took place in 1985 (Moya 1992, 20). 
 In 1997, a UN report indicated that Haitian women were extremely vulnerable 
because they are not recognized by the bateyes (community where Haitian immigrants 
reside to work cutting sugar cane) nor by the sugar cane field owners, all of which 
hinders their possibilities of obtaining legal status and benefits. Furthermore, their 
children are condemned to a situation of permanent precariousness and exploitation 
(Vairac 2008). In 2004, the latest migration law (Law No. 285-04) passed, stating that 
children born in the Dominican Republic from undocumented mothers cannot become 
Dominican nationals. This has created a social problem by denying these children access 
to any benefits.  
 The law also forbids the entrance of individuals who are mentally sick or have 
major diseases, unless they enter the Dominican Republic only for the purpose of 
receiving medical attention. Furthermore, individuals without a profession or who lack 
any skills are not to be admitted.
73
 This law has remained controversial, bringing about 
the protest of many human rights organizations and various sectors of civil society, as 
well as international attention, pressuring the Dominican government to implement 
appropriate policies that will help to ease social conflict (Lozano 2008). 
 In short, while each of the countries in this study experience varying degrees of 
immigration, the context under which immigrants come and live in the host society, 
defines the migration agenda of each. The Dominican Republic is the country with the 
most deeply embedded history of migration and anti-immigrant discourse, while 
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Argentina and Chile show the most accepting atmosphere for immigrants illustrated by 
their liberal migration policies. Further, Costa Rican migration history appears to be more 
―selective‖ at the beginning, but turns to be more accepting of other types of migration 
thereafter.  
 In terms of migration flows, Argentina, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic 
had a long history of immigration. Although Chile constituted largely a net-emigration 
country, in recent times it has turned into a country of immigration, paralleling Argentina 
and Costa Rica, historically net-immigration countries. The Dominican Republic is the 
nation with both high emigration and immigration rates all through its history. Finally, 
each state has dealt with positive and negative periods of political and economic 
development that, in turn, have influenced migration flows. 
 In the final section of this chapter, I will explore public opinion toward 
immigrants in a comparative perspective in order to have a better understanding of the 
dynamics of pro-immigrant sentiment and how countries’ specific historical events and 
contexts matter when determining the sources of such sentiments. The main argument 
throughout this dissertation is that support for democratic values will lead to a more 
accepting environment for immigrants provided that host governments cannot enforce 
policies that will eradicate immigration right away, thus, foreign born residents become 
an important minority group in host societies. And, as noted throughout this dissertation, 
to accelerate the move toward higher quality democracies, the protection of minorities is 
imperative. 
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Public Opinion: An Empirical Assessment in Four Latin American Countries 
 In the next pages, I will explore some of the main theoretical relationships already 
analyzed in Chapter III. This section begins with an overview of attitudes towards 
immigrants in the four countries under analysis and concludes with the multivariate 
analysis and the corresponding discussion of the results.  
 Figure IV.1 shows that Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic emerge as the 
countries with the highest pro-immigrant sentiment in our small sample of four countries, 
with 66.4 and 64.3 percent respectively of its population agreeing strongly or somewhat 
to the notion that the government should provide basic services for immigrants (e.g., 
health care, education, housing). These results are particularly unexpected for the case of 
the Dominican Republic because as noted, this country has a deeply embedded history of 
migration and anti-immigrant discourse. But in terms of public opinion, Dominicans 
appear to express pro-immigrant sentiment in general. Argentina, on the other hand, 
shows the lowest pro-immigrant sentiment out of the four countries with almost 53 
percent of citizens strongly or somewhat agreeing with immigrant governmental 
provision of services, followed by 55 percent of Chileans. It is worth mentioning that the 
majority of the population in the four countries reveals sympathy toward foreign born 
citizens, contrary to predictions that citizens in less developed societies convey more 
unreceptive attitudes than those in established democracies. 
 When observing closely the percentage of those who strongly or somewhat 
disagree with this support, almost 23 percent of Costa Ricans (the lowest percentage in 
the sample) express anti-immigrant opinions, compared to 27.2 percent of Argentineans, 
30.3 percent of Chileans and 31.1 percent of Dominicans.  
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Figure 0.1.  Support for Governmental Services for Immigrants by Country 
 
 
 Moreover, the Dominican Republic surfaces as the nation with a more polarized 
stand on immigration as expressed by the very low percentage of Dominicans revealing 
neutral views. Perhaps an explanation for these results is the ongoing anti-Haitian 
discourse and its political relevance throughout Dominican history. These events may 
have generated citizens that either favor or are against Haitian migration, leaving out any 
neutral sentiments. The rest of results indicate that around 20 percent of Argentineans, 15 
percent of Chileans, and 11 percent of Costa Ricans reveal neutral views, a significant 
higher number than those in the Dominican Republic. Next, we proceed with the 
multivariate analysis.  
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Multivariate Analysis  
Through an ordinary least square regression model, I am able to examine the 
influence of support for democratic values on attitudes toward foreign born residents in 
Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic. Figure IV.4 shows the 
graphical representation of the effects. As noted in Chapter III, each variable included in 
the analysis is listed on the vertical (y) axis. If located to the right of the vertical ―0‖ the 
line indicates a positive effect, and if to the left of the ―0‖ line, a negative effect is 
demonstrated.  If the effects are statistically significant, they are shown by confidence 
interval lines stretching to the left and right of each dot without overlapping the vertical 
―0‖ line (at .05 or better). If they overlap the vertical line, the effects are statistically 
insignificant. The relative strength of each variable is indicated by standardized 
coefficients.   
First, Argentina arises as the nation with the strongest democratic political culture 
in terms of attitudes toward foreign born residents, substantiating some of my theoretical 
expectations laid out in Chapter II. Argentineans that exhibit a positive perception of 
governmental efficacy, elevated levels of political tolerance and interpersonal trust, 
reveal favorable views toward immigrants, as expressed by the dots located to the right of 
the vertical line and by their confidence intervals, which do not overlap the same line. 
Chileans also display immigrant sympathy when they perceive the government as 
efficient and when they trust core political institutions. These results corroborate with the 
thesis that when citizens recognize that their institutions and governments are capable of 
satisfying their demands then, natives will be less opposed to ―outsiders’‖ competition for 
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the same resources. Chile also imparts a marginal positive effect of satisfaction with 
democracy on pro-immigrant sentiment.  
 
 
Support for Democracy
Patriotism
National Pride
Governmental Efficacy
Pol. Inst.Legitimacy
Presidential Approval
Satisfaction w/ Democracy
Pol. Tolerance
Interpersonal Trust
-0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
R-Squared =0.206
F=4.992
N =844
Interpersonal Trust
Support for Democracy
Patriotism
National Pride
Satisfaction w/ Democracy
Pol. Inst. Legitimacy
Governmental Efficacy
Presidential Approval
Pol. Tolerance
-0.1-0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
R-Squared =0.129
F=8.483
N =1174
Chile
Interpersonal Trust
Patriotism
National Pride
Pol. Tolerance
Presidential Approval
Governmental Efficacy
Pol. Inst. Legitimacy
Satisfaction w/ Democracy
Support for Democracy
-0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
R-Squared =0.097
F=5.180
N =1151
Argentina
Interpersonal Trust
Support for Democracy
Patriotism
National Pride
Pol. Tolerance
Presidential Approval
Governmental Efficacy
Pol. Inst. Legitimacy
Satisfaction w/ Democracy
-0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
R-Squared =0.068
F=4.705
N =1062
Dominican Republic
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP
95% C.I. (Design-Effects Based)
Costa Rica
Alternative Effects, SES,
and Intercept Included
 but not shown here
 
Figure 0.2. Support for Democratic Values: A Multivariate Analysis in Argentina, Chile,  
Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic 
 
 
On the other hand, and in opposition to my predictions, Costa Rica, the most 
historically stable democracy in the region, displays no effects on pro-immigrant 
sentiment. The only variable that becomes significant is support for democracy and 
against the predicted direction. Costa Ricans that express higher levels of support for 
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democracy convey negative attitudes toward foreigners, as illustrated by the dot located 
on the left side of the vertical line. This finding is surprising, especially in light of Costa 
Rica’s strong democratic political culture throughout the last half century, rendering the 
country most apt to a welcoming environment for immigrants. Here, we find that there is 
no relationship between support for democratic values and immigrant sympathy, and that 
support for democracy elicits negative attitudes among the Costa Rican citizenry.  
An explanation for these results may be the escalation of Nicaraguan migration 
during the last decade. Indeed, most of the current debate in Costa Rica has been 
surrounded by the idea that the deterioration of the quality of public services is due to 
immigration. However, studies have found that no such relationship exists (Bonilla-
Carrion 2008; Gatica 2008). As Roger Bonilla (2008) points out,  
 
―…from 1998, net-insurance has augmented in 5 percentage points for 
Nicaraguan homes and it has diminished by 5 point for Costa Ricans. 
When adjusting by the effect of taxpayers, it shows a higher decline 
among Costa Rican homes in 1998. From that year, the reason for net 
consultations has incremented by 43 percent in Nicaraguan homes, in 
contrast to 25 percent for Costa Rican homes. These results let us think of 
the possibility of the loss in the credibility of public institutions by the 
Costa Rican  population, and similarly, it seems that the Nicaraguan 
population is investing more in public services, exactly how it should be in 
contributing regimes‖ (Bonilla 2008, 146, author’s translation). 
 
 
 If Costa Ricans lose confidence in their public institutions, these feelings may 
quickly be transformed into a loss of support for democracy that, in turn, will end up in 
the general manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment. This situation opens the door for 
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future research on the question of the overall impact of citizens’ disenchantment with 
their political institutions on democracy, and their views on migration. 
The Dominican Republic, furthermore, does not show any significant effects. A 
plausible explanation for the lack of significant findings in this country may be attributed 
to the fact that Haitian migration has been profoundly rooted in Dominican politics and 
society. Hence, it is likely that there is no variation in attitudes toward immigrants across 
individuals. Dominicans may express one sort of attitude toward immigrants and no 
matter how much support for democratic values they demonstrate, how educated 
individuals are, or what other characteristics individuals exhibit, the fact that they express 
the same type of attitude may render the results insignificant when running the 
multivariate model.  
To assess more thoroughly the strength of the effects of support for democratic 
values and of other variables that may explain immigrant opinion, Table V.1 displays a 
comprehensive model by presenting only the significant effects. The full model with and 
without statistically significant effects are found in the Appendix. As indicated above, 
Argentina shows a more welcoming environment for immigrants than Costa Rica and the 
Dominican Republic.  
Specifically, for one unit increase in interpersonal trust, political tolerance, and 
governmental efficacy among Argentineans, pro-immigrant sentiment will be increased, 
on average, by 15, 11, and 24 points, respectively, on a 0 to 100 scale. Moreover, an 
interesting finding is the negative impact of authoritarian attitudes: authoritarian 
individuals show, on average, 16 points less immigrant sympathy than those who are 
more democratic. This outcome underscores the notion that authoritarian individuals tend 
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to have strong preference for conformity and uniformity (Hetherignton and Weiler 2009; 
Stenner and Feldman 1997; Stenner 2005). It does not come as a surprise that 
Argentineans who exhibit authoritarian attitudes will tend to dislike immigrants. 
 
 
Table 0.1. Determinants of Support for Governmental Services for Immigrants: 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Regression 
  
Argentina 
 
 
Chile 
 
Costa Rica 
 
Dominican 
Republic 
 Coef. ( t ) Coef. ( t ) Coef. ( t ) Coef. ( t ) 
Interpersonal Trust 0.150*** (3.57)    
Political Tolerance 0.109*** (3.36)    
Governmental Efficacy 0.235*** (3.93) 0.111** (2.73)   
Pol. Inst.  Legitimacy  0.128** (3.14)   
Support for Democracy   -0.104** (-2.97)  
Authoritarian Attitudes -0.164*** (-3.96)    
National Economic 
Satisfaction 
 0.082*** (3.57) 0.107** (2.84)  
Migration Connection 
Index 
  0.068* (2.23)  
Age   -0.068* (-2.30)  
Race
a
        Mestizo  0.068* (2.17) 0.078* (2.38)  
                 Other    0.068* 
(3.80) 
Female  -0.066* (-2.36)   
Wealth    0.069* 
(2.11) 
Size of City/Town   -0.071* (-2.22)  
Unemployed
b
  
Other (Students, 
housework, retirees) 
  
0.070* (2.20) 
  
Region
c
 Centro 
0.174** (3.22) 
 Urbano Central 
-0.094*** (-3.64) 
 
  Rural Central 
-0.083** (-2.56) 
 
Constant -0.010 (-0.22) -0.013 (-0.38) 0.016 (0.65) 0.026 (0.85) 
R-Squared 0.208 0.129 0.097 0.068 
Number of Obs. 844 1174 1151 1062 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
a.  The reference group is White                                                              
b. The reference group is individuals in the labor force 
c. The reference group for Argentina=AMBA; Chile=Norte; Costa Rica=AMSJ; Dom Republic=Metropolitan 
Note: This model takes into consideration the design of the sample. 
Source: AmericasBarometer 2008 by LAPOP 
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Another finding in the Argentinean case is the variation on immigrant opinion by 
region. Argentineans who reside in the Central region tend to have more positive 
opinions than those who live in the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Region (AMBA). 
Because foreigners tend to cluster in greater numbers in metropolitan areas, it may elicit 
more negative attitudes among the citizenry than in regions with fewer immigrants (e.g., 
Quillian 1995; Kuvonich 2004; Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006; Tolbert and 
Hero 1996; Wilkes et al. 2008,).  
In the case of Chile, one unit increase in the positive perception of governmental 
efficacy and the legitimacy of core political institutions increases immigrant sympathy 
among Chileans, on average, by 11 and 13 points, in that order, on a 0 to 100 scale, 
whereas the opposite is true for support for democracy among Costa Ricans.  
Furthermore, the more satisfied Chileans and Costa Ricans are with their national 
economic situation their positive views toward foreigners increase, on average, by 8 and 
11 points, accordingly. This outcome corroborates with prior research stating that those 
who believe that the national economy is stagnant or is not doing well are those who 
express negative views toward immigration (Citrin et al. 1997; Espenshade and 
Hempstead 1996; Chandler and Tsai 2001; Pantoja 2006, Burns and Gimpel 2000). In 
addition, Costa Rican citizens display pro-immigrant sentiments depending on their 
connections to migrant networks.  
When focusing the attention to the analysis of socio-economic demographic 
characteristics, race becomes a significant explanatory factor of immigrant opinion in 
Chile, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic. Mestizos exhibit, on average, more 
positive opinions than whites in the first two cases, while in the latter, other ethnicities 
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besides Blacks and mulattos reveal more pro-immigrant sentiment than whites. These 
results support previous studies where differences in opinion toward foreigners depend 
on race (Burns and Gimpel 2000; De la Garza, Falcon, and Garcia 1996; Hood, Morris, 
and Shirkey 1997). Women also demonstrate less favorable opinions than men in Chile. 
Region is another determinant factor in Costa Rica. Those who live in the Urban 
Central and Rural Central areas of the country show more negative opinions toward 
immigrants than those who live in San Jose’s Metropolitan Region (AMSJ). Further, 
Costa Ricans who live in bigger cities impart more unfavorable attitudes than those who 
live in smaller ones. Finally, job status and wealth seem to have an impact on pro-
immigrant sentiment in Chile and the Dominican Republic, respectively. In Chile, 
students, retirees, and those who work at home show more favorable attitudes than those 
who are in the work force. By the same token, wealthy Dominicans exhibit immigrant 
sympathy. 
In short, these results demonstrate how each country varies in its political culture 
vis-à-vis immigrant opinions. Our results indicate that a stronger democratic political 
culture is found in Argentina as expressed by the positive impact of many democratic 
values on immigrant sympathy. On the other hand, Dominican Republic’s political 
culture does not show any influence on the same attitudes. As suggested in previous 
pages, this outcome may reflect how well embedded migration is in Dominican 
Republic’s political and social life, therefore, generating little change in citizens’ views 
toward immigrants. It is noteworthy that in Chile, a country with a shorter migration 
history, a higher positive perception of government efficacy and institutional legitimacy 
leads to higher pro-immigrant sentiment. These results highlight Chile’s leading position 
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as a strong Latin American democracy. Consequently, it is not unexpected that Chileans 
are more likely to perceive immigrants favorably.  
To conclude, Costa Rica emerges as the most surprising case out of the four 
countries under study. No impact of a strong political culture is revealed in this country, 
contrary to my expectations. These results may indicate that when a massive surge of 
immigrants takes place in a small country, such as Costa Rica, people’s democratic 
attitudes may weaken, manifesting themselves in anti-democratic responses toward 
immigrants. These reactions may be explained by, as noted earlier, Costa Ricans loss of 
confidence in their public institutions to meet their basic needs, especially under 
conditions of high migration (i.e. Nicaraguan). These feelings, in turn, may quickly be 
transformed into a loss of support for democracy more generally, that, in turn, will end up 
in the general manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment. One could even go further by 
arguing that hostile attitudes may deteriorate to the point of expressing itself in higher 
support for authoritarian alternatives in order to solve the ―migration problem.‖ This idea 
will be further explored in the following chapter by the in-depth analysis of Ecuador, 
both a small country and with high migration rates. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD IMMIGRANTS: 
THE CASE OF ECUADOR 
 
 
 The country since 2000 has experienced deep demographic 
           transformations and the migration dynamic—emigration and 
           immigration—is a reality that is reconfigured in an adverse  
           context as a result of a generalized crisis and it presents new 
          challenges to an including coexistence based in the  
          acknowledgement, respect, and validity of the rights of every  
          person that resides in Ecuador.   
  (Chávez and Betancourt 2007, 32  
 Author’s translation) 
 
 
Ecuador experienced a 30 percent reduction in its gross domestic product and a 
considerable increase in poverty, from 45 to 71 percent, as a result of the economic and 
financial crisis of 1998–99 (Acosta 2006, 196). Consequently, a large number of 
Ecuadorians emigrated to Spain and a smaller number to Italy. In the last decade, it is 
estimated that 1 million to 1.5 million Ecuadorians have left the country in order to 
improve their individual and their families’ living conditions (IOM 2009).  
At the same time, Ecuador has become a country of destination in recent years. 
Neighboring Colombia has experienced an environment characterized by high levels of 
violence with the emergence of groups such as the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia), the ELN (National Liberation Army), paramilitary organizations, and 
drug-trafficking networks, creating a humanitarian crisis that has produced a large influx 
of Colombian immigrants into Ecuador. Between 2000 and 2006, Ecuador received 
approximately 250,000 displaced Colombians because of the armed conflict, and it is 
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expected that this number will increase in upcoming years if the situation is not 
resolved.
74
 
When a massive influx of migrants – be they economic or political refugees – take 
place, it usually places a tremendous pressure on a political system’s capacity to respond 
to the increased strain on its infrastructure. Often times these increased strains have 
manifested themselves in citizens’ attitudes toward the emergent democracy itself, 
sometimes leading to calls for a more repressive response to the influx of migrants 
(Seligson et al. 2006).  Provided the potential connection between immigration and 
system stress it is useful not only to understand how immigration influences citizens’ 
views toward democracy but also how preexisting attitudes toward democracy might help 
prepare citizens to react to a dramatic increase in immigration in a more tolerant and 
democratic manner.  
The main argument of this dissertation is that citizen support for democratic 
values matters for ―the question of migration‖ because it creates a favorable environment 
for foreign born residents. As demonstrated so far, citizens who support a strong 
democratic political culture understand the significance of the protection of minorities’ 
rights. And, when these rights are protected, the move toward higher quality democracies 
is more likely. If citizens, instead, create a hostile environment for immigrants, it could 
heighten violence and social distrust and even possibly ignite citizens’ support for 
authoritarian alternatives. For all these reasons, support for democratic values matter for a 
                                                 
74
 According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) only 135,000 Colombians 
are classified as refugees in Ecuador, and only 22,000 of these have formally requested asylum, probably 
because of fear or ignorance of the UNHCR system. At the same time, because of the worsening situation 
in Colombia, the increasing influx of Colombian immigrants in Ecuador has displaced many Ecuadorians in 
the country. The UNHCR has requested that other countries admit Colombians to relieve some of the stress 
on Ecuador and Venezuela. For a more detailed understanding of this issue, see El Comercio 2009 a and b; 
UNHCR 2009. 
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peaceful reception of immigrants that strengthens social cohesion and makes a diverse 
democratic society work. The present chapter seeks to offer a better understanding of the 
sources of attitudes about immigration in Ecuador through the implementation of both 
qualitative and quantitative data. 
This chapter starts with some general descriptive statistics of immigration flows 
in Ecuador and reviews briefly the theoretical framework already discussed in Chapter II. 
A novel approach to the theory is the inclusion of the theoretical justification of the 
sources of immigrant opinion of Ecuadorians migrants residing abroad. It follows with 
the discussion of how important democratic values are for the acceptance of minority 
groups in host societies and the significance of this relationship in public opinion. The 
chapter concludes with the empirical assessment of these relationships.  
 
Descriptive Statistics of Migration Flows 
Even though the majority of immigrants in Ecuador are displaced Colombians, 
there has also been an economic migration due to some economic stability and 
development experienced in recent years with the introduction of the dollar as the 
national currency (since 2000). Some descriptive statistics of the bulk of immigration is 
shown in Table V.1.75 
In Table V.1, one observes the presence of around a little over a million 
immigrants in Ecuador, with 75 percent coming mainly from Colombia and Peru. 
Peruvians, as a matter of fact, see in Ecuador a country where they can improve their 
living conditions, attributable partly to the newly dollarized Ecuadorian economy. 
                                                 
75
 All this information could be easily accessed at www.senami.gov.ec 
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Table 0.1. Migratory Movement by Nationalities in Ecuador 
Nationality Entry Exit Balance General Balance 
Colombia 1.406.169 835.948 570.221 48,61% 
Peru 685.252 373.075 312.177 26,61% 
EEUU 1.191.464 1.172.023 19.441 1,66% 
Others 1.938.676 1.667.410 271.166 23,12% 
Total 5.221.461 4.048.456 1.173.005 100% 
Source: Dirección Nacional de Migración (2000-2006) INEC Anuario Migración 2005 
Prepared by: Coalition CTMF 
 
 
 
A number of sources indicate that communities in the southern region of the 
country where many Ecuadorians emigrated have indeed become communities of 
reception. Many jobs are fulfilled by this type of immigration, particularly in provinces, 
such as El Oro, Azuay, and Loja (e.g., FLACSO 2008). Fieldwork in Loja, Ecuador, 
during the summer of 2009 supports these assertions: 
 
 
―My father has always had workers but because many people left 
in search of better lives abroad, a lot of the manual labor left, so, 
there is no manual labor. As you know agriculture is important [in 
Loja] and a lot of people are needed to work in agriculture, 
therefore, Peruvians replace those who left. For Peruvians, 
Ecuador is like the United States because of the dollar. A Peruvian, 
when he was working for us, was telling me that by working three 
months in Ecuador, they are able to buy a motorcycle in Peru and a 
motorcycle in the Peruvian border is like a taxi. Imagine what it 
means to buy a motorcycle that in Peru is really difficult, there is a 
lot of poverty down there. Therefore, a lot of them came to replace 
the people who left‖         
Interviewee, C2, Loja, Ecuador 
(Author’s translation) 
 
 
Furthermore, recent accounts suggest an escalation of Cuban immigration. Even 
though estimates of this immigration are limited, when looking at the period of four 
months from January to April 2009, around 1,633 stayed in Ecuador (El Expresso 
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2009).
76
 In addition, there are some claims that Cubans are getting into bogus marriages 
in order to acquire Ecuadorian citizenship (El Hoy 2008).
77
 During 2009, an estimate of 
1710 Cubans went to the Registry Office to get married with Ecuadorian citizens, 
representing an increase of almost 375 percent in one year. It is believed that this 
increment occurred after the suppression of visas for Cubans in 2008 (El Comercio 
2009).
78
 At the same time, a rise in reports over their illegality is registered. Fieldwork in 
Ecuador provides some evidence of people’s view on this issue: 
 
 
―When my nephew got married in the registry office, I saw a 
considerable number of Cuban males and Ecuadorian females 
waiting on-line to get married. At the end of the ceremony, we saw 
these same couples exchanging phone numbers. It was obvious that 
they were arranged marriages. Furthermore, something that was 
particularly interesting to me was that when we went to celebrate it 
[nephew’s wedding] at a restaurant, one of the Cubans I saw at the 
registry office was there celebrating his marriage by himself with 
his other Cuban friends. Very very bizarre‖ 
Interviewee, C1, Quito, Ecuador  
(Author’s translation) 
 
 
 
 
―Cubans come here to marry young girls. In fact, I know that they 
go and look for girls in the Manuela Cañizares [public school], in 
schools like that, that are public to offer them money and to marry 
them in order to get visas…I am shocked by it…‖          
Interviewee, C5, Quito, Ecuador  
(Author’s translation) 
 
 
                                                 
76
 See,  <http://www.expreso.ec/ediciones/2009/06/01/especial/ecuador-atractivo-para-
loscubanos/default.asp? 
fecha=2009/06/01> 
77
 See, <http://www.hoy.com.ec/noticias-ecuador/denuncian-supuestos-matrimonios-arreglados-de-
cubanos-en-ecuador-323148.html> 
78
 See, <http://ww1.elcomercio.com/noticiaEC.asp?id_noticia=323423&id_seccion=4> 
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Compared to other countries such as the U.S. traditionally considered a country of 
immigration with around 12.5 percent of foreign-born residents,
79
 Ecuador, with a 
population of almost 14 million,
80
 has reached an immigration of 10 percent during the 
period from 2000-2006 (Chávez and Betancourt 2007, 96). The majority, nonetheless, 
originates from Colombia making up around 50 percent of the foreign-born population in 
Ecuador. Thus, this chapter offers a historical description of Colombian migration to 
Ecuador. First, we look at Ecuador’s location in relationship to the rest of the countries in 
the region with respect to their immigrant opinions. 
 
Attitudes Toward Immigrants in Ecuador in Comparative Perspective  
As recalled in Chapter III, Ecuador compared to other countries in the region is 
situated among those with the lowest positive attitudes or, in other words, with the 
highest negative views toward immigrants, being these differences statistical significant. 
Ecuador, as Guatemala and Bolivia, shows averages lower than 50 points in scale from 0 
to 100, when positive attitudes are measured by citizens’ support for governmental 
services for immigrants.  
At the other extreme, Uruguay, Costa Rica, and Venezuela exhibited the highest 
levels of support for immigrant governmental services with averages higher than 64 on 
the same scale. Ecuador, moreover, in sharp contrast to Costa Rica, shows levels 
significantly lower than the rest of the countries with only 30 percent of its population 
supporting the notion that immigrants take jobs citizens do not want (that is, three fourths 
                                                 
79
 See, <http://pewhispanic.org/files/factsheets/foreignborn2006/Table-1.pdf> 
80
 www.inec.gov.ec 
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of the population believe that foreigners take jobs away from Ecuadorians), while Costa 
Rica displayed the highest percentage of its population favoring this view (77.2%). 
Ecuador is one of the countries with the lowest levels of acceptance of immigrants 
in the region, possibly as the result of an unexpected influx of a high number of displaced 
Colombians, and more recently, with the sudden arrival of Cubans. Fears to be displaced 
by foreigners at the job site or fears that the government will neglect citizens’ needs if the 
government provides special services to immigrants elicit unfavorable immigrant 
perceptions among the Ecuadorian citizenry. These claims are further tested at the end of 
this chapter through a multivariate analysis, but first I offer a historical overview of 
Colombian immigration and immigrant public opinion in Ecuador. 
 
Colombian Immigration and Public Opinion in Ecuador 
Before the mid-twentieth century, the movement of immigrants from Colombia to 
Ecuador was insignificant. By the end of the 1950s and 1960s, however, when Ecuador’s 
agrarian reform opened the labor market, a considerable number of Colombian farmers 
started to settle in the country to find better working conditions. In the 1960s, the number 
of immigrants doubled; it continued to grow during the 1970s and maintained the same 
levels during the 1980s (Rivera et al. 2007). 
Earlier, the ten-year civil conflict known as La Violencia (1948–58) saw the death 
of more than three hundred thousand Colombians (Molano 2000). It ended in a 
compromise that resulted in a power-sharing agreement, the National Front (Holmes, 
Piñeres, and Curtin 2006). But important sectors of the society were left out of this new 
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agreement, a result that unleashed the rise of insurgent groups later on, such as the FARC 
and the ELN.  
The FARC emerged during the 1970s from a peasant movement of only ―about 
500 people to an army of 3,000‖ (Molano 2000, 23). Today, ―it is the dominant political 
force in over 50 percent of the country’s municipalities, fielding a guerrilla army of 
approximately 18,000 mostly peasant fighters‖ (Petras 2000, 134). In sharp contrast, the 
ELN’s founders, with a considerably smaller number of members, were university 
students, oil workers, and Catholic priests who defended liberation theology (Garcia-Pena 
2000). 
The presence of the guerrillas became more problematic when other actors, such 
as paramilitary organizations and drug-trafficking networks, committed violence. Armed 
groups might attack the civil population with the purpose of strengthening and expanding 
territorial control, amassing land, and extracting natural resources (New York Times 
2009). Crimes against civilians also include ―death threats, massacres, forced recruitment, 
temporary takeover of towns, and selected homicides‖ (Ibáñez and Vélez 2008, 661). 
Consequently, the conflict has become a significant humanitarian crisis, in which a 
massive number of Colombians have been internally displaced and later have migrated to 
neighboring countries (Camacho 2005; Guanipa Muñoz 2003; Guerrero, Rodríguez, and 
Molina 1995; Padilla Muñoz, Ponce, and Betancourt 2003; Trejos and Ochoa 2004).
81
 
Today, Colombia has one of the largest displaced populations in the world, with an 
estimated 3 million persons living outside their place of residence, which corresponds to 
                                                 
81
 The paramilitary groups are more effective at inflicting displacement, compared to the guerrillas. See 
Ibáñez and Vélez 2008. 
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almost 7 percent of the country’s population and 29.1 percent of the rural residents. 
Women and children are the most affected (USCRI 2006). 
 Ecuador has experienced growth in Colombian immigration due to the armed 
conflict. According to the 2001 census, there are approximately 51,556 Colombians in 
Ecuador, living mainly in Pichincha (41.7 percent), Carchi (13.5 percent), Imbabura (12.5 
percent), Sucumbios (8.3 percent), and Esmeraldas (6.9 percent), provinces that belong 
variously to the regions of the highlands, the Amazon, and the coast (see Trejos and 
Ochoa 2004, 73). Still, considering that the characteristics of the internal conflict are 
complex, it is nonetheless difficult to differentiate immigrants who are displaced from 
those who voluntarily leave the country for economic reasons.  
As a result of the large influx of Colombian immigrants in Ecuador, negative 
perceptions and stereotypes toward this group have increased lately among the 
Ecuadorian population. For instance, there is a widespread perception that the presence of 
Colombians has augmented violence in Ecuador—crime rates, thefts, kidnappings, and so 
on (Martínez 2005). Similarly, Colombians are seen to be taking jobs from the general 
population and generating costs for the Ecuadorian government by taking advantage of 
health services and education (Camacho 2005; Rivera et al. 2007; Trejos and Ochoa 
2004). Certain sectors of Ecuadorian society feel threatened by Colombians in the labor 
market. One reason for this widespread negative sentiment toward Colombians is the role 
that the mass media play in promoting restrictive actions against Colombians (Izquierdo 
2005). In contrast, there are Ecuadorians who think that Colombians are hard workers, 
perseverant, kind, and savvy about how to sell and do business (Camacho 2005).  
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Because of all the aforementioned reasons that Ecuadorians become intolerant of 
Colombian immigrants or immigrants in general, why is it that some Ecuadorians have 
positive attitudes toward foreigners? What sets them apart from others with respect to 
their views toward immigrants?   
Throughout this dissertation I have argued that a strong democratic political 
culture contribute to a more sympathetic view of immigrants in host societies. This more 
welcoming environment, consequently, helps a democratic society to more effectively 
handle a sudden surge of foreigners than nations where anti-immigrant attitudes may 
produce heightened violence and threats to various components of democracy. 
Furthermore, an anti-immigrant environment may increase citizens’ support for 
authoritarian alternatives ―to put an end‖ to the migration problem. For that reason, a 
strong democratic political culture understood as a high support for democratic values 
and democratic political support is essential for the persistence of democracy as a form of 
government  
 
Core Hypothesis: Individuals with higher levels of democratic values are more likely to 
view immigrants positively.  
 
Given that the goal of this research is to study in more depth immigrant 
perceptions in Ecuador as it is facing both sides of the same phenomenon (emigration and 
immigration); these points of exposure allows the researcher to have more leverage in 
establishing the causal mechanisms of the relationship between support for democratic 
values and the formation of attitudes toward immigrants. Before I turn to the empirical 
 126 
description of my main dependent variables and the statistical analysis of immigrant 
opinion in the Ecuadorian context, I offer a brief overview of emigration and how it may 
influence emigrants’ views toward immigration in Ecuador. 
 
Ecuadorian Emigrants Views on Immigration in Ecuador 
Ecuador has become the country of the Andean region with the highest percentage 
of emigration with respect to its population. Specifically, from 1999 to 2007, around one 
million of Ecuadorians have left the country which represents 7 percent of the Ecuadorian 
population or the equivalent to 14 percent of the EAP (Economically Active Population) 
(FLACSO 2008, 15). Almost 50 percent among these have moved to Spain, 33 percent to 
the United States and 9, 4 percent to Italy. These three countries host 89 percent of all the 
global Ecuadorian foreign population (FLACSO 2008, 33).  
As noted in the introduction Chapter of this dissertation, the original intent of 
fieldwork research in Spain was aimed toward the study of social remittances, that is, 
―the ideas, behaviors, identities, and social capital that flow from receiving-to sending-
country communities‖ (Levitt 1998, 927)  as a part of a larger project. But as a result of 
some interviews in which the issue of immigration in Ecuador was willingly brought into 
light by some of the respondents, my interest on this topic grew tremendously.  
This chapter attempts to show the significance of a strong democratic political 
culture on immigrant perceptions in Ecuador by adding to the discussion emigrants’ 
views. The expectation is that Ecuadorian emigrants will be more sympathetic toward 
immigrants in Ecuador because they understand the difficulties that come with migration 
due to their condition as foreigners themselves. In addition, I suspect that immigrants by 
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working and living in more developed societies will acquire new ideas and behaviors. 
These individuals’ exposure to migration, one would argue, is in part a product of the 
tension that emerges between an individual’s attitudinal and behavioral ―status quo‖ – 
that is, her accepted way of thinking and behaving politically – and the new ideas and 
behaviors that the individual is exposed to through migration (Black 1987; Levitt 2001; 
Ramakrishnan 2005; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001). Whether such tension, if it 
emerges, will bring about negative or positive change (with respect to democratic 
attitudes and behaviors) depends on a variety of factors, first and foremost whether the 
individual himself/herself benefits from his/her exposure to migration. So for instance, if 
Ecuadorians moving to Spain have positive experiences living and working in a 
developed democratic economy, we might expect these individuals to have a greater 
support for democratic values and, in turn, a positive opinion toward immigrants in their 
country of origin. My fieldwork in Spain shows that this may be the case.  
The following excerpts expose the opinions of Ecuadorian emigrants who 
reported having positive experiences living in Spain. The first passage illustrates the 
opinion of an Ecuadorian male residing in Spain for eight years. The second passage, on 
the other hand, shows the views of a recent Ecuadorian female migrant living in the 
Spanish capital for two years. The third passage, shows the opinions of an Ecuadorian 
female that lived in Spain for 5 years, moved to Ireland for one year, and currently 
resides in Luxembourg. All three respondents share the common feature of having 
experienced the benefits of living in a new nation that, in turn, may have an association 
with their sympathetic views toward immigrants in Ecuador.  
 
 
 128 
 ―I think that people, who come to our country, come to seek a better 
future, a better life. And if they are good hard working people, they can 
easily be integrated. You also have to think that they need housing, food 
and that helps the domestic economy, and if they offered their services at 
lower wages and they work better than Ecuadorians that helps to the 
development of certain sectors…  
 
Interviewee, Ma8, Madrid, Spain 
(Author’s translation) 
 
 
 
―The driving force for human mobility is the search for a better future. The 
vast majority of immigrants in Ecuador are Colombians and Peruvians, 
who attracted by several factors like the dollar, peace, and living costs 
have been installed legally or illegally in the country. The process of 
immigration in a country could be potentially good for society… Given 
the labor migration to countries like the U.S., Spain or Italy, a few sectors 
such as that of the flower sector were left without work and immigration 
[in Ecuador] somehow balanced the missing workforce. Unfortunately, 
violence has itself been a factor linked to migration, both by the 
composition of its members, as well as the techniques adopted by the 
criminals. Overall, I think that immigrants in Ecuador are the most 
vulnerable group that can positively contribute to the development of 
society, but within a framework of state control and planning…‖ 
 Interviewee, Ma10, Madrid, Spain 
(Author’s translation) 
 
 
 
Everyone has the right ―to live‖ as one sees it fit and if the solution 
is not found in one’s local area, why not go somewhere else to look for a 
better life? Human beings are citizens ―of the world‖… In relation to 
Ecuador, we must remember that we are an imminent country of 
migration, with more than 1 million Ecuadorians abroad, so why not give 
the same opportunity that we find in other countries to those who now 
come to live in ours? This is a great opportunity to learn to be tolerant, to 
respect other cultures and also learn from their professional experience, 
etc… What we don’t understand is that no one is better or worse, just 
different and to accept those differences in one’s country is more difficult. 
Now that I am an immigrant myself and after a long time, I have noticed 
all this. 
Interviewee, Lux1, Luxembourg  
(Author’s translation) 
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All these passages depict the complexities of the migration phenomenon and how 
it can be turned into an agent for development. I contend that these ideas are connected to 
broader views of democracy itself and views of how a working democracy should handle 
this phenomenon. As noted before, if citizens recognize that their political system is 
capable of satisfying citizens demands, as it is most likely to be the case in the developed 
world (e.g., Spain), then, individuals are more likely to express less opposition to 
―outsiders‖ entitlement to resources and a peaceful life under the same regime. Moreover, 
individuals residing in developed democracies may relate the instrumental value of 
democracy with a ―working democratic political system‖ increasing the recognition of 
certain rights vis-à-vis the political system and fellow citizens. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that emigrants who report having had good experiences in their host societies 
also express favorable views toward immigrants in their country of origin.   
In contrast, if emigrants may in fact experience hostility from the part of their host 
community, then, I suspect higher opposition to immigrants in their country of origin. 
When I was conducting research in Murcia, Spain, I came across Miriam, an Ecuadorian 
residing in Spain for seven years. My interest was in understanding if her political views 
had changed since her arrival to this established European democracy after a life in the 
troubled Ecuadorian system.
82
After several minutes of listening to her story, as she 
described the reasons behind her decision to leave Ecuador and the many difficulties she 
had to overcome to make this foreign city her new home, she mentioned that one of the 
biggest challenges she faced in her new country was the hostility expressed toward her 
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 During my fieldwork in Europe I was able to explore further on the question of migration’s impact on 
individuals political attitudes and behaviors which will be examined in future studies. The objective of this 
section is to establish a possible connection between how individuals’ exposure to migration may have 
influenced their views toward democracy more generally and, consequently, perceive immigrants and 
immigration differently than otherwise do if they stayed in their home country.   
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from Spaniards. Most interestingly, however, was what she said next, recounting a 
conversation she had with her sister back home: 
 
 
―The other day my sister was telling me that there are too many 
Colombians there [Ecuador] and I asked her if there were 
Bolivians, and she told me no. I told her anyway that all of them 
should leave because it is not their country, and they don’t do 
anything good‖  
Interviewee Mu1, Murcia, Spain 
(Author’s translation). 
 
 
 
This interview illustrates how a migrant who faces negative experiences under a 
―working democracy,‖ the more she or he will be inclined to express similar attitudes 
toward immigrants in her country of origin. Of course fieldwork data serve as an 
illustration and by no means represent the views of the whole population of Ecuadorian 
migrants abroad. My intention in here is only to elucidate on the theoretical connection 
behind broader views about democracy and attitudes toward immigrants. 
By providing opinions of Ecuadorian emigrants as well as of those left behind and 
common Ecuadorian citizens, I hope to introduce additional evidence on the sources of 
favorable opinions toward immigrants in a developing democracy. The remaining of this 
chapter concentrates on the empirical assessment of immigrant opinion in 2008 and adds 
some preliminary evidence of recently available 2010 data. I draw some comparisons 
between 2008 and 2010 and conclude with the discussion of the findings.  
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How Do We Measure Attitudes Toward Immigrants? 
As a member of LAPOP, I had the exceptional opportunity to include three more 
questions in the 2008 and 2010 Ecuadorian dataset that are directly related to this 
research and explained more extensively in Chapter I. The items take into consideration 
the social, economic, and cultural dimension of migration, presenting several advantages. 
For instance, they measure the degree of acceptance of immigrants in one’s country by 
tapping into distinct aspects of attitudes toward immigrants, such as the economic, 
cultural, and social dimensions. One shortcoming, however, is that these questions do not 
specify an immigrant group. But still, the fact that respondents are free to choose the 
immigrant group they see as most relevant in their daily lives render these items more 
accurate. Moreover, during my fieldwork in Ecuador I had the opportunity to ask 
Ecuadorian citizens broader questions on migration. The questions asked were: 
 
What do you think about immigration in Ecuador and why do you think that? 
How did you arrive to this opinion? Newspapers? TV? Friends? 
 
The advantage of this approach is to examine in general terms how individuals 
view immigration. What are the benefits and shortcomings of having a significant influx 
of foreigners in the country? And are there differences in opinion by group of 
immigration? My intention in asking these questions was to let respondents answer as 
freely as they wanted on their views on immigration without conditioning their responses 
to a specific topic or immigrant group. Some respondents may see the economy or job 
availability directly affecting their lives through migration, while others may see national 
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identity or culture associated to migration. Other respondents, furthermore, may spouse 
pro-immigrant sentiment as they may have families or friends abroad and understand 
better this phenomenon.  
Ecuador is a country as much of emigration (with many residing in nations such 
as the United States, Spain, and Italy, among others) as it is of immigration with an 
increasing presence of many immigrant groups (e.g., Colombians who make up the 
highest percentage of foreigners, Peruvians, Cubans, Chinese, and Americans). This 
chapter proceeds with the empirical analysis of the data with a succinct introduction of 
how immigrant opinions may have been influenced by the 2008 economic recession. 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Immigration Items 
Table V.2 and V.3 displays some descriptive statistics related to immigrant 
opinion for the years 2008 and 2010. We want to know if there are significant differences 
between both years. If they are, the expectation is that a drastic event may have happened 
during this period that may have triggered more opposition against foreign-born 
residents. The specific case of the 2008 economic crisis comes to mind. Even though the 
Latin American and Caribbean region was not deeply affected by the economic recession 
as were advanced industrial democracies such as the United States, the European Union, 
and Japan to name a few,
 83
 it did have a moderate effect on the Ecuadorian economy.  
Ecuador averaged an economic growth of 3.2 percent during the 2006-2007 
periods, reaching a 6.5 percent in 2008. However, by 2009 it declined to -2.2 percent 
                                                 
83
 The US experience an economic growth decline of 2.5% in 2009, but it is expected to grow by 2.1% in 
2010. Japan, in contrast, a nation that severely felt the consequences of the economic recessions (-5.4%) 
compared to other advanced industrialized nations is expected to grow only marginally in 2010 (0.9%). 
See, http://www.un.org/esa/policy/wess/wesp2010files/wesp2010pr.pdf 
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(World Bank 2010, 137). Predictions of an economic recovery are on the way suggesting 
that economic growth will arrive at a 1.7 percent by the end of 2010 and 3 percent by 
2011 (World Bank 2010). Another natural impact of the economic crisis in Latin America 
and the Caribbean region is a significant decrease in remittances. Ecuador, for instance, 
experienced a 22.7 and 11.56 percent remittance reduction by the end of 2008 and 2009, 
respectively.
84
 Still, Ecuador has been comparatively less affected by the crisis than other 
countries in the region with over 70 percent of Ecuadorian emigrants continuing sending 
remittances to Ecuador.
85
 The question becomes: did the economic crisis have an effect 
on Ecuadorians views toward immigration? Is it possible that we see a rise in anti-
immigrant sentiment in 2010 due to unfavorable economic conditions? 
 Table V.2 shows that in 2008, 46 percent of citizens ―strongly agree‖ (19%) and 
―somewhat agree‖ (27%) that the Ecuadorian government offers services to immigrants. 
On the other hand, around the same percentage ―strongly disagrees‖ (26%) or ―somewhat 
disagrees‖ (15%) with the provision of these governmental services. Only 14 percent of 
Ecuadorians reveal a neutral view towards this topic. These results indicate Ecuadorians’ 
polarized stand on the role that the government should play vis-à-vis immigration. When 
we look at the 2010 data, the results remain virtually the same. There is very little 
variation in citizen’s views toward this topic during this period. Do we see the same trend 
with other migration items? 
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 See, http://www.elcomercio.com/noticiaEC.asp?id_seccion=6&id_noticia=268596 
See, http://www.elcomercio.com/solo_texto_search.asp?id_noticia=218836&anio=2010&mes=3&dia=8 
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 See, http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=2100503 
Table 0.2. Support for Governmental Services for Immigrants in Ecuador 
 2008 2010 Change 
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Table V.3 shows other descriptive statistics of attitudes towards immigrants 
related to job security, cultural identity, crime, and the economy. For instance, the top left 
portion of Table V.3 shows that 70 percent of respondents think that immigrants take jobs 
from Ecuadorians in 2008 and with an increase of one percentage in 2010. Conversely, 
only one third of the sample thinks that immigrants take jobs Ecuadorians do not want in 
both years. Some fieldwork in Ecuador supports the former: 
 
 
―The people who come to Ecuador come here to earn in dollars, 
consequently, they take away job opportunities or jobs from 
Ecuadorians because they offer their services at a lower value to 
what Ecuadorians will charge for their work‖ 
Interviewee, A7, Quito, Ecuador 
(Author’s translation) 
 
 
 
―I don’t think it is right that a lot of people from other countries 
come because they are taking jobs away from our own Ecuadorian 
brothers and sisters, consequently fueling the exit of our people 
abroad 
Interviewee, F12, Quito, Ecuador 
(Author’s translation) 
 
 
 
Strongly Agree (%) 18.91 18.38 -0.53 
Somewhat Agree (%) 26.69 25.90  -0.79 
Neutral (%) 13.58 14.76  +1.18 
Somewhat Disagree (%) 15.20 16.69 +1.49 
Strongly Disagree (%) 25.62 24.27 -1.35 
N 2908 2954  
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Similarly, the right portion of Table V.3 shows that almost three quarters of the 
population thinks that immigrants weaken the Ecuadorian culture, while only one fourth 
of the sample agrees that Ecuadorian culture is enriched by foreign-born residents in 
2008. There is a little change of 3 percentage points in 2010, suggesting that the same 
levels of this view continue during a two-year period. Contrary to the popular belief that 
there is no cultural threat perceived by Ecuadorians —as the racial and ethnic make-up of 
immigrants from neighboring countries (e.g., Colombia and Peru) is not substantially 
different from that of Ecuadorians, and Ecuadorian citizens may not reflect negative 
attitudes toward a specific ethnic group, like those expressed in developed countries 
(compared, for example, to U.S. citizens’ negative attitudes toward Mexican 
immigrants)— the present results indicate that Ecuadorians reveal fears of a threat to 
Ecuadorian culture and national identity despite immigrants’ ethnic similarities (Rivera et 
al. 2007).
86
Qualitative data confirms some of these assertions: 
 
―Unfortunately, people that come here from other countries are not 
the most prepared nor the most educated. They have come here to 
take our jobs and they want to impose their bad customs in our 
country‖ 
Interviewee, E17, Quito, Ecuador 
 
 
Moreover, the bottom right portion of Table V.3 shows that the majority of 
Ecuadorians (60%) believe that immigrants have a negative impact on the economy in 
2008, with only few percentage points up in 2010 (67%), corroborating previous studies 
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 Furthermore, it is difficult to disentangle the question of xenophobic attitudes and racism in the 
developed world. Citizens may be presenting one or the other or both attitudes at once because immigrants, 
in addition to being foreigners, may also have a different ethnic-racial make-up from citizens in host 
societies.  
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where citizens tend to have negative opinions toward immigration, especially when they 
link the arrival of immigrants to the state of the national economy.  
 
 
 
Table 0.3. Attitudes toward Immigrants Related to Jobs, the Economy, Culture and Crime 
Problems (2008-2010) 
 
Immigrant Opinion 
 
Change 
 
Immigrant Opinion 
 
Change 
 
Would you say that the people who 
come to live here from other 
countries: 
  
Would you say that Ecuadorian 
culture is generally weakened or 
enriched by immigrants? 
 
        
 2008 2010   2008 2010  
Take Jobs 
Ecuadorians 
Don’t Want 
(%) 
 
30.07       
 
28.64 
 
-1.43 
 
Enriched 
(%) 
 
 
24.57 
 
21.29 
 
-3.28 
Take Jobs 
From 
Ecuadorians 
(%)  
 
69.93 
 
71.36 
 
+1.43 
 
Weakened 
(%) 
 
75.43   
 
78.71 
 
+3.28 
N 2,704 2,748  N 2,678 2,550  
 
Do crime problems in Ecuador are 
worsened by immigrants that come 
to live here? 
  
Would you say that it is good or 
bad for the Ecuadorian economy 
that immigrants live here? 
 
        
 2008 2010   2008 2010  
 
No (%) 
 
10.35 
 
25.33 
 
+14.98 
 
Good (%) 
 
39.76 
 
32.92 
 
-6.84 
 
Yes (%) 
 
89.65   
 
74.67 
 
-14.98 
 
Bad (%) 
 
60.24   
 
67.08 
 
+6.84 
N 2,695 2,823  N 2641 2494  
 
 
 
If the economy is doing well and people perceive it is making progress, then, 
attitudes toward immigrants tend to be positive. Conversely, when the economy is doing 
badly or it is stagnant, people tend to reveal negative attitudes toward foreign-born 
residents (Chandler and Tsai 2001; Citrin et al. 1997; Espenshade and Hempstead 1996). 
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This preliminary evidence shows little support for a rise in anti-immigrant sentiment 
among Ecuadorians even during hard economic times.  
None of the variables examined so far show a significant increase in negative 
attitudes in 2010, contrary to our expectations. In fact, the bottom left portion of Table 
V.3, exhibits that the percentage of Ecuadorians expressing negative views toward 
immigrants when related to crime issues decrease significantly from 90 to 75 percent in 
2008-2010, while those who express favorable views increase from 10 to 25 percent 
during the same period. Still, the majority of the population believes that crime problems 
are worsened by the influx of immigrants in both years, providing additional evidence for 
the link citizens make between a rise of criminal activity and immigration (Palmer 1996).  
Fieldwork in Ecuador complements both of these findings: 
 
 
 
―In the last few years the arrival of too many foreigners has 
affected in a certain way the country’s economy because the 
majority comes to look for a job and they find it more easily than a 
person from here. At the same time, there is more crime which is 
terrorizing everyone. Insecurity is huge‖ 
Interviewee, E13, Quito, Ecuador 
(Author’s translation) 
 
 
 
―On one hand, there are people who come to invest in businesses 
in order to do better economically and foment employment. On the 
other hand, there are people that come here to harm our country in 
terms of higher levels of robberies, insecurity, crime, alcoholism, 
tabaquism, rapes, etc.‖ 
Interviewee, F10, Quito, Ecuador 
(Author’s translation) 
 
  
 138 
In addition, Ecuadorians associate specific immigrant groups to particular 
occurrences as noted above, that is, citizens make a linkage between the types of 
migration with the type of issue experienced in the country (Chávez and Betancourt 
2007). These results suggest that citizens do differentiate between immigrant groups. 
They also are indicative that negative views persist; even if one group is perceived ―more 
favorably‖ than the other, the overall opinion toward immigrants is negative (Sniderman 
et al. 2000). 
 
―I think that some people come to work honestly in our country but 
the majority of foreigners are coming to cause harm. For example, 
due to the presence of Colombians, crime has augmented. Or 
Cubans come here in search for freedom that in their country of 
origin don’t have, but they are displacing Ecuadorian manual labor 
because they work for very cheap‖ 
Interviewee, E18, Quito, Ecuador 
(Author’s translation) 
 
 
 
―They [immigrants] invade the Ecuadorian market. For example, 
the Chinese sell clothing and steal room for Ecuadorian 
merchandises‖ 
Interviewee, F13, Quito, Ecuador 
(Author’s translation) 
 
 
 
In short, all the evidence provided so far points to a high anti-immigrant sentiment 
among the Ecuadorian citizenry even after taking into account the possible effects of the 
2008 economic recession. Why, then, is it that some Ecuadorians exhibit immigrant 
sympathy? What sets them apart from others with respect to their views toward 
immigration? In the next pages, I attempt to answer these conundrums.   
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Who are those Ecuadorians Who Reveal Favorable Opinions toward Immigrants? 
 First, descriptive statistics are calculated: means for continuous and frequencies 
for dichotomous variables. Second, an ordinary least squares (OLS) linear regression 
model is applied to estimate the effects of the predictor variables, specifically, the effects 
of democratic values on pro-immigrant sentiment are examined after controlling for the 
traditional demographic factors, authoritarian attitudes, threat from a minority, prejudice, 
ideology, national and personal economic satisfaction, media effects, the perception of 
personal insecurity, and the degree of connectedness to a migrant network.  
Table V.4 displays some descriptive statistics of the main variables analyzed in 
this chapter for the years 2008 and 2010. Statistically significant changes during this two-
year period are depicted by the bolded figures in the last column on the right. The mean 
for the independent and control variables ranges anywhere from 34 to 95 in 0-100 scale 
in both years; the legitimacy of core political institutions shows the lowest mean. The 
highest mean, on the other hand, corresponds to national pride. It shows a statistically 
significant increase in 2010, illustrated by the last column on the right. On scale from 0 to 
6, the mean for a migrant connection is of 1.02 and 0.95 in 2008 and 2010, respectively, 
and during the same time period, the size of the city (smallest to largest) presents a mean 
of 2.6 on 1-5 scale. The mean for wealth is of 3.8 on 0-9 scale in 2008, with no changes 
in 2010.
87
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 The ―wealth‖ index consists of a count of household assets and access to basic services at the household 
level. The list of assets in the survey includes durable goods, such as a TV set, a refrigerator, a car, and a 
computer, and access to basic services like clean water and sewage inside the house. For a more detailed 
description of this index, see www.lapopsurvey.org 
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Table 0.4. Summary of Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Factors: Full Sample (N = 3,000) 
 
Individual Characteristics 
Descriptive Statistics* 
2008 2010 Change 
Mean Std. D Mean Std. D 
Independent Variables       
Support for the Political System       
     Support for the Political Community 
          National Pride  
 
88.16 
 
(24.71) 
 
94.55 
 
(14.91) 
 
+6.39 
          Patriotism   72.64 (27.03) NA NA NA 
     Support for Democracy in Principle 64.75 (28.27) 68.05 (27.14) +3.3 
     Support for Democracy in Practice 52.83 (21.82) 51.70 (23.58) -1.13 
     Legitimacy of Core Pol. Institutions  34.30 (18.73) 40.80 (20.51) +6.5 
     Perception of Governmental Efficacy 46.80 (25.72) 50.56 (24.31) +3.76 
     Presidential Approval  62.18 (22.05) 61.43 (21.83) -0.75 
Political Tolerance  46.04 (25.28) 50.49 (25.38) +4.45 
Interpersonal Trust  55.72 (30.28) 56.05 (31.57) +0.33 
Control Variables       
     Threat from a Minority 52.75 (29.99) 48.73 (30.88) -4.02 
     Prejudice 63.12 (32.11) 61.02 (35.69) -2.1 
     Ideology (Role of State) 70.98 (25.30) 81.95 (19.04) +10.97 
     National economic satisfaction 43.02 (21.62) 47.41 (20.75) +4.39 
     Personal economic satisfaction 50.87 (19.66) 51.60 (18.62) +0.73 
     Media effects  84.69 (25.01) NA NA NA 
     Perception of personal insecurity 43.94 (29.71) 42.30 (30.39) -1.64 
     Migration Connection Index (0-6) 1.02 (1.66) .95 (1.55) -0.07 
Socioeconomic Demographic Variables 
     Age  
 
38.48 
 
(15.46) 
 
39.42 
 
(15.77) 
 
     Education  10.16 (4.25) 10.11 (2.19)  
     City size (from smallest to largest, 1–5) 2.6 (1.49) 2.58 (1.46)  
     Wealth (from 0-9) 3.8 (1.7) 3.9 (1.66)  
 Perc 
(%) 
Obs Perc 
(%) 
Obs  
     Gender                     Male 
                                      Female 
50.00 
50.00 
(1,500) 
(1,500) 
50.00 
50.00 
(1,500) 
(1,500) 
 
     Race                          White 
                                      Mestizo 
                                      Indigenous 
                                      Others 
8.62 
83.04 
4.14 
4.21 
(254) 
(2,448) 
(122) 
(124) 
10.28 
82.18 
3.13 
4.41 
(305) 
(2,439) 
(93) 
(131) 
 
     Occupation              Unemployed 
                                      Working 
                                      Other 
4.30 
59.93 
35.76 
(128) 
(1,783) 
(1,064 ) 
5.13 
57.43 
37.10 
(154) 
(1,723) 
(1,113) 
 
     Region                      Costa 
                                      Sierra 
                                      Oriente 
44,23 
39.83 
15.93 
(1,327) 
(1,195) 
(478) 
43.90 
39.70 
16.40 
(1,317) 
(1,191) 
(492) 
 
Authoritarian Attitudes          Iron Fist 
                                                Participation for all 
31.93 
68.07 
(904) 
(1,927) 
22.94 
77.06 
(672) 
(2,257) 
-8.99 
+8.99 
* All the variables were recoded into 0-100 scale unless indicated otherwise 
Source: AmericasBarometer 2008 and 2010 by LAPOP 
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Similarly, age and education exhibit a mean of 38 years and 10 years, in that 
order. Half of both samples consist of women and the other half by men.  The percentage 
of unemployed Ecuadorians in 2008 is of 4.3 percent, with most of them actively looking 
for a job compared to 60 percent that is already in the labor force. Only a minor increase 
in the unemployed population (5.13%) is registered in 2010. Furthermore, in 2008, 68 
percent of Ecuadorians support a government with the participation of all, whereas only 
32 percent support a government with an iron fist. Surprisingly, there is a significant 
reduction of Ecuadorians who support a government with an iron fist (from 32 to 23 
percent).  The highest statistical significant change from 2008 to 2010 yet is that of the 
role of the state, with an increase of over 10 points. The rest of the variables have 
remained about the same during this time period with very few statistically significant 
changes.  
 
Results 
In this section, I will complement public opinion data with my own field research 
in Ecuador to provide a better assessment of the linkage between a strong democratic 
political culture and pro-immigrant sentiments.
 
At the same time, in order to maintain 
comparability with previous Chapters, I decided to focus on the analysis of the same 
dependent variable employed throughout this dissertation, that is, support for the 
provision of governmental services for immigrants. In that way, comparisons can be 
drawn with other nations included in this study.
88
   
                                                 
88
 Each variable included in the analysis is listed on the vertical (y) axis. The impact of each of those 
variables on attitudes toward immigrants is shown graphically by a dot, which if located to the right of the 
vertical ―0‖ line indicates a positive effect, and if to the left of the ―0‖ line a negative effect.  If the effects 
are statistically significant, they are shown by confidence interval lines stretching to the left and right of 
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Figure V.2
89
 displays the effects of support for democratic values on immigrant 
sympathy. Starting from bottom up and going on the predicted direction, we observe that 
interpersonal trust has a positive impact in 2008, while it did not yield statistically 
significant results in 2010. Interpersonal trust is essential for democratic societies because 
it allows for general interactions between individuals that come from dissimilar 
backgrounds and who hold different views and values, consequently, increasing political 
tolerance (Córdova 2008). These actions are believed to reinforce democracy (e.g., 
Fukuyama 1995, Putnam 1993, 2000, Uslaner 2002).  
Political tolerance did not reach statistical significant effects in 2008. Fieldwork 
research in Ecuador, nonetheless, suggests that there are some citizens that do view 
political tolerance as a fundamental value for democracy. When asked what do you think 
of the rights to vote, run for office or give a speech of the people who constantly criticize 
the government or the form of government? Some interviewees said: 
 
 
 ―I believe that in one way or the other, we all are citizens, and 
democracy is just that, the power for everyone who lives here. I 
totally approve with their right to vote, etc‖ 
Interviewee, G2, Quito, Ecuador 
(Author’s translation) 
 
 
 
―Everyone has the right to express their opinions. As there are 
sectors in favor of the government, they are others that are not, and 
they should be respected…‖ 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
each dot that do not overlap the vertical ―0‖ line (at .05 or better). If they overlap the vertical line, the 
effects are statistically insignificant. The relative strength of each variable is indicated by standardized 
coefficients.   
89
 The 2010 data did not include variables related to patriotism or the effects of the media. I suspect that the 
substantive significance of the results without these variables will change only marginally. 
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With regards to immigration, the same individual responded:  
 
 
 
―In mi opinion foreigners come to look for better opportunities the 
same way our migrants do in countries such as Spain, and I believe 
that they deserve respect…‖ 
Interviewee, G14, Quito, Ecuador 
(Author’s translation) 
 
 
These responses illustrate the significance of political tolerance in eliciting 
attitudes of respect among the citizenry toward the rights of those individuals who do not 
necessarily agree or share the same views, traditions, and values than oneself.  
 
 
Patriotism
National Pride
Support for Democracy
Satisfaction w/ Democracy
Pol. Inst. Legitimacy
Governmental Efficacy
Presidential Approval
Political Tolerance
Interpersonal Trust
-0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2R-Squared =0.071
F=3.117
N =2293
Alternative Effects, SES,
and Intercept Included
but not shown here
Presidential Approval
Support for Democracy
National Pride
Political Tolerance
Government Efficacy
Pol. Inst. Legitimacy
Satisfaction w/ Democracy
Interpersonal Trust
-0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3R-Squared =0.124
F=13.449
N =2293
2010
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP
95% C.I. (Design-Effects Based)
2008
 
Figure 0.1.  Determinants of Support for Governmental Services for Immigrants 
 in Ecuador (2008-2010) 
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Moreover, completely inconsistent with my expectations, the 2010 results show 
that higher levels of political tolerance, in fact, have a negative effect on pro-immigrant 
perceptions. These results are unexpected and open questions for future research in this 
topic. Is it possible that political tolerance may have different effects on other dimensions 
of immigrant opinion?   
In addition, quantitative results indicate, in Figure V.2, that the perception of the 
government as efficient has a positive impact on immigrant sympathy in both years. They 
highlight the important role that the government plays in maintaining citizens’ 
satisfaction with its role in fighting unemployment, poverty, corruption, etc. Therefore, it 
is natural that natives express positive views toward foreigners because they view the 
government as an agent to meet their own needs as well as that of immigrants. Fieldwork 
in Ecuador strengthens these views: 
 
 
―The government has done a lot of good things such as creating 
programs to fight poverty, helping to give credits to people that 
want to start up their own business, giving houses to those in need, 
giving jobs to disable people in addition to promoting the value of 
kindness and other values‖  
 
 
The same respondent said: 
 
 
―I think that a lot of people like to come here to live because it is a 
very calm country and generally things that can be harmful do not 
happen. In addition, Ecuadorians appreciate a lot of knowledge 
that are brought by foreigners and also they create sources of work 
because some of them come to put up their own businesses and this 
allows Ecuadorians to have a stable job‖ 
Interviewee, G13, Guayaquil, Ecuador 
(Author’s translation) 
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―Everyone has the right to live somewhere and a job to live, but the 
governments of each country should first support their own people 
and not foreigners. Because if the people are doing ok then they 
could help foreigners‖ 
Interviewee, D15, Quito, Ecuador 
(Author’s translation) 
 
 
 
Further, we see in Figure V.2, in the predicted direction, that national pride 
influences negatively immigrant perceptions (2008-2010). Qualitative research illustrates 
the strength of Ecuadorians attachment to their country. The following excerpt shows an 
interviewee’s answer to the following question: to what extent are you proud of being 
Ecuadorian? 
 
To be an Ecuadorian is to have it in your blood; and I feel very very proud 
and honored to be an Ecuadorian because our people are people who have 
values, cultures that no other country has. In addition, our land is filled 
with flora and fauna that no other country possesses. 
Interviewee, A11, Quito, Ecuador 
(Author’s translation) 
 
 
 
 These results highlight that elevated levels of national pride may develop a sense 
of ―blind patriotism‖ in which people tend to be less accepting of outsiders (Schatz, 
Staub, and Lavine 1999). A result that is striking and inconsistent with my expectations 
in 2008  is the relationship between support for democracy in principle (best for of 
government) and negative views toward foreigners (statistically insignificant in 2010): 
the higher support for democracy the lower pro-immigrant sentiment is revealed among 
the Ecuadorian citizenry. An explanation for these results may be the escalation of 
Colombian migration during the last decade. As a matter of fact, most of the current 
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debate in Ecuador has been surrounded the idea that the deterioration of quality of public 
services is due to immigration (Camacho 2005; Rivera et al. 2007; Trejos and Ochoa 
2004). If Ecuadorians lose confidence in their public institutions, these feelings may 
quickly be transformed into a loss of support for democracy. And, in turn, wind up in the 
general manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment.  
These results echo those found in Costa Rica (results exposed in Chapter IV). In 
contrast to other nations examined thus far, both countries have faced a sudden surge of 
immigrants (e.g., Nicaraguans in Costa Rica and Colombians/Cubans in Ecuador) as a 
consequence of the internal conflicts experienced in these migrants’ home countries. 
These events seem to have elicited negative associations between citizens’ democratic 
norms and immigration. It could be that there is a turning point for natives’ democratic 
attitudes in host societies and their views toward immigration, especially when significant 
migration flows take place in small countries. Immigrants may be viewed as placing 
tremendous strains in the system capacity to respond to citizens’ demands. These 
outcomes, moreover, may manifest themselves in anti-democratic responses to solve the 
―migration problem‖ that, in turn, weakens the quality of democracy. I will look further 
into these explanations in the concluding chapter of this dissertation.  
To assess more thoroughly the strength of the effects of support for democratic 
values and of other variables that may explain immigrant opinion, Table V.5 displays a 
more comprehensive model by presenting only significant effects. The full model with 
and without statistically significant effects are found in the Appendix. Table V.5 reports 
findings of the impact of having positive opinions toward immigrants in 2008 and 2010. 
Results in 2008 show that one unit increase in the levels of interpersonal trust and the 
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perception of governmental efficiency increases, on average, pro-immigrant opinion by 6 
and 12 points on a 0 - 100 scale, respectively. On the other hand, a unit increase in 
support for democracy in principle and national pride will decrease, on average, 
immigrant sympathy by 7 points in the same scale.  
Most of the control variables included in the model found in Table V.5 did not 
reach statistical significance, except for few socio-demographic factors. Older individuals 
and the unemployed express lower levels of pro-immigrant sentiment compared to those 
that are in the work force, validating research on the negative effects of economic 
deprivation (e.g., Gang, Rivera-Batiz, and Yun 2001; Tucci 2005). Yet these findings do 
not hold in 2010. Rather our results in 2010 show that the indigenous Ecuadorian 
population and those individuals who live in bigger cities tend to express more favorable 
opinions than Mestizos and those who live in rural areas.  
Further, Ecuadorians who live in the Oriente and Sierra regions, show less pro-
immigrant sentiment than those who live in the Coast. This evidence validates the 
argument that a higher immigrant presence brings out negative views among natives 
given that both regions hold the highest immigrant populations, noted previously. It is 
worth mentioning that all these results became statistically significant after taking into 
account the design effect of the sample. 
Perception of insecurity and the degree of connection to a migrant network 
became significant in 2008. While the positive impact of the latter makes sense, the 
former is a result that is striking and inconsistent with my expectations.  
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Table 0.5. Determinants of Support for Governmental Services for Immigrants in Ecuador: 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Regression 
 2008 2010 
 Coefficient. T Coefficient. T 
Interpersonal Trust 0.059* (2.23)   
Political Tolerance   -0.050* (-2.38) 
Governmental Efficacy 0.123** (3.06) 0.165*** (3.35) 
Support for Democracy -0.069* (-2.56)   
National Pride -0.074* (-2.24) -0.118*** (-5.28) 
Perception of Insecurity 0.092*** (3.29) -0.075* (-2.45) 
Migration Connection Index 0.053* (2.25)   
Unemployed
a
 -0.046* (-2.22)   
Indigenous
b         
   0.051* (2.00) 
Size of City/Town   0.094* (2.43) 
Age -0.052* (-2.12) -0.067* (-2.36) 
Region
c
         Oriente   -0.076** (-2.83) 
                       Sierra   -0.059* (-2.01) 
Constant -0.035 (-0.71) -0.009 (-0.38) 
R-Squared 0.071  0.124  
Number of Obs. 2293  2293  
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
a. The reference group is individuals in the labor force  
b. The reference group is Mestizo                                                           
c. The reference group is Costa 
Note: This model takes into consideration the design of the sample. 
Source: AmericasBarometer 2008 and 2010 by LAPOP 
 
 
There is no clear explanation for the linkage between higher levels of insecurity 
perceptions and pro-immigrant sentiment. So far, much of quantitative and qualitative 
research indicates that citizens associate a rise in criminal activity with the rise of 
immigration (Chávez and Bentancourt 2007; Palmer 1996); in quite opposition of what is 
found in 2008. We find in 2010, however, that an increase in insecurity perception leads 
to higher anti-immigrant sentiment, consistent with prior literature on this topic. Still, it 
remains unclear why we register a positive impact in 2008 and a negative impact in 2010. 
I leave this question up for future inquires. 
In the case of the positive association between citizens’ degree of connection to a 
migrant network and immigrant sentiment, the results go on the predicted direction in 
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2008 (did not reach statistical significance in 2010).
90
 These results highlight the 
importance of the different sides of migration (emigration and immigration) in the daily 
lives of many Ecuadorians. I indicated earlier that the degree to which individuals are 
exposed to migration in general—be it with family abroad or the desire to live and work 
in a different country—will influence these citizens’ views on migration, most likely, by 
increasing their understanding of the dynamics of this phenomenon. Fieldwork in 
Ecuador supports the quantitative results: 
 
 
―I believe that in the same way as Ecuadorians who go to work in 
Europe and the United States, the people who come to our country 
have the same right because they look for a better future‖ 
Interviewee, D8, Quito, Ecuador  
(Author’s translation) 
 
 
 
―I think that migration is very good because we all deserve the 
opportunity to have or get a job by any means. I also think that it is 
good because there are Ecuadorians that also go to work in 
different countries and all of us have the same right…I have direct 
contact with them because I have familiars that have left the 
country because there is no work here and it is 8 years and we all 
know that to survive, we have to do whatever it takes‖ 
Interviewee, G6, Quito, Ecuador  
(Author’s translation) 
 
 
 These results clearly demonstrate that individuals who have direct experience 
with migration become more sympathetic to foreigners.  
 
                                                 
90
 The Migration Connection Index was created by Hiskey and Córdova (2008) to measure the degree of 
connection to a migrant network. The three survey questions used to create this index are: 
(1) Do you have plans to leave the country to work or live during the next three years? 
(2) Do you have close relatives who used to live in this household and are now living abroad?? 
(3) Does your family receive remittances from abroad?  
For a more detailed explanation of this index’s theoretical and empirical approach, see Hiskey and Córdova 
(2008) 
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 Do all these results tell us the whole story when related to citizens’ democratic 
political culture and their views toward immigrants? Thus far, I have presented 
quantitative and qualitative evidence for the argument that a democratic political culture 
matter for immigrant reception as it helps to mitigate social conflict, making democracy 
endure. On the other hand, if citizens express persistent anti-democratic responses to the 
question of migration, it will create a hostile environment that may even galvanize 
citizens’ support for authoritarian alternatives to stop the ―migration problem.‖ In the 
following section, I examine how anti-immigrant attitudes may decrease the quality of 
democracy and even pose a threat to democratic stability. 
 
Support for Authoritarian Alternatives: Support for Military Coups 
In this final section, a possible connection between anti-immigrant attitudes and 
support for authoritarian alternatives, namely, military coups is examined. We start from 
the premise that anti-immigrant attitudes are the result of people’s scoring low on 
various features of a democratic political culture. I suggested earlier that a rise in anti-
immigrant sentiments is bad for democracy because these feelings may translate into the 
support for fundamental violations of human rights. Few instances consist of citizens’ 
engagement in aggressive behavior against foreigners, endorsement of restrictive 
policies, denial of basic human rights, etc, than in turn, undermine democracy.  
Besides few examples already noted above, a recent anti-immigrant legislation in 
the U.S. was passed in the State of Arizona. It was approved by the House of 
Representatives and signed by the state’s governor in April 23, 2010. It authorizes the 
police to arrest foreigners suspected to be illegal as well as sanction individuals who 
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transport undocumented immigrants, including family members.  Specifically, it gives the 
police the power to arrest foreigners based only on ―reasonable suspicion‖ and not actual 
evidence (New York Times 2010).
 91
 This law is expected to increase racial profiling.  
Another illustration of how extreme could anti-immigrant sentiments gets and, 
consequently, decrease the quality of democracies is if instances as the ones that follow 
spread to the general population. On the night of November 8, 2008, an Ecuadorian 
migrant was walking on the streets outside New York. He suddenly met a group of young 
U.S. citizens who were allegedly hunting to beat up migrants that night. The event 
escalated to such levels of violence, going from brutally beating him up to stabbing him 
several times that eventually ended with his life (El Comercio 2010).
92
 Another example 
of this aggressive behavior was the case of an Ecuadorian teenager who was brutally 
attacked by her fellow Spanish classmates in one of Madrid’s high schools during the 
summer of 2008. The incident turned gruesome when the teenager was left almost 
unconscious while her Spanish classmates stood and watched, shouted encouragement, 
and recorded it on their cell-phones.
93
  
In the Latin American context, Ecuadorians (ironically) have exhibited similar 
attitudes and acts of aggression toward immigrants, most tragically displayed in the event 
of April, 2008 when two Colombians were incinerated alive as a response to their 
allegedly criminal practices.
94
 These are some of the examples of how anti-democratic 
                                                 
91
 See, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/15/us/15immig.html?pagewanted=1&sq=arizona%20 
immigration&st=cse&scp=1 
92
 See, http://beta.elcomercio.com/2010-04-16/Ecuatorianos/Ecuatorianos-en-el-Mundo/Noticia-
Principal/marcelo-lucero.aspx 
93
 See, <http://www.elcomercio.com/noticiaEC.asp?id_noticia=317898&id_seccion=4> 
<http://www2.deia.com/es/digital/sociedad/2008/08/01/488279.php> 
94
 See, < http://www2.elcomercio.com/noticiaEC.asp?id_noticia=183214&id_seccion=4> 
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attitudes may translate into fundamental violations of human rights and, in turn, 
undermine democracy.  
All these reactions to the migration question, therefore, lead us to expect that the 
more citizens’ express anti-democratic responses toward immigrants, the more likely 
these reactions may not only weaken the quality of these democracies, but perhaps even 
allowing an environment highly supportive of authoritarian alternatives to put an end to 
the ―migration problem.‖ The following questions measure if citizens, under certain 
conditions, support military coups in Ecuador.  
 
Now, changing the subject. Some people say that under some circumstances it would be 
justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d’état (military coup). In 
your opinion would a military coup be justified under the following circumstances? [Read 
the options after each question]:  
JC1. When there is 
high unemployment. 
(1) A military take-over of the 
state would be justified 
(2) A military take-over 
of the state would not 
be justified 
(88) 
DK 
(98) 
DA 
JC10. When there is 
a lot of crime.  
(1) A military take-over of the 
state would be justified 
(2) A military take-over 
of the state would not 
be justified 
(88) 
DK 
(98) 
DA 
  
JC13. When there is 
a lot of corruption. 
(1) A military take-over of the 
state would be justified 
(2) A military take-over 
of the state would not 
be justified 
(88) 
DK 
(98) 
DA 
 
These items tap into citizens’ willingness to justify a military take-over under 
conditions of unemployment, crime, and corruption. An Index of Support for Military 
Coups (0-100) was created from these questions, which is used as the dependent variable 
in the analysis that follows. Figure VI.3 provides some evidence of how anti-immigrant 
attitudes may undermine democracy by increasing natives’ support for military coups in 
2010. 
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After controlling for other theoretical relevant variables that may be associated 
with the support for coups, the belief that immigrants increase crime problems leads to 
higher levels of this support, as shown by the dot located at the right side of the vertical 
line. This evidence is striking and consistent with my expectations. When natives 
perceive that foreign-born residents cause problems in their societies, they show 
authoritarian tendencies: a higher support for military coups. Still, none of the other 
immigrant items render statistically significant results suggesting that Ecuadorians are 
still willing to defend democracy even under conditions of high migration.  
 
 
Insecurity Perception
Unemployed
Other
White
Indigenous
Other Ethnicity
Female
Wealth
Size of City/Town
Education
Age
Neg. National Econ Perception
Neg. Personal Econ Perception
Immigrants Increase Crime
-0.1 0.0 0.1-0.15 -0.05 0.05 0.15
95% Confidence Interval (Design-Effect Based)
Source: AmericasBarometer 2010 by LAPOP
R-Squared =0.029
F=5.469
N =2701
 
Figure 0.2.  Impact of Anti-Immigrant Sentiment on Support for Military Coups (2010) 
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Only in the case of crime, Ecuadorians are more likely to support military coups. 
In the last few years, crime problems have increased in Ecuador considerably and citizens 
mostly think of Colombian and most recently Cuban immigrants as those executing such 
acts, demonstrated by my fieldwork in Ecuador.  
  This chapter has investigated in more-depth attitudes toward immigrants by 
adding to the discussion the views of Ecuadorians living abroad. In addition, I offered 
some support for the argument that anti-immigrant attitudes may undermine democracy 
by increasing support for authoritarian alternatives, illustrated by the support for military 
coups. In the next chapter, I put together my assertions and findings and conclude with 
the implications of what this research means for Latin American democracies more 
generally.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Throughout this dissertation, I attempted to provide answers to the following 
questions: What are the causes and consequences of citizens’ attitudes toward migrants in 
Latin America?  Why is it that some citizens express positive attitudes, while many 
others want to get rid off them? What do these attitudes, both positive and negative, mean 
for a world increasingly characterized by the movement of people across borders? The 
main argument turned around the importance of the linkage between attitudes towards 
immigrants and more general democratic attitudes, a relationship that has been largely 
overlooked in the past. I have asserted repeatedly that the attitudinal components of what 
many refer to as a democratic political culture contribute to pro-immigrant views among 
native-born citizens. This more welcoming environment in turn helps a democratic 
society to more successfully handle an unexpected dramatic influx of migrants compared 
to those societies where anti-immigrant attitudes may cause increased violence and 
threats to the rule of law and other critical elements of democracy.  
In Chapter I, an overview of the main ideas that drive this research was presented. 
It outlined the significance of a democratic political culture for the survival and quality of 
Latin American democracies through its positive impact on immigrant opinion as 
migration is becoming an increasingly feature of these less developed societies. The 
description of why migration has gained political saliency in recent years was exposed, 
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followed by the research design including the quantitative and qualitative approaches 
implemented in this dissertation.   
 Chapter II reviewed relevant literature with respect to public opinion toward 
immigrants in developed democracies and established the theoretical framework of the 
significant role that a democratic political culture plays for immigrants’ reception in host 
societies and how it mattered for the quality of democracy. I hypothesized that 
individuals with higher support for democratic values, such as political tolerance and 
interpersonal trust, are more likely to view immigrants positively as they understand that 
one of the quintessential tenets of democracy is the respect of minorities’ rights. I also 
theorized that citizens who support democracy in the abstract and in practice will express 
more favorable views toward foreign born residents. Furthermore, individuals with higher 
levels of patriotism will show more pro immigrant sentiment, whereas individuals with 
elevated levels of national pride will demonstrate negative opinions. I also included into 
the discussion the importance of national level characteristics: economic development 
and a country’s levels of democracy. The key expectation for the role of context was that 
countries with higher levels of economic development and democracy will have higher 
averages of pro-migrant sentiments than less developed and democratic countries.  
Chapter III presented a general assessment of the consequences of a strong 
democratic political culture in the Americas. Empirical analyses and a general discussion 
of these relationships were outlined. The main statistical techniques implemented in this 
chapter were multilevel analyses, highlighting the importance of context. In fact, the 
findings confirmed many of my expectations. First, context is a significant explanatory 
factor of immigrant opinion, adding more evidence to this area of research (Gang, 
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Rivera-Batiz, and Yun 2002; Kunovich 2004; McLaren 2003; O'Rourke and Sinnott 
2006; Quillian 1995; Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006; Wilkes, Guppy, and 
Farris 2008).  
For instance, economic development and democracy elicit pro-immigrant sentiments 
among Latin Americans. Specifically, individuals who live in more developed and 
democratic societies exhibit more immigrant sympathy that citizens with the same 
characteristics in less developed and less democratic societies. When immigrant opinion 
is measured by support for the provision of governmental services for immigrants, after 
controlling for other factors, Argentina emerged as the most pro-immigrant country in the 
sample compared to Bolivia, the most anti-immigrant nation. Not surprisingly, Argentina 
is the country with the highest economic development in the region while Bolivia is 
among the poorest nations.  
The same is true in terms of democratic development. We found that pro-immigrant 
opinion, when related to the belief that foreign-born residents do not take the jobs from 
native-born citizens, is greater in more democratic nations: Uruguay and Costa Rica, than 
less democratic societies such as Guatemala, considered partly free according to the 
Freedom House 2009.
95
 These results offered additional support for the argument that 
democracy matters for the strengthening of social cohesion in increasingly diverse 
societies. However, when immigrant sympathy was measured by the support of 
governmental services, democratic development did not reach statistical significance. 
Because of data limitations across countries in the Americas, we were unable to explore 
further if democracy influences other dimensions of immigrant opinion, such as issues 
related to crime, the economy, and culture, as we did for the case of Ecuador.  
                                                 
95
 For more information, see www.freedoomhouse.org 
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These are important areas for future research. For example, can we find the same 
relationships in the context of the developed world? Do more democratic nations in the 
developed world indeed present a more inclusive environment for immigrants than ―less‖ 
democratic nations? Why do we see this emerging backlash against immigrants in many 
European countries and the United States, while in other countries such as Australia a 
more opening society for immigrants is more apparent?  Does it have something to do 
with the weakening/strengthening of these countries democratic political culture? 
 Other cross national results included the positive impact of each of the components 
of democratic political support. Satisfaction with democracy, legitimacy of political 
institutions, governmental efficacy, presidential approval, all of these factors increment 
support for the provision of governmental services for foreigners and increase the 
likelihood to believe that immigrants do the jobs native-born citizens do not want. By the 
same token, support for democratic values, namely, political tolerance and interpersonal 
trust increase support for governmental services. When related to the belief that 
immigrants do not take jobs from native-born, only interpersonal trust increases the 
probability of having this view. National pride and support for democracy, on the other 
hand, reduce support for the provision of governmental services for foreign born-
residents and did not yield statistically significant results for the belief that foreigners do 
not take jobs away from citizens. The former operated in the expected direction, whereas 
the latter was a surprising finding that also opens questions for further research.   
Does support for democracy decreases when citizens perceived that immigrants put 
strains on the system’s capacity to meet natives’ needs? What is the mechanism behind 
support for democracy and immigrant opinion? Is it possible that support for democracy 
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is related differently to various dimensions of immigrant opinion? What is the direction 
of the arrow? Is it that immigration has an impact on democratic attitudes or is it that 
democratic attitudes affect the formation of immigrant opinion? Another avenue for 
future research is the implementation of structural equations to tease out concerns about 
endogeneity.  
Chapter Five concentrated on the analysis of four countries: Argentina, Chile, 
Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic. It offered a historical review of migration flows 
and migration policy in these countries as well as an overview of their economic and 
political development. The intention here was the provision of additional evidence for the 
significance of context in the formation of attitudes toward immigrants in Latin America, 
by specifically looking at these four countries. By implementing a multivariate regression 
analysis, the results in this chapter demonstrated that a stronger democratic political 
culture was found in Argentina, expressed by the positive impact of various features of a 
democratic political culture on pro-immigrant sentiment. The Dominican Republic, in 
contrast, did not yield any significant effects, suggesting that perhaps migration is so well 
embedded in this country’s political and social life generating little change in citizens’ 
views toward foreign born residents. Moreover, Chile, a country with a shorter migration 
history, showed a favorable perception of government efficacy and institutional 
legitimacy that led to higher immigrant sympathy. These results emphasized Chile’s 
leading position as a consolidated Latin American democracy.  
In this chapter, the most surprising case out of the four countries was that of Costa 
Rica. No support for the argument of a strong democratic political culture was found in 
Costa Rica, especially after providing some evidence in Chapter III in which democratic 
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development, measured by Freedom House, situated Costa Rica (alongside Uruguay) as 
the most democratic nation with pro-immigrant views. A possible explanation for these 
findings suggested that when a dramatic influx of immigrants takes place in a small 
country such as Costa Rica (or Ecuador), people’s democratic attitudes may diminish, 
resulting in a more anti-immigrant sentiments. Citizens may fear that too many migrants 
pose a threat to the political system’s capacity to meet non-migrants needs and no matter 
how democratic the country’s political culture is; its citizens will remain hostile until 
getting habituated to the new arrivals. Perhaps these mechanisms also appear in the 
context of the developed world, as was the case of the United States with the arrival of 
many Germans, Irish, and Chinese immigrants in the turn of the XX century, later 
becoming successfully integrated into American society. Now, the challenge seems to 
incorporate many Latino immigrants. I argue that the same may take place in the context 
of developing countries as those found in Latin America, illustrated by the Costa Rican 
and Ecuadorian cases. 
Chapter Five presented a unique opportunity to study migration from its various 
dimensions. Both quantitative and qualitative evidence for the positive impact of a 
democratic political culture on immigrant sympathy was provided. A novel approach in 
this chapter was the inclusion of the opinions of emigrants. I showed that Ecuador is as 
much a country of immigration as it is of emigration. It has experienced a significant 
mass departure of its population to the developed world (e.g., United States, Spain, and 
other European countries) and in a lesser extent to neighboring countries (e.g., Chile). At 
the same time, Ecuador is the recipient of a significant number of Colombians, Peruvians, 
and Cubans, among others.  
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This chapter also included some evidence for the argument that anti-immigrant 
attitudes undermine democracy by increasing support for military coups. Yet not all the 
items that measure immigrant sentiment became statistically significant when related to 
authoritarian tendencies. Ecuadorians are still willing to defend democracy even under 
conditions of high migration. Another avenue for future research is to look further into 
this question in other countries that have lately experienced a decline in democracy as 
well as a rise in levels of immigration; such is the case of Venezuela. In the same vein, it 
will be interesting to extend this kind of analysis to the developed world, especially as an 
increasing backlash against foreigners is taking place at present (exemplified by the 
proliferation of anti-immigrant policies in many of these nations). 
In conclusion, why is it that a strong democratic political culture leads to more 
favorable views toward immigrants? One reason is that people who support a democratic 
political culture understand the importance of protecting the rights of minorities which 
allows for a more accepting environment that, in turn, accelerates the move toward higher 
quality democracies. 
As immigration has become an important part of host societies in developed 
countries and lately in the developing world (e.g., Peruvians in Chile), it is crucial to 
understand the dynamics of how preexisting attitudes toward democracy might help 
prepare citizens to react to a dramatic increase in immigration in a more tolerant and 
democratic manner. This dissertation found that a strong democratic political culture 
remains a defining feature of immigrant opinion. Moreover, not only a democratic 
political culture matters for the acceptance of non-natives in host societies, but also a 
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country’s levels of economic and democratic development are central in the formation of 
these attitudes.   
Another implication of this dissertation is related to the measurement of opinions 
toward immigrants as an alternative evaluation of how democratic is the political culture 
of individuals. Thus far, a democratic political culture has been regarded as an output in 
the democratization process. In this dissertation, a democratic political culture is seen as 
an input in the acceptance of immigrants, leading to a harmonious coexistence between 
different cultures. While prior research has shown that individuals can be tolerant toward 
a variety of groups, they are not necessarily supportive of those that they dislike (e.g., 
Gibson 2006). When related to immigrant opinion, citizens in democratic societies may 
score very high in different democratic attitudes, but still express intolerant attitudes 
toward foreign born residents. In other words, while democratic norms are the more and 
more ingrained in many societies across the globe and the majority of citizens enjoy a 
better protection of their rights, many among these are not necessarily ―democratic‖ when 
related to attitudes toward non-natives.  With a world increasingly characterized by the 
movement of people across borders, to find different ways of measuring how foreign-
born residents are viewed and treated may be, as noted, an alternative assessment of how 
democratic is the political culture of individuals who live under democratic regimes. And, 
at the same time it can be indicative of the quality of these democracies. 
In terms of policy implications, it is widely demonstrated that education is a 
critical element for democracy because it enhances tolerance even among those who have 
negative feelings toward a specific group (Bobo and Licari 1989; Gibson 2006; 
Golebiowska 1995; Lawrence 1976; Orcés 2008). Therefore, it would be important for 
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governments, especially where immigrants are becoming a fast growing minority group, 
to implement programs that expand a better understanding of the migration question and 
that help find ways to turn migration into an agent for development in host societies. By 
creating programs that incorporate foreigners more successfully in receiving-countries, 
the move toward higher quality democracies is more feasible, reducing social conflict and 
distrust that can stem from increasing immigration in a volatile economic context as those 
found in Latin America.  
Through an extensive analysis of what affects the formation of attitudes toward 
immigrants, in this dissertation I attempted to elucidate some of the reasons of why 
maintaining and strengthening a democratic political culture in Latin America is 
fundamental, especially when many of these democracies still face many other challenges 
at present.  I hope that this study will open further research and debate on what I see as a 
topic of increasing significance not only for certain countries in Latin America, but much 
of the developing world where increasing migration rates (domestic or international) are 
taking place in the context of an ongoing democratization process. The challenge for 
further research, therefore, is to extend this kind of analysis to all Latin American 
countries and the developed world.  
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Tables 
 
 
Table A.1. Immigration and Emigration in Latin America and the Caribbean (14 countries) 
Country 
 
Immigration: 
Share of the population 
(%) 
Emigration: 
International Movement Rate  
 (%) 
Belize 14.4 27.4 
Costa Rica 10.2 9.7 
Dominican Republic 4.1 10.4 
Argentina 3.9 5.6 
Venezuela 3.8 5.3 
Panama 3.2 8.2 
Uruguay 2.5 9.5 
Chile 1.4 4.5 
Bolivia 1.2 5.3 
Ecuador 0.9 5.9 
Mexico 0.6 9.5 
El Salvador 0.6 14.6 
Guatemala 0.4 5.2 
Brazil 0.4 0.8 
 Source: ECLAC 2008 
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Table A.2. A Linear Multilevel Analysis of the Determinants of Pro-Immigrant Sentiment 
in LAC:  The Impact of Economic Development, 2008 
 Coef.    Std. Err. z P>z    [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
GDP Per Capita Index .1268 .0448 2.83 0.005 .0388 .2148 
Other (Student, Housework, 
Retiree) 
.0006 .0082 0.07 0.940 -.0155 .0168 
Unemployed
a
 -.0170 .0074 -2.28 0.023 -.0316 -.0023 
Mujer -.0066 .0080 -0.83 0.405 -.0223 .0090 
Wealths .0095 .0101 0.94 0.347 -.0103 .0294 
City of Size/Town .0112 .0084 1.33 0.184 -.0053 .0278 
Education .0170 .0096 1.77 0.078 -.0018 .0360 
Age -.0276 .0082 -3.37 0.001 -.0437 -.0116 
Migration Connection Index .0429 .0076 5.60 0.000 .0279 .0579 
Perception of Insecurity -.0123 .0079 -1.55 0.122 -.0279 .0032 
Effects of Media -.0163 .0083 -1.95 0.051 -.0327 .0001 
Personal Economic 
Satisfaction 
.0366 .0086 4.24 0.000 .0197 .0536 
National Economic 
Satisfaction 
.0332 .0088 3.75 0.000 .0158 .0506 
Role of State -.0136 .0084 -1.62 0.105 -.0300 .0028 
Prejudice -.0267 .0083 -3.19 0.001 -.0431 -.0103 
Threat of Minority 
Perception 
-.0181 .0077 -2.35 0.019 -.0333 -.0030 
Authoritarian Attitudes -.0046 .0075 -0.62 0.539 -.0194 .0101 
Interpersonal Trust .0463 .0078 5.91 0.000 .0309 .0616 
Political Tolerance .0231 .0083 2.78 0.005 .0068 .0395 
Presidential Approval .0464 .0093 4.96 0.000 .0281 .0648 
Governmental Efficacy 0874 .0107 8.14 0.000 .0663 .1085 
Core Pol. Institutions 
Legitimacy 
.0384 .0098 3.92 0.000 .0191 .0576 
Satisfaction with 
Democracy 
.0687 .0083 8.24 0.000 .0523 .0850 
Support for Democracy -.0246 .0088 -2.78 0.006 -.0420 -.0072 
Patriotism -.0067 .0090 -0.74 0.457 -.0243 .0109 
National Pride -.0188 .0081 -2.32 0.020 -.0347 -.0029 
_cons .0064 .0413 0.16 0.876 -.0745 .0874 
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Random-effects 
Parameters 
Estimate Std. Err [95% Conf. Interval] 
pais: Identity 
var(_cons) 
 
.0220 
 
.0093 
 
.0095 
 
.0507 
var(Residual) .9119 .0098 .8928 .9315 
  
Mixed-effects REML regression                                                                    Number of obs      =     
17046 
Group variable: pais                                                                                       Number of groups   
=        14 
Obs per group:      min       =    732                    
                                 avg       =    1217.6                      
                                max       =    2292 
Wald chi2(26)                      =    969.78 
Log restricted-likelihood   =   -23513.984                      Prob > chi2         = 0.0000 
LR test vs. linear regression: chibar2(01) =   259.02    Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000 
a. The reference group is individuals in the labor force 
Source: AmericasBarometer 2008 by LAPOP 
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Table A.3. A Logistic Multilevel Analysis of the Determinants of Pro-Immigrant Sentiment 
in LAC: 
The Impact of Democracy, 2008 
 Coef. Std. Err. Z P>z [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Freedom House Index (inv) .4562 .1682 2.71 0.007 .1265 .7860 
Other (Student, Housework, 
Retiree) 
-.0012 .0195 -0.06 0.948 -.0396 .0371 
Unemployed
a
 .0159 .0223 0.71 0.477 -.0279 .0598 
Female -.0230 .0217 -1.06 0.289 -.0655 .0195 
Wealth .1393 .0275 5.06 0.000 .0853 .1933 
City of Size/Town -.0493 .0228 -2.16 0.031 -.0940 -.0045 
Education .1460 .0273 5.34 0.000 .0924 .1996 
Age -.0235 .0224 -1.05 0.295 -.0676 .0205 
Migration Connection Index .0556 .0204 2.72 0.006 .0155 .0957 
Perception of Insecurity -.0623 .0213 -2.92 0.003 -.1041 -.0205 
Effects of Media .0035 .0227 0.16 0.876 -.0411 .0482 
Personal Economic Satisfaction .0401 .0240 1.67 0.095 -.0069 .0871 
National Economic Satisfaction .0434 .0239 1.82 0.069 -.0034 .0903 
Role of State -.2002 .0250 -7.99 0.000 -.2493 -.1511 
Prejudice -.0903 .0229 -3.94 0.000 -.1352 -.0453 
Threat of Minority Perception .0226 .0208 1.09 0.276 -.0181 .0635 
Authoritarian Attitudes .0281 .0203 1.38 0.168 -.0118 .0680 
Interpersonal Trust .0611 .0208 2.94 0.003 .0203 .1019 
Political Tolerance -.0210 .0225 -0.93 0.351 -.0652 .0231 
Presidential Approval .1543 .0273 5.64 0.000 .1007 .2079 
Governmental Efficacy .0218 .0289 0.75 0.451 -.0349 .0786 
Core Pol. Institutions Legitimacy .0812 .0261 3.11 0.002 .0299 .1324 
Satisfaction with Democracy .1111 .0224 4.95 0.000 .0670 .1551 
Support for Democracy .0458 .0241 1.90 0.058 -.0014 .0932 
Patriotism .0376 .0250 1.50 0.133 -.0114 .0867 
National Pride -.0226 .0229 -0.98 0.325 -.0676 .0224 
_cons -.2623 .1614 -1.63 0.104 -.5787 .0540 
 
Random-effects Parameters Estimate Std. Err [95% Conf. Interval] 
country: Identity 
var (_cons) 
 
.2552   
 
.1167       
 
.1041     
 
.6255 
var (Residual)     
 
Mixed-effects logistic regression                                                                  Number of obs          = 
12027 
Group variable: pais                                                                                       Number of groups   =  
10 
Obs per group:    min        =    629                            
                               avg        =    1202.7                                    
                               max       =    2145 
Wald chi2(26)                     =    466.79                                                                Integration points    
=   7 
Log likelihood                    =  -7376. 2533                                                                   Prob > chi2       
=  0.0000 
LR test vs. logistic regression: chibar2(01) =   433.67                                              Prob>=chibar2 
=  0.0000 
a. The reference group is individuals in the labor force 
Source: AmericasBarometer 2008 by LAPOP 
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Table A.4.The Impact of Economic Development on Support for Governmental Services for 
Immigrants in LAC, 2008 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
GDP Per Capita Index 56.45 20.02 2.82 0.005 17.21 95.68 
Mujer -.3897 .5303 -0.73 0.462 -1.429 .6497 
Wealths .1939 .1848 1.05 0.294 -.1683 .5562 
City of Size/Town .2461 .1946 1.26 0.206 -.1352 .6275 
Education .1311 .0753 1.74 0.082 -.0165 .2789 
Age -.5892 .1853 -3.18 0.001 -.9524 -.2259 
Migration Connection Index .9860 .1784 5.52 0.000 .6362 1.335 
Perception of Insecurity -.0141 .0091 -1.55 0.122 -.0321 .0038 
Effects of Media -.0194 .0098 -1.98 0.048 -.0386 -.0002 
Personal Economic Satisfaction .0671 .0151 4.43 0.000 .0374 .0968 
National Economic Satisfaction .0514 .0138 3.71 0.000 .0242 .0785 
Role of State -.0214 .0135 -1.58 0.114 -.0479 .0051 
Prejudice -.0254 .0080 -3.19 0.001 -.0411 -.0098 
Threat of Minority Perception -.0197 .0082 -2.39 0.017 -.0358 -.0035 
Authoritarian Attitudes -.3709 .5966 -0.62 0.534 -1.540 .7984 
Interpersonal Trust .0554 .0093 5.94 0.000 .0371 .0737 
Political Tolerance .0296 .0106 2.79 0.005 .0088 .0504 
Presidential Approval .0707 .0142 4.98 0.000 .0428 .0986 
Governmental Efficacy .1157 .0141 8.16 0.000 .0879 .1436 
Core Pol. Institutions Legitimacy .0583 .0148 3.92 0.000 .0291 .0875 
Satisfaction with Democracy .1042 .0126 8.28 0.000 .0795 .1289 
Support for Democracy -.0305 .0110 -2.75 0.006 -.0523 -.0088 
Patriotism -.0102 .0130 -0.78 0.435 -.0358 .0154 
National Pride -.0303 .0131 -2.30 0.022 -.0562 -.0044 
_cons .3853 14.55 0.03 0.979 -28.14 28.91 
 
Random-effects Parameters   Estimate Std. Err    [95% Conf. Interval] 
pais: Identity 
Var(_cons)    
 
27.88     
 
11.87        
 
12.1074      
 
64.22 
Var(Residual)  1164.35    12.62        1139.87     1189.36 
  
Mixed-effects REML regression                                                                    Number of obs      =     
17046 
Group variable: pais                                                                                       Number of groups   =        
14 
Obs per group:      min       =    732                    
                                 avg       =    1217.6                      
                                max       =    2292 
Wald chi2(24)                      =    964.22 
Log restricted-likelihood   =   -84426.398                       Prob > chi2         = 0.0000 
LR test vs. linear regression: chibar2(01) =   257.63     Prob >= chibar2 = 0.0000 
a. The reference group is individuals in the labor force 
Source: AmericasBarometer 2008 by LAPOP 
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Table A.5.The Impact of Economic Development on Support for Governmental Services 
for Immigrants in LAC, 2008 
Country Linear Prediction Std. Error [95% Confidence Interval] 
 
Mexico 62.1359 (1.92669) [58.3596 65.9121] 
Guatemala 54.063 (2.13696) [49.8747 58.2514] 
El Salvador 55.3615 (1.82297) [51.7885 58.9344] 
Costa Rica 61.6278 (1.81181) [58.0767 65.1789] 
Panama 58.8616 (1.44334) [56.0327 61.6905] 
Ecuador 53.5549 (2.27344) [49.0991 58.0108] 
Bolivia 49.4903 (3.51013) [42.6106 56.37] 
Chile 63.152 (2.18308) [58.8733 67.4308] 
Uruguay 61.402 (1.76426) [57.9441 64.8599] 
Brazil 59.8213 (1.51042) [56.8609 62.7817] 
Venezuela 57.5631 (1.47777) [54.6668 60.4595] 
Argentina 64.7892 (2.64756) [59.6001 69.9783] 
Dominican Republic 59.5955 (1.48792) [56.6792 62.5117] 
Belize 58.2406 (1.44168) [55.4149 61.0662] 
Dependent variable: immig1r         Equation: immig1r        Created variables: pred, err 
Variable left as is: gdpind               Covariates set to mean* See Table 
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Table A.6.The Impact of Democracy on the Belief that Immigrants Do NOT Take Jobs Away 
From Citizens in LAC, 2008 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Freedom House Index (inv) .2700 .0995 2.71 0.007 .0748 .4652 
Mujer -.0340 .0402 -0.85 0.398 -.1128 .0448 
Wealths .0707 .0139 5.08 0.000 .0434 .0980 
City of Size/Town -.0312 .0145 -2.15 0.032 -.0596 -.0027 
Education .0299 .0056 5.29 0.000 .0188 .0411 
Age -.0141 .0140 -1.01 0.314 -.0418 .0134 
Migration Connection Index .0345 .0126 2.74 0.006 .0098 .0592 
Perception of Insecurity -.0020 .0006 -2.94 0.003 -.0034 -.0006 
Effects of Media .0001 .0007 0.17 0.866 -.0013 .0015 
Personal Economic Satisfaction .0019 .0011 1.68 0.094 -.0003 .0042 
National Economic Satisfaction .0018 .0010 1.80 0.071 -.0001 .0039 
Role of State -.0084 .0010 -7.99 0.000 -.0104 -.0063 
Prejudice -.0024 .0006 -3.93 0.000 -.0036 -.0012 
Threat of Minority Perception .0007 .0006 1.08 0.278 -.0005 .0019 
Authoritarian Attitudes .0611 .0441 1.39 0.166 -.0253 .1477 
Interpersonal Trust .0020 .0007 2.94 0.003 .0007 .0034 
Political Tolerance -.0008 .0008 -0.92 0.355 -.0023 .0008 
Presidential Approval .0061 .0010 5.64 0.000 .0040 .0082 
Governmental Efficacy .0008 .0010 0.75 0.451 -.0013 .0029 
Core Pol. Institutions Legitimacy .0036 .0011 3.13 0.002 .0013 .0058 
Satisfaction with Democracy .0047 .0009 4.94 0.000 .0028 .0065 
Support for Democracy .0016 .0009 1.89 0.058 -.0001 .0032 
Patriotism .0015 .0010 1.49 0.136 -.0005 .0034 
National Pride -.0010 .0010 -0.97 0.333 -.0030 .0010 
_cons -3.72 .9823 -3.79 0.000 -5.64 -1.79 
 
Random-effects 
Parameters 
Estimate Std. Err [95% Conf. Interval] 
country: Identity 
var(_cons) 
 
.2553    
 
.1168       
 
.1041     
 
.6258 
Var(Residual)     
 
Mixed-effects logistic regression                                                                  Number of obs          = 
12027 
Group variable: pais                                                                                       Number of groups   =  10 
Obs per group:    min        =    629                            
                               avg        =    1202.7                                    
                               max       =    2145 
Wald chi2(24)                     =    466.24                                                             Integration points    =   
7 
Log likelihood                    =  -7376.5262                                                                 Prob > chi2       =  
0.0000 
LR test vs. logistic regression: chibar2(01) =   435.17                                           Prob>=chibar2 =  
0.0000 
a. The reference group is individuals in the labor force 
Source: AmericasBarometer 2008 by LAPOP 
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Table A.7.The Impact of Democracy on the Belief that Immigrants Do 
NOT Take Jobs Away From Citizens in LAC, 2008 
Country exp(xb) 
  
Mexico .671335 
Guatemala .39116 
El Salvador .671335 
Costa Rica 1.50944 
Panama 1.15219 
Ecuador .512445 
Bolivia .512445 
Uruguay 1.50944 
Brazil .879492 
Dominican Republic .879492 
Dependent variable: immig2r     Equation: eq1    Created variable: pred2 
Variable left as is: freehinv           Covariates set to mean: *See Table 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.8. Number of Observations by Country 
Country Freq. 
Mexico 1,560 
Guatemala 1,538 
El Salvador 1,549 
Costa Rica 1,500 
Panama 1,536 
Ecuador 3,000 
Bolivia 3,003 
Chile 1,527 
Uruguay 1,500 
Brazil 1,497 
Venezuela 1,500 
Argentina 1,486 
Dominican Republic 1,507 
Belize 1,552 
Total 25,755 
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Table A.9. Summary Statistics, Mean Values by Country (2008) 
Country 
Variables 
Years of 
Education  
Age 
% 
Female  
Size of 
City/Town 
Wealth* 
Argentina 10.887 36.651 51.30 3.616 5.321 
Bolivia 9.945 36.897 49.70 2.515 2.932 
Brazil 7.295 41.427 53.70 3.13 4.507 
Chile 10.483 43.599 59.20 3.613 5.275 
Costa Rica 8.160 40.779 51.10 2.532 5.629 
Dominican Republic 7.316 41.171 54.80 3.114 3.679 
Ecuador 10.168 38.485 50.00 2.606 3.824 
El Salvador 8.396 38.451 52.10 62.298 3.604 
Guatemala 6.007 39.414 49.80 2.328 2.941 
Mexico 8.269 40.841 50.50 2.953 4.980 
Panama 10.238 38.983 50.00 2.942 4.435 
Belize 8.272 37.003 49.36 2.173 4.148 
Uruguay 8.984 45.296 53.40 3.622 4.903 
Venezuela 9.961 38.659 54.60 3.373 4.930 
Total 9.317 39.589 51.88 2.903 4.239 
* The ―wealth‖ index consists of a count of household assets and access to basic services at the 
household level. The list of assets in the survey includes durable goods, such as a TV set, a 
refrigerator, a car, and a computer, and access to basic services like clean water and sewage inside 
the house.  
Source: AmericasBarometer 2008 by LAPOP 
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Table A.10. Summary Statistics, Mean Values by Country (2008) 
Country 
Variables 
Authoritarian 
Attitudes (%)  
Threat from 
Minority 
Prejudice  
Migration 
Connection 
Index 
Argentina 21.06 27.365 30.012 .392 
Bolivia 20.64 48.104 63.932 1.267 
Brazil 36.70 40.919 46.981 .216 
Chile 38.54 46.930 50.117 .345 
Costa Rica 36.38 48.588 54.541 .758 
Dominican Republic 33.98 54.555 74.738 1.310 
Ecuador 31.93 52.753 63.122 1.029 
El Salvador 32.39 51.213 72.094 1.885 
Guatemala 33.70 49.496 71.912 1.106 
Mexico 26.47 46.124 53.614 .890 
Panama 45.87 46.449 58.487 .585 
Belize 11.88 48.022 62.787 .952 
Uruguay 18.70 36.293 33.994 .461 
Venezuela 19.53 41.496 61.761 .275 
Total 28.78 45.167 56.045 .868 
Source: AmericasBarometer 2008 by LAPOP 
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Table A.11. Summary Statistics, Mean Values by Country (2008) 
Country 
Variables 
Media 
Effects  
Perception 
of 
Insecurity 
National 
Economic 
Satisfaction 
Personal 
Economic 
Satisfaction 
Role of 
State 
Argentina 77.348 57.304 46.111 53.012 78.583 
Bolivia 73.061 47.603 42.472 49.698 73.703 
Brazil 87.853 41.251 46.452 50.438 68.014 
Chile 87.839 49.342 46.831 48.344 77.759 
Costa Rica 89.121 34.527 43.132 50.00 71.440 
Dominican Republic 77.715 39.493 36.239 39.833 79.492 
Ecuador 84.699 43.941 43.021 50.878 67.788 
El Salvador 80.074 41.512 28.483 40.342 75.779 
Guatemala 66.330 39.563 31.964 44.389 67.218 
Mexico 80.558 39.612 38.178 47.817 72.490 
Panama 85.983 35.497 37.312 43.979 70.379 
Belize 73.640 32.620 33.411 42.85 76.831 
Uruguay 86.762 44.492 46.918 50.584 77.097 
Venezuela 81.892 46.747 44.908 52.772 56.726 
Total 80.640 41.659 40.011 47.664 70.221 
Source: AmericasBarometer 2008 by LAPOP 
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Table A.12. Determinants of Support for Governmental Services for Immigrants: 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Regression 
  
Argentina 
 
 
Chile 
 
Costa Rica 
 
Dom Republic 
 Coef. ( t ) Coef. ( t ) Coef. ( t ) Coef. ( t ) 
Interpersonal Trust 0.150*** (3.57) 0.048 (1.57) 0.039 (1.34) 0.031 (0.79) 
Political Tolerance 0.109*** (3.36) -0.056 (-1.65) 0.009 (0.26) -0.024 (-0.77) 
Presidential Approval -0.046 (-1.31) 0.014 (0.46) 0.020 (0.51) 0.062 (1.35) 
Governmental 
Efficacy 
0.235*** (3.93) 0.111** (2.73) 0.036 (0.87) 0.087 (1.38) 
Political Institutional 
Legitimacy 
-0.071 (-1.87) 0.128** (3.14) 0.046 (1.26) 0.079(1.77) 
Satisfaction with 
Democracy 
-0.095 (-1.91) 0.042 (1.94) 0.025 (0.69) 0.005 (0.15) 
Support for 
Democracy 
0.038 (0.94) 0.011 (0.41) -0.104** (-
2.97) 
-0.002 (-0.07) 
Patriotism 0.008 (0.26) -0.001 (-0.02) -0.007 (-0.23) -0.022 (-0.57) 
National Pride -0.057 (-1.31) -0.033 (-0.96) -0.034 (-1.00) 0.032 (0.91) 
Authoritarian 
Attitudes 
-0.164*** (-3.96) 0.010 (0.29) -0.057 (-1.93) 0.033 (1.13) 
Threat from Minority 0.011 (0.27) 0.014 (0.54) -0.054 (-1.81) -0.022 (-0.80) 
Prejudice -0.063 (-1.28) -0.069 (-1.71) -0.057 (-1.85) -0.025 (-0.69) 
Role of State 0.013 (0.25) -0.020 (-0.68) 0.042 (1.22) 0.005 (0.16) 
National Economic 
Satisfaction 
0.023 (0.62) 0.082*** (3.57) 0.107** (2.84) 0.016 (0.32) 
Personal Economic 
Satisfaction 
0.076 (1.54) -0.002 (-0.08) 0.009 (0.19) 0.013 (0.45) 
Effects of Media 0.023 (0.67) -0.070 (-1.84) -0.020 (-0.73) 0.031 (1.15) 
Perception of 
Insecurity 
-0.060 (-1.92) -0.048 (-1.59) -0.027 (-0.84) 0.033 (1.04) 
Migration Connection 
Index 
0.011 (0.38) 0.048 (1.91) 0.068* (2.23) 0.037 (1.31) 
Age 0.006 (0.15) -0.045 (-1.13) -0.068* (-2.30) -0.025 (-0.77) 
Race
a
                            
      Mestizo 
 
-0.050 (-1.42) 
 
0.068* (2.17) 
 
0.078* (2.38) 
 
-0.027 (-0.52) 
      Indigenous 0.039 (1.17) 0.033 (1.35) 0.036 (1.54)  
      Black    0.054 (1.29) 
      Mulatto    0.046 (1.13) 
      Other -0.043 (-1.07) 0.020 (0.50) -0.042 (-1.85) 0.068* (3.80) 
Female -0.040 (-1.12) -0.066* (-2.36) -0.042 (-1.50) 0.009 (0.27) 
Wealth -0.068 (-1.89) 0.049 (1.37) -0.052 (-1.72) 0.069* (2.11) 
Size of City/Town -0.005 (-0.10) -0.049 (-0.88) -0.071* (-2.22) -0.031 (-0.53) 
Education 0.041 (0.98) 0.067 (1.59) 0.024 (0.71) -0.025 (-0.69) 
Unemployed
b
 -0.028 (-1.06) -0.041 (-1.52) -0.042 (-1.50) 0.012 (0.44) 
     Other (Students, 
housework, retirees) 
0.038 (0.81) 0.070* (2.20) 0.001 (0.04) -0.017 (-0.43) 
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Region
c
 
 
 
 
Centro 
0.174** (3.22) 
Centro 
0.029 (0.50) 
Urbano Central 
-0.094*** (-
3.64) 
Norte 
-0.004 (-0.07) 
NorthEast 
0.003 (0.06) 
Sur 
0.058 (1.00) 
Rural Central 
-0.083** (-
2.56) 
Este 
-0.043 (-0.92) 
NorthWest 
0.022 (0.39) 
 Urban Bajura 
-0.034 (-1.07) 
Sur 
-0.036 (-0.84) 
Cuyo 
0.071 (1.35) 
   
Patagonia 
-0.046 (-0.86) 
   
 
Constant -0.010 (-0.22) -0.013 (-0.38) 0.016 (0.65) 0.026 (0.85) 
R-Squared 0.208 0.129 0.097 0.068 
Number of Obs. 844 1174 1151 1062 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
a.  The reference group is White                                                              
b. The reference group is individuals in the labor force 
c. The reference group for Argentina=AMBA; Chile=Norte; Costa Rica=AMSJ; Dom 
Republic=Metropolitan 
Note: This model takes into consideration the design of the sample. 
Source: AmericasBarometer 2008 by LAPOP 
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Table A.13. Determinants of Support for Governmental Services for Immigrants in 
Ecuador: Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Regression 
 2008 2010 
 Coefficient. t Coefficient. t 
Interpersonal Trust 0.059* (2.23) 0.041 (1.59) 
Political Tolerance 0.007 (0.22) -0.050* (-2.38) 
Presidential Approval 0.033 (1.08) 0.042 (1.24) 
Governmental Efficacy 0.123** (3.06) 0.165* (3.35) 
Pol. Inst. Legitimacy 0.012 (0.29) 0.050 (1.45) 
Satisfaction with Democracy 0.022 (0.83) 0.034 (1.39) 
Support for Democracy -0.069* (-2.56) -0.017 (-0.52) 
Patriotism -0.003 (-0.09)   
National Pride -0.074* (-2.24) -0.118* (-5.28) 
Authoritarian Attitudes -0.010 (0.32) 0.012 (1.64) 
Threat from Minority -0.023 (-0.88) -0.011 (-0.55) 
Prejudice 0.016 (0.46) -0.036 (-1.52) 
Role of State -0.034 (-0.97) -0.023 (-0.80) 
National Econ. Satisfaction -0.014 (-0.39) 0.020 (0.94) 
Personal Econ.  Satisfaction 0.040 (1.11) 0.048 (1.96) 
Effects of Media 0.022 (0.62)   
Perception of Insecurity 0.092*** (3.29) -0.075* (-2.46) 
Migration Connection Index 0.053* (2.25) 0.035 (1.45) 
Unemployed
a
 -0.046* (-2.22) 0.003 (0.15) 
    Other (Students, housework, 
retirees) 
-0.033 (-1.14) -0.018 (-0.66) 
Race
b
   White -0.017 (-0.75) 0.009 (0.36) 
             Indigenous 0.017 (0.48) 0.051* (2.00) 
             Other -0.012 (-0.53) -0.037 (-1.69) 
Female -0.035 (-1.63) 0.017 (0.72) 
Wealth -0.036 (-0.97) -0.003 (-0.10) 
Size of City/Town -0.035 (-0.68) 0.094* (2.43) 
Education 0.019 (0.63) 0.019 (0.74) 
Age -0.052* (-2.12) -0.067* (-2.36) 
Region
c
         Oriente 0.041 (0.67) -0.076* (-2.83) 
                        Sierra -0.064 (-1.31) -0.059* (-2.01) 
Constant -0.035 (-0.71) -0.009 (-0.38) 
R-Squared 0.071  0.124  
Number of Obs. 2293  2293  
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
a. The reference group is individuals in the labor force                                                              
b. The reference group is Mestizo 
c. The reference group is Costa 
Note: This model takes into consideration the design of the sample. 
Source: AmericasBarometer 2008 by LAPOP 
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Sample Questionnaire 
 
 
Version #18Q   IRB Approval:060187  
 
LOGO OF LOCAL INSTITUTION TO BE INSERTED 
HERE 
 
 
Democracy Audit: Country, 2008  
© Vanderbilt University 2006. All rights reserved. 
 
1. Sections in yellow are ones that require customization for each country, generally the 
insertion of the country name in place of the word ―country.‖  
2. Sections in grey indicate optional questions that each country team may wish to include or 
exclude.  
4. Each country team may, of course, propose to add individual country-specific questions not 
included in this draft version.  
  
Country:  1. Mexico  2. Guatemala 3. El Salvador 4. Honduras 5. Nicaragua   
6. Costa Rica  7. Panama  8. Colombia 9.  Ecuador  10. Bolivia 11. Peru 
12. Paraguay  13. Chile  14. Uruguay  15. Brazil 16. Venezuela 17. Argentina  21. Dominican Republic 
22. Haiti  23. Jamaica  24.Guyana  25. Trinidad  40. United States  41. Canada 
IDNUM. Questionnaire number [assigned at the office] 
ESTRATOPRI: Insert the names of the strata here 
UPM_______________________ 
Province (or department) :_______________________________________ 
County (or municipality):  ________________________________________ 
DISTRICT (or parish, etc.): ____________________________________________ 
CENSUS SEGMENT _______________________________________________ 
Sector____________________________________________________ 
[CLUSTER]: ______________________________________________ 
[A cluster cannot be larger than 8 interviews in urban towns, and 12 in rural areas] 
UR   1. Urban  2. Rural 
Size of place: 1. National Capital (Metropolitan area) 2. Large City  3. Medium City   4. Small City  5. 
Rural Area  
Questionnaire language: (11) English  INSERT OTHER LANGUAGES 
Start time: _____:_____  [Don’t enter] 
Date  Day: ____    Month:_______    Year: 2006 
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Q1.  Sex (note down; do not ask): (1) Male (2) Female 
 
 
A4 [COA4]. To begin with, in your opinion, what is the most serious problem faced by the country? 
[DO NOT READ OUT THE RESPONSE OPTIONS; ONLY A SINGLE OPTION] 
                      
Water, lack of 19 Inflation, high prices   02 
Roads in poor condition  18 Politicians  59 
Armed conflict    30 Bad government    15 
Corruption    13 Environment   10 
Credit, lack of    09 Migration    16 
Delinquency, crime, violence  05 Drugtrafficking    12 
Human rights, violations of 56 Gangs    14 
Unemployment    03 Poverty     04 
Inequality 58 Popular protests (strikes, road  
blocks, work stoppages, etc.) 
06 
Malnutrition    23 Health services, lack of  22 
Forced displacement of persons   32 Kidnappings   31 
External debt    26 Security (lack of)   27 
Discrimination    25 Terrorism    33 
Drug addiction    11 Land to farm, lack of 07 
Economy, problems with, crisis of  01 Transportation, problems of 60 
Education, lack of, poor quality  21 Violence    57 
Electricity, lack of   24 Housing 55 
Population explosion   20 Other 70 
War against terrorism   17 Doesn’t know 88 
 
 
                              Now, changing the subject…[After each question, repeat “every day”, “once or twice a week”, “rarely”, 
or “never” to help the respondent] 
 
How frequently do you … Every day 
[Also accept 
almost every 
day] 
Once or twice 
a week 
Rarely Never DK 
A1. Listen to the news on 
the radio 
1 2 3 4 8 
A2. Watch the news on TV 1 2 3 4 8 
A3. Read the news in 
newspapers 
1 2 3 4 8 
A4i. Read the news on the 
Internet 
1 2 3 4 8 
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SOCT1.  How would you describe the country’s economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, 
good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?  
(1) Very good   (2)  Good   (3)  Neither good nor bad (fair)   (4)  Bad    (5)  Very bad   (8) Doesn’t know  
SOCT2.  Do you think that the country’s current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse 
than it was 12 months ago?  
(1) Better  (2) Same     (3)  Worse      (8) Doesn’t know  
IDIO1. How would you describe your overall economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, 
good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?  
(1) Very good   (2)  Good   (3)  Neither good nor bad (fair)   (4)  Bad    (5)  Very bad   (8) Doesn’t know  
IDIO2. Do you think that your economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 
months ago?  
(1) Better  (2) Same     (3)  Worse      (8) Doesn’t know 
 
Now, moving on to a different subject, sometimes people and communities have problems that they 
cannot solve by themselves, and so in order to solve them they request help from a government official or 
agency. 
In order to solve your problems have you 
ever requested help or cooperation from...? 
Yes No DK/DR 
  
  
CP2. A member of congress/parliament 1 2 8 
 
  
CP4A. A local public official (e.g, a mayor, 
municipal councilperson, provincial 
official)  
1 2 8 
 
  
CP4. Any ministry, public institution or 
state agency  
1 2 8 
 
  
 
NP1. Have you attended a town meeting, city council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months?         
(1) Yes   (2) No   (8) Doesn’t know/Doesn’t remember 
NP1B.  To what degree do you think municipal officials pay attention to what people ask for in such 
meetings?  (1) A lot  (2) Some (3) Not at all (8) DK 
NP2. Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councilman of the 
municipality within the past 12 months?  
(1) Yes       (2) No          (8) Doesn’t know/Doesn’t remember 
SGL1. Would you say that the services the municipality is providing are…? [Read options] 
(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor poor (fair) (4) Poor (5) Very poor   (8) Doesn’t know 
SGL2. How have you or your neighbors been treated when you have dealt with the municipality? Have 
you been treated very well, well, neither well nor badly, badly or very badly? (1) Very well (2) Well (3) 
Neither well nor badly   (4) Badly  (5) Very badly  (8) Doesn’t know 
LGL2. In your opinion, should the municipal government be given more money and more responsibility 
or should the national government assume more responsibility and provide municipal services? 
(1) More for the municipal government      
(2) National government should assume greater responsibility      
(3) Nothing should change [do not read]       
(4) More to the municipality if it provides better services [do not read]       
(8) Doesn’t know/Doesn’t respond 
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LGL2A. Taking into account the current public services in the country, who should be given more 
responsibilities? [Read options] 
(1) Much more to the central government 
(2) Somewhat more to the central government 
(3) The same amount to the central government and the municipality 
(4) Some more to the municipality 
(5) Much more to the municipality 
(88) DK/DA  
LGL2B.  And taking into account the available economic resources in the country, who should manage 
more money? [Read options] 
(1)   Much more the central government 
(2)   Some more the central government 
(3)   The same amount the central government and the municipality 
(4)   Some more the municipality 
(5)   Much more the municipality  
(88)  DK/DA 
LGL3. Would you be willing to pay more taxes to the municipal government so that it could provide 
better services or do you believe that it would not be worth it to do so? 
(1) Willing to pay more     (2) Not worth it     (8) Doesn’t know 
MUNI5. Have you ever participated in drafting the budget of the municipal government?                                                                                                                                                                                               
(1) Yes, has participated  (0) Has not participated        (8)  DK/DR 
MUNI6. How much confidence do you have that the local /municipal government manages funds well? 
[Read the options] 
(3) A lot  (2) Some   (1) A little  (0) None  (8) DK/DR   
MUNI8. Have you carried out any official dealings or requested any document at the municipal 
government in the past year?  
(1) Yes [Continue]       (0) No [Go to MUNI11]      (8) DK/DR [Go to MUNI11] 
MUNI9. How were you treated? [Read the options]   
(1) Very well      (2) Well      (3) Neither well nor poorly     (4) Poorly   (5) Very poorly   (8) DK/DR    (9) 
N/A 
MUNI10. Did they solve your problem or request?  
(1) Yes       (0) No      (8)  DK/DR      (9) N/A 
MUNI11. [Ask to everyone]  How much influence do you think you have on what the municipality 
does? Would you say a lot, some, little, or no influence? 
(1.)A lot   (2) Some  (3) Little   (4) None   8. DK/DR 
MUNI15. How interested do you think the mayor/municipal leader is in the people’s participation in the 
work of the municipality?  [Read options]  
 (3) Very interested (2) Somewhat interested (1) Little interested  (0) Not at all interested  (8) DK/DR 
 
 
 Once a 
week 
Once or 
twice a 
month 
Once or 
twice a 
year 
Never DK 
CP5. Now, changing the subject. In the 
last 12 months have you tried to help to 
solve a problem in your community or 
in your neighborhood? Please, tell me 
if you did it at least once a week, once 
or twice a month, once or twice a year 
or never.  
1 2 3 4 8 
 
 
I am going to read a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend their meetings at least 
once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. [Repeat for each question “once a 
week,” “once or twice a month,” “once or twice a year” or “never” to help the respondent] 
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 Once a 
week 
Once or 
twice a 
month 
Once or 
twice a 
year 
Never DK/DR 
CP6. Meetings of any 
religious organization? Do 
you attend them… 
1 2 3 4 8 
CP7. Meetings of a parents’ 
association at school? Do you 
attend them…. 
1 2 3 4 8 
CP8. Meetings of a 
committee or association for 
community improvement? 
Do you attend them… 
1 2 3 4 8 
CP9. Meetings of an 
association of professionals, 
traders or farmers? Do you 
attend them… 
1 2 3 4 8 
CP10. Meetings of a labor 
union? Do you attend them… 
1 2 3 4 8 
CP13. Meetings of a political 
party or political movement? 
Do you attend them… 
1 2 3 4 8 
CP20. [Women only] 
Associations or groups of 
women or home makers. Do 
you attend them… 
1 2 3 4 8 9 
(Male) 
 
LS3. Changing the subject, in general how satisfied are you with your life? Would you say that you are...?  
(1) Very satisfied  (2) Somewhat satisfied  (3) Somewhat dissatisfied  (4) Very dissatisfied  (8) DK 
 
IT1. Now, speaking of the people from here, would you say that people in this community are generally 
very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...?     [Read options]                                                                                                                                               
(1) Very trustworthy  (2) Somewhat trustworthy (3) not very trustworthy  (4) untrustworthy   (8) DK 
 
IT1A. How much do you trust people that you meet for the first time?     [Read options]                                                                                                                                               
(1) Totally trust them (2) Somewhat trust them  (3) Trust them a little (4) does not trust them at all  (8) DK 
 
IT1B. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in 
dealing with people?  
(1) Most people can be trusted 
(2) One can't be too careful in dealing with people  
(8) DK/DR                                                                                                                                      
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SHOW CARD # 1 
L1. (Left-Right Scale) Now, to change the subject....  On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to 
right. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those on the left and those on the right.  In 
other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right.  According to the meaning 
that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you 
place yourself on this scale? Indicate the box that comes closest to your own position.  
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Left Right 
                           Collect Card # 1 
 
IMMIG1.  To what degree do you agree that the (country) government provides social services such as 
healthcare, education, housing, to foreigners who come to live or work in this country? [Read options] 
(1) Strongly agree  
(2) Somewhat agree  
(3) Neutral  
(4) Somewhat disagree  
(5) Strongly Disagree  
(8) DK 
IMMIG2.  Would you say that the people who come to live here from other countries do the jobs that 
(country’s citizens, e.g., Jamaicans) do not want to do, or generally take jobs away from (country’s 
citizens)?   
(1) Do the jobs that (country’s citizens) do not want to do 
(2) Take jobs away from (country’s citizens)   
(8) DK/DR 
 
PROT1.  Have you ever participated in a public 
demonstration or protest? Have you done it sometimes, 
almost never or never? [If he answered “Never” or 
“DK”, Mark 9 in PROT2 and Go to CP5] 
 
(1) 
Sometimes 
(2) 
Almost 
never 
(3) 
Never 
(8) 
DK 
 
 
PROT2. And now thinking about the last 12 months, 
have you participated in a public demonstration or 
protest? Have you done it sometimes, almost never or 
never? 
(1) 
Sometimes 
(2) 
Almost 
never 
(3) 
Never 
(8) 
DK 
 (9) 
Inap 
 
 
 
 
Now let’s change the subject. Some people say that under some circumstances a military take-over 
through a coup d’état would be justified. In your opinion would a military coup be justified in the 
following circumstances? [Read the options after each question]: 
JC1. When there is high 
unemployment. 
(1) A military take-over 
would be justified 
(2) A military take-
over would not be 
justified 
(8) DK 
  
JC4. When there are a lot of 
social protests. 
(1) It would be justified  (2) It would not be 
justified  
(8) DK 
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JC10. When there is a lot of 
crime.  
(1) It would be justified (2) It would not be 
justified 
(8) DK 
  
JC12. When there is high 
inflation, with excessive prices 
increases. 
(1) It would be justified (2) It would not be 
justified 
(8) DK 
  
JC13. When there is a lot of 
corruption. 
(1) It would be justified (2) It would not be 
justified 
(8) DK 
  
 
JC15. Do you think that sometimes there can be sufficient grounds for 
the President to shut down the Congress or do you think there can never 
be sufficient grounds to do so?  
(1) Yes (2) No (8)DK 
JC16. Do you think that sometimes there can be sufficient grounds to 
dissolve the Supreme Court of Justice, ADAPT THIS TO EACH 
COUNTRY or do you think that there can never be sufficient grounds to 
do so?  
(1) Yes (2) No (8)DK 
 
VIC1. Now changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months?                                                                   
(1) Yes [Continue]  (2) No [Skip to VIC701]    (8) DK/DR [Skip to VIC701]  
AOJ1. Did you report the crime to any institution?  
(1) Yes [Skip to VIC20] (2) Did not report [Continue]   
 (8) DK/DR [Skip to VIC20]  (9) Inap (not a victim) [Skip to VIC20] 
AOJ1B. Why did you not report the crime? [Do not read options] 
(1) Does not work 
(2) It is dangerous and afraid of retaliation    
(3) Did not have any proof 
(4) It was not that serious 
(5) Did not know where to report 
(6) Other reason 
(8) DK/DR           
(9) INAP   
 
 
 
[ASK TO EVERYONE]: Now, please think about what has happened to you 
in the past 12 months when responding to the following questions: [If 
responds “Yes,” ask how many times. Write the number of times. If 
responds “No,” write “0” zero.  
How many times? 
[Write down the 
number of times, if 
responded “No” 
write down 0, 
DK/DR=88] 
VIC20. You were a victim of an armed robbery of property not including your 
car in the past 12 months? How many times? 
 
VIC21. Your house has been burglarized in the past 12 months? How many 
times? 
 
VIC27. In the past 12 months has any police officer mistreated you verbally, 
physically or assaulted you? How many times? 
 
 
AOJ8. In order to apprehend criminals do you think that the authorities should always respect the law or that 
occasionally they can skate close to the limits of the law?                                                                                                                                                                
(1) They should always respect the law (2) Can act on the margins occasionally  (8)DK/DR 
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AOJ11. Speaking of the neighborhood where you live, and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or 
robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe?  
(1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe (4) Very unsafe  (8) DK/DR 
 
AOJ11A.  And speaking of the country in general, how much do you think that the level of crime that 
we have now represents a threat to our future well-being? [Read the options] 
 (1) Very much  (2) Somewhat  (3) Little (4) None  (8) DK/DR 
AOJ12. If you were a victim of a robbery or assault how much faith do you have that the judicial system 
would punish the guilty? [Read the options] 
 (1) A lot  (2) Some  (3) Little (4) None  (8) DK/DR 
AOJ12a. If you were a victim of a robbery or assault how much faith do you have that the police would 
apprehend the guilty? [Read the options] 
 (1) A lot  (2) Some  (3) Little (4) None  (8) DK/DR 
AOJ16A.  In your neighborhood, have you seen anyone selling drugs in the past 12 months?  
(1) Yes  (2) No    (8) DK 
 
AOJ17.  To what extent do you think your neighborhood is affected by gangs? Would you say a lot, 
somewhat, a little or none?  
(1) A lot (2) Somewhat  (3) Little  (4) None  (8) DK 
 
AOJ18.  Some people say that the police in this community (town, village) protect people from 
criminals, while others say that the police that are involved in the criminal activity. What do you think?  
(1) Police protect  or 
(2) Police involved in crime   
(3) [Don’t Read] Doesn’t protect, but is not involved in crime or protect and involved in crime 
(8) DK/DR 
 
 
Regarding the formal dealings that you or someone from your family has had with the following 
institutions at some time, do you feel very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied or very 
dissatisfied? (REPEAT THE RESPONSE OPTIONS IN EACH QUESTION)  
 Very 
satisfied 
Somewhat 
satisfied 
Somewhat 
dissatisfied 
Very 
dissatisfied 
[Don’t read] 
Didn’t have 
any official 
dealings 
DK/DR 
ST1. The 
national police 
1 2 3 4 9 8 
ST2. The courts 
or justice system 
1 2 3 4 9 8 
ST3. The district 
attorney’s office 
1 2 3 4 9 8 
ST4. The local 
or municipal 
government  
(mayor’s office) 
1 2 3 4 9 8 
 [Give card "A" to the respondent] 
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Now we will use a card...This card has a 7 point scale; each point indicates a score that goes from 1, 
meaning NOT AT ALL, to 7, meaning A LOT. For example, if I asked you to what extent you like 
watching television, if you don’t like watching it at all, you would choose a score of 1, and if, on the 
contrary, you like watching television a lot, you would indicate the number 7 to me. If your opinion is 
between not at all and a lot, choose an intermediate score. So, to what extent do you like watching 
television? Read me the number. [Make sure that the respondent understands correctly]. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7   8 
Not at all A lot DK 
 
B1. To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (Read: If you think the 
courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose 
number 7 or choose a point in between the two.) 
B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)?  
B3. To what extent do you think that citizens’ basic rights are well protected by the political system of 
(country)? 
B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)? 
B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)? 
B10A.  To what extent do you trust the justice system? 
B11. To what extent do you trust the Supreme Electoral Tribunal? 
B12. To what extent do you trust the Armed Forces?  [ Don’t use in Costa Rica, Panama or Haiti] 
B13. To what extent do you trust the National Congress?  
B14. To what extent do you trust the national government? 
B15. To what extent do you trust the Federal Department of Justice? 
B18. To what extent do you trust the National Police? 
B20. To what extent do you trust the Catholic Church?  
B21. To what extent do you trust the political parties? 
B21A.  To what extent do you trust the President/Prime Minister 
B31. To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court?  
B32. To what extent do you trust the local or municipal government?  
B43. To what extent are you proud of being (nationality corresponding to country)? 
B16. To what extent do you trust the State Attorney General?  
B17. To what extent do you trust the Public Defender’s Office? 
B19. To what extent do you trust the Office of the Auditor General? 
B33. To what extent do you trust the provincial/state governor?  
B37. To what extent do you trust the media? 
B40. To what extent do you trust indigenous movements?  
B42. To what extent do you trust the Internal Revenue Service?  
B50. To what extent do you trust the Constitutional Tribunal?  
B46 [b45]. To what extent do you trust the anti-corruption commission?  
B47.  To what extent do you trust elections? 
B48.  To what extent do you believe that free trade agreement will help to improve the economy? 
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N1. To what extent would you say the current administration fights poverty? 
N3. To what extent would you say the current administration promotes and protects democratic 
principles? 
N9. To what extent would you say the current administration combats government corruption? 
N10. To what extent would you say the current administration protects human rights. 
N11. To what extent would you say the current administration improves the security of 
citizens? 
N12. To what extent would you say the current administration combats unemployment? 
 
        Now I a m going to read a series of sentences about [country’s] political parties and then I will ask your                     
opinion. We will continue to use the same scale of 1 to 7 where 1 means not at all and 7 means a lot. 
[Take back card A] 
 
 
 
 
M1. Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job 
performance of President NAME CURRENT PRESIDENT? [Read the options] 
(1) Very good  (2) Good  (3) Neither good nor bad (fair)  (4) Bad  (5) Very bad   (8) DK/DR  
M2. Now speaking of Congress/Parliament. Thinking in those members of congress as a 
whole, without considering the political parties to which they belong, do you believe that the 
Members of Congress/Parliament are performing their jobs very well, well, neither well nor 
poorly, poorly, or very poorly? 
(1) Very well  (2) Well  (3) Neither well nor poorly (fair)  (4) Poorly  (5) Very poorly   (8) 
DK/DR  
 
EPP1. Thinking of political parties in general, to what extent do [country’s] political parties represent their 
voters well? 
8. DK/DR 
EPP2. To what extent does corruption exist within [country’s] political parties? 
8. DK/DR 
EPP3. How often do political parties listen to the average person? 
8. DK/DR 
EC1. And now thinking of the Parliament. To what extent does the national legislature limit the power of the 
president? 
8. DK/DR 
EC2.  To what extent do members the Parliament waste time discussing, debating and negotiating among 
themselves? 
8. DK/DR 
EC3. How important to the country are the laws passed by the parliament? 
8. DK/DR 
EC4. To what extent does the Parliament accomplish what you would hope for it to do? 
8. DK/DR 
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[Give card B]: Now we will use a similar card, but this time 1 means ―strongly disagree‖ and 7 means 
―strongly agree.‖ A number in between 1 and 7 represents an intermediate score. I am going to read 
various statements and I would like you to tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with these 
statements.  
 
Write a number 1-7, or 8 for those who don’t know 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7   8 
Strongly disagree                                                                                      Strongly 
agree 
Doesn’t know 
 
Taking into account the current situation of this country, I would like you to tell me how much you 
agree or disagree with the following statements, again using card B: 
 
POP101. It is necessary for the progress of this country that our presidents/prime ministers limit the 
voice and vote of opposition parties, how much do you agree or disagree with that view?  
8.DK/DR 
POP102. When the Congress hinders the work of our government, our presidents/prime ministers 
should govern without the Congress. How much do you agree or disagree with that view? 
8. DK/DR 
POP103. When the Supreme Court/Constitutional Tribunal hinders the work of our government, it 
should be ignored by our presidents/prime ministers. How much do you agree or disagree with that 
view? 
 8. DK/DR 
POP106. Our presidents/prime ministers must follow the will of the people because what the people 
want is always right. How much do you agree or disagree with that view? 
8. DK/DR 
POP107. The people should govern directly and not through elected representatives. How much do 
you agree or disagree?  
8. DK/DR 
POP109.  In today’s world there is a battle between good and evil, and people must choose between 
one of the two. How much do you agree or disagree that such a battle between good and evil exits? 
8. DK/DR 
POP110.  Once the people decide what is right, we must prevent opposition from a minority. How 
much do you agree or disagree with that view? 
8. DK/DR 
POP112. The biggest obstacle to progress in our country is the dominant class or oligarchy that takes 
advantage of the people.   How much do you agree or disagree with that view? 
POP113. Those who disagree with the majority represent a threat to the interests of the country. How 
much do you agree or disagree with that view? 
8. DK/DR 
 
EFF1. Those who govern this country are really interested in what people like me think.  How much 
do you agree or disagree? 
EFF2. I feel that I understand the most important political issues of this country. How much do you 
agree or disagree. 
ING4. Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government.  To what 
extent do you agree or disagree with these statements? 
PN2.  Despite our differences, we (nationality) have many things that unite us as a country.   How 
much do you agree or disagree with this statement? 
DEM23. Democracy can exist without political parties. How much do you agree or disagree or 
disagree with this statement? 
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Now I am going to read some items about the role of the national government. Please tell me to what 
extent you agree or disagree with the following statements. We will continue using the same scale 
from 1to 7. 
ROS1. The (Country) government, instead of the private sector, should own the most important 
enterprises and industries of the country.  How much do you agree or disagree with this statement? 
ROS2. The (Country) government, more than individuals, is the most responsible for ensuring the 
well-being of the people. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement? 
ROS3. The (Country) government, more than the private sector, is the primarily responsible for 
creating jobs. To what extent to do you agree or disagree with this statement? 
ROS4. The (Country) government should implement firm policies to reduce inequality in income 
between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement? 
[Take back Card "B"] 
 
PN4. In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied 
with the form of democracy in country? 
(1) Very satisfied        (2) Satisfied                 (3) Dissatisfied       (4) Very dissatisfied  (8) DK/DR 
PN5. In your opinion, is country very democratic, somewhat democratic, not very democratic or not at 
all democratic? 
(1) Very democratic      (2)  Somewhat democratic      (3) Not very democratic       
(4) Not at all democratic     (8) DK/DR 
 
[Give the respondent card "C"] 
Now we are going to use another card. The new card has a 10-point scale, which goes from 1 to 10, 
where 1 means that you strongly disapprove and 10 means that you strongly approve. I am going to 
read you a list of some actions that people can take to achieve their political goals and objectives. 
Please tell me how strongly you would approve or disapprove of people taking the following actions. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10   88 
Strongly disapprove                                   Strongly approve Doesn’t 
know 
 
E5. Of people participating in legal demonstrations. How much do you approve or disapprove?  
E8. Of people participating in an organization or group to try to solve community problems. How 
much do you approve or disapprove? 
E11. Of people working for campaigns for a political party or candidate. How much do you approve or 
disapprove? 
E15. Of people participating in the blocking of roads. Using the same scale, how much do you approve 
or disapprove? 
E14. Of people seizing private property or land. How much do you approve or disapprove? 
E2. Of people seizing factories, offices and other buildings. How much do you approve or disapprove? 
E3. Of people participating in a group working to violently overthrow an elected government. How 
much do you approve or disapprove? 
E16. Of people taking the law into their own hands when the government does not punish criminals. 
How much do you approve or disapprove?   
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[Don’t take back card "C"] 
 
Now we are going to talk about some actions the government can take. We will continue using a 1-
10 scale. Please use card C again. On this scale, 1 means strongly disapprove and 10 means strongly 
approve.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10   88 
Strongly disapprove                                                                            Strongly 
approve 
Doesn’t know 
 
 
D32.  To what degree do you approve or disapprove of a law prohibiting public protests?  
D33. To what degree do you approve or disapprove of a law prohibiting the meetings of any group that 
criticizes the [nationality] political system?  
D34. To what degree would you approve or disapprove of the government censoring television 
programs? 
D36. To what degree would you approve or disapprove if the government censored books in public 
school libraries?  
D37. To what degree would you approve or disapprove if the government censored any media outlets 
that criticized it?  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10   88 
Strongly disapprove Strongly approve Doesn’t know 
 
 
D1. There are people who speak negatively of the (nationality) form of government, not just the 
government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such 
people’s right to vote? Please read me the number from the scale: [Probe: To what degree?] 
D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed to conduct peaceful 
demonstrations in order to express their views? Please read me the number.  
D3. Still thinking of those who speak poorly of the (nationality) for of government, how strongly do 
you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office?  
D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television to make 
speeches?  
D5.  And now, changing the topic and thinking of homosexuals, how strongly do you approve or 
disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office?   
 
COLLECT CARD “C” 
 
Now changing the subject… 
 
The following questions are to find out your opinion about the different ideas of people who live in 
country. Please continue using the 10 point scale [card C].  
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DEM2. With which of the following statements do you agree with the most:  
(1) For most people it doesn’t matter whether a regime is democratic or non-democratic.  
(2) Democracy is preferable to any other form of government   
(3) Under some circumstances an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one. 
(8) DK/DR 
DEM11. Do you think that our country needs a government with an iron fist, or that problems can be resolved 
with everyone's participation?    
(1) Iron fist   (2) Participation for all  (8) DK/DR  
 
 
AUT1. There are people who say that we need a strong leader that does not have to be elected. Others say that 
although things may not work, electoral democracy, or the popular vote, is always best. What do you think? 
[Read]  
(1) We need a strong leader who does not have to be elected  
(2) Electoral democracy is the best             
(8) DK/DR    
AUT2. With which of the following statements do you agree the most: [Read choices] 
(1) As citizens we should be more active in questioning our leaders or 
(2) As citizens we should show more respect for the authority of our leaders 
(8) DK/DR 
 
PP1. During election time, some people try to convince others to vote for a party or candidate. How often 
have you tried to convince others to vote for a party or candidate? [Read the options]   
(1) Frequently (2) Occasionally (3) Rarely (4) Never (8) DK/DR 
PP2. There are people who work for parties or candidates during electoral campaigns. Did you work for any 
candidate or party in the last presidential elections of 2004?  
 (1) Yes, worked       (2) Did not work        (8) DK/DR   
 
 
Now, I would like for you to tell me if you consider the following actions as: 
 1) corrupt and should be punished; 2) corrupt but justified under the circumstances; or 3) not corrupt.   
DC10. A mother of several children needs to obtain a birth certificate for one of them. In order not to waste time 
waiting, she pays the county or municipal clerk amount and currency of country equivalent to US$5. Do you 
think that what the woman did is [Read the options, and if answer “the municipal official has to be 
punished,” Ask: and the mother?]:   
1) Corrupt and should be punished 
2) Corrupt but justified 
3) Not corrupt       DK=8  
  
DC13. An unemployed individual is the brother-in-law of an important politician, and the politician uses his 
influence to get his brother-in-law a job. Do you think the politician is [Read the options  
1) Corrupt and should be punished 
2) Corrupt but justified 
3) Not corrupt       DK=8  
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 INAP 
Did not try 
or did not 
have 
contact 
No Yes DK/DR 
Now we want to talk about your personal experience 
with things that happen in everyday life...  
    
EXC2. Has a police officer ask you for a bribe during 
the past year?  
 0 1 8 
EXC6. During the past year did any government 
employee ask you for a bribe?  
 0 1 8 
EXC11. During the past year did you have any official 
dealings in the municipality/local government?  
If the answer is No  mark 9 
If it is Yes ask the following: 
During the past year, to process any kind of document 
(like a license, for example), did you have to pay any 
money above that required by law?  
9 0 
  
1 
  
8 
  
EXC13. Are you currently employed?  
If the answer is No  mark 9 
If it is Yes ask the following: 
At your workplace, have you been bribed within the past 
year? 
9 0 
  
1 
  
8 
  
EXC14. During the past year, have you had any dealings 
with the courts?  
If the answer is No  note down 9 
If it is Yes ask the following: 
Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts within the past 
year?  
9 0 
  
1 
  
8 
  
EXC15. Have you use any public health services during 
the past year?  
If the answer is No  mark 9 
If it is Yes ask the following: 
 In order to receive attention in a hospital or a clinic 
during the past year, did you have to pay a bribe?  
9 0 
  
1 
  
8 
  
EXC16. Have you had a child in school during the past 
year?  
If the answer is No  mark 9 
If it is Yes ask the following: 
 Have you had to pay a bribe at school during the past 
year?  
9 0 1 8 
EXC17. Did anyone ask you for a bribe to avoid having 
the electricity shut off?  
 0 1 8 
EXC18. Do you think given the way things are, 
sometimes paying a bribe is justified?  
 0 1 8 
 
 
EXC7.  Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is 
[Read] (1) Very common, (2) Common, (3) Uncommon, or (4) Very uncommon? (8) DK/DR 
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Now we want to know how much information about politics and the country is known by the people...  
GI1. What is the name of the current president of the United States? [Don’t read, George Bush]  
 (1) Correct  (2) Incorrect  (8) Do not Know  (9) No Answer 
GI2.  What is the name of the President of Congress in country?  [Don’t read, insert name]  
(1) Correct  (2) Incorrect  (8) Do not Know  (9) No Answer  
GI3. How many provinces does the country have? [Don’t read, insert number of provinces] 
(1) Correct  (2) Incorrecto  (8) Do not Know  (9) No Answer 
NICARAGUA AND PANAMA ACCEPT WITH OR WITHOUT COMARCAS   
GI4. How long is the presidential/prime ministerial term of office in country? [Don’t read, insert number of 
years] 
((1) Correct  (2) Incorrect  (8) Do not Know  (9) No Answer 
GI5. What is the name of the current president of Brazil? [Don’t read, Luis Inacio Lula da Silva, also accept  
―Lula‖]  
 (1) Correct  (2) Incorrect  (8) Do not Know  (9) No Answer 
 
 
VB1. Are you registered to vote? [El Salvador, Costa Rica, Panama, Peru: Do you have an Identity Card?] (1) 
Yes   (2) No  (3) Being processed   (8) DK   
VB2. Did you vote in the last presidential elections of (year of last presidential elections)? 
(1) Voted [Continue]  (2) Did not vote [Go to VB50]   (8) DK [Go to VB50] 
 
VB3. Who did you vote for in the last presidential elections? [DON’T READTHE LIST]  
0.None (Blank ballot or vote canceled) 
X01.   INSERT NAMES AND PARTIES     
X02. 
X03. Replace X with Country Code 
77. Other ___________________________________ 
88. DK/DR 
99. INAP (Did not vote) 
VB50. [Ask to everyone] Generally speaking, men are better political leaders than women. How much do you 
agree with that statement? 
(1) Agree very much  (2) Agree  (3) Disagree  (4) Disagree very much 
VB10. Do you currently identify with a political party? 
(1) Yes [Continue]  (2) No [Go to POL1] (8) DK [Go to POL1] 
VB11. Which political party do you identify with? [Don’t read the list] 
X01.  WRITE DOWN THE NAMES OF CURRENT POLITICAL PARTIES 
X02. 
X03. 
X04 
Replace X with Country Code 
88. DK/DR [Skip to POL1] 
99. NA [Skip to POL1] 
VB12. Would you say that your identification with that party [the party mentioned in VB11] is very weak, 
weak, not weak or strong, strong, very strong? 
(1) Very weak   (2) Weak    (3) Not weak, or strong    (4) Strong      (5) Very strong      
(8) DK/DR     (9) INAP 
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POL1.  How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none? 
1) A lot   2) Some 3) Little 4) None 8) DK/DR 
POL2.  How often do you discuss politics with other people? (Read the options) 
1) Daily  2) A few times a week    3) A few times a month 4) Rarely      5) Never 
8) DK/DR 
 
 
Now changing the subject, have you ever felt discriminated or treated unfairly 
because of your physical appearance or the way you talk in the following places: 
DIS2.  In government offices (courts, municipal offices) 
(1) Yes     (2) No (8) DK/DR 
DIS4. In social events or meetings 
(1) Yes     (2) No (8) DK/DR 
DIS5. In public places (such as on the street, in a mall, or in a store) 
(1) Yes     (2) No (8) DK/DR 
 
 
VB20. [Ask to everyone] If the next presidential elections were being held this 
Sunday, for which party would you vote? [Read options] 
(1) Wouldn’t vote 
(2) Would vote for the incumbent candidate or party 
(3) Would vote for a candidate or party opposing the current administration 
(4) Would go to vote but would leave the ballot blank or would purposely 
cancel my vote 
(8) DK/DR 
VB21. What is the way that you think you can have the most influence to change 
things? [Read options] 
(1) Vote to elect those who support my position 
(2) Participate in protest movements and demand changes directly 
(3) Influence in other ways 
      (4) It is not possible to have influence in order to change things, it does not 
matter 
      (8) DK/DR 
 
 
[Give Card "D"] 
LS6. Please, imagine a ladder with steps numbered 0 to 10, where 0 is the lowest 
step and 10 the highest. Suppose that I tell you that the highest step represents the 
best life possible for you and the lowest step represents the worst life possible for 
you…if the highest is 10 and the lowest 0, on what step of the ladder do you 
feel at this moment? (ONLY ANSWER/SPONTANEOUS) 
 
LS4. Considering everything that we have talked about this city/area, would you 
say that you are satisfied or unsatisfied with where you live? 
 (1) Satisfied  (2) Unsatisfied   (8) DK/DR 
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Q2. How old are you? __________ years 
Q3. What is your religion? [Do not read options] 
(1) Catholic  
(2) Mainline Protestant or Protestant non-Evangelical (Adventist, Baptist, Calvinist, The Salvation 
Army, Lutheran, Methodist, Nazarene, Presbyterian). 
(3) Non-Christian Religions (Jewish, Muslims, Buddhists, Hinduisms, Taoists). 
(5) Evangelical and Pentecostal (Pentecostals, Charismatic non-Catholics, Light of World). 
(6) Mormons, Jehovah’s Witness, Spiritualists and Seventh-Day Adventists. 
(7) Traditional Religions or Native Religions (Candomble, Vodoo, Rastafarian, Mayan Traditional 
Religion). 
(4) None, secularist or atheist (Do not believe in God) 
(8) DK/DR  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  88  
Worst life possible 
[Take back Card "D"] 
                        Best 
life possible 
        DK/DR 
 
In this city/area where you live, are you satisfied or unsatisfied with … [Repeat “satisfied” and 
“unsatisfied” after each question to help the respondent]  
 Satisfie
d 
Unsatisfi
ed 
DK/DR   
SD1. The public transportation system 1 2 8   
SD2. the streets and interstates 1 2 8   
SD3. The educational system and schools 1 2 8   
SD4. The quality of air  1 2 8   
SD5. The quality of water 1 2 8   
SD6. The availability of health services and 
health care 
1 2 8   
SD7. The availability of good housing at 
affordable prices 
1 2 8   
SD8. The attractiveness of the area 1 2 8   
SD9. Traffic 1 2 8   
SD10. The sidewalks or pedestrian areas  1 2 8   
SD11. The availability of parks, plazas, 
green areas 
1 2 8   
SD12. The availability of recreational 
facilities   
1 2 8   
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Q5A. How often do you attend religious services? [Read options] 
1. More than once per week     2. Once per week       3. Once a month     4. Once or twice a year   5. 
Never     8. DK/DR 
[Show the list of ranges on Card E ] 
Q10. Into which of the following income ranges does the total monthly income of this household fit, 
including remittances from abroad and the income of all the working adults and children?   
[10 deciles based on the currency and distribution of the country] 
(00)  No income 
(01)  Less than $25 
(02)  $26- $50 
(03)  $51-$100 
(04)  $101-$150 
(05)  $151-$200 
(06)  $201-$300 
(07) $301-$400 
(08) $401-500 
(09) $501-$750  
(10) More than $751 
 (88) DK/DR 
[COLLECT CARD E] 
Q10A. Does your family receive remittances from abroad?  
1. Yes   2.[Go to Q10C] No  8. DK/NA [Go to Q10C] 
 
 
And now to finish up, I am going to ask you a few questions for statistical purposes.  
ED. What was the last year of education you passed? 
_____ Year  ___________________ (primary, secondary, university) = ________ total number of years 
[Use the table below for the code] 
 1 2 3 4 5 6   
None 0              
Primary 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Secondary 7 8 9 10 11 12 
University 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Doesn’t know/Doesn’t 
respond 
88           
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Q10A1. [Only for those who receive remittances] How do you generally use the remittances? 
[Don’t Read] 
1. Consumption (food, clothing) 
2. Housing (construction, repair) 
3. Education 
4. Community (schools repairs, reconstruction of churches/temples, community parties) 
5. Health care 
6. Savings/Investment 
7. Other 
8. DK/DR 
9. INAP 
Q10B. [Only for those who receive remittances] To what extent does the income of this household 
depend on remittances from abroad? [Read Options] 
(1) A lot    (2) Some    (3) Little  (4) Nothing  (8) DK/NA  (9) Inap 
Q10C. [Ask to everybody] Do you have close relatives who use to live in this household and are 
now living abroad? [If answer “Yes”, Ask where] 
[Don’t Read] 
(1) Yes, in the United States only 
(2) Yes, in the United States and in other countries 
(3) Yes, in other countries (not in the United States) 
(4) No [Skip to Q14] 
(8)  DK/NA [Skip to Q14] 
Q16. [Only for those who answered Yes to Q10C] How often do you communicate with them? 
(1) Everyday   
(2) Once or twice a week  
(3) Once or twice a month   
(4) Rarely 
(5) Never 
(8)  DK/DR  
(9) INAP 
Q14.  [Ask to everyone] Do you have any intention of going to live or work in another country in the 
next three years? 
1) Yes   2)  No   8) DK/DR 
Q10D. [Ask to everyone] The salary that you receive and  total family income : [ Read the options] 
1. Is enough, so that you can save                                                 
2. Is  just enough, but you can not save                                     
3. Is not enough,  you can not pay your bills                        
4. Is not enough, you can not cover your basic needs         
8. [Don’t read] DK/DR                                                                  
Q11. What is your marital status? [Don’t read options]    
(1) Single  (2) Married  (3) Common law marriage (4) Divorced  (5) Separated  (6) Widowed  (8) 
DK/DR 
Q12. How many children do you have?  _________ (00 = none  Skip to ETID)    DK……88 
Q12A. [If has children] How many children live with you at the present time? 
_________ (00) = none, (99) INAP (doesn’t have children). 
ETID.  Do you consider yourself white, mestizo, indigenous, Afro-country (black), mulatto, or of 
another race?  
(1) White   (2) Mestizo   (3) Indigenous    (4) Black o Afro-country  (5) Mulatto  
(7) Other (8) DK/DR 
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[NB; WRITE THE FIRST THREE LETTERS OF THE COUNTRY IN THE CODE OF THIS 
QUESTION.  For example, for Costa Rica, it should be COSETIDA] 
ETIDA. Do you think your mother is or was white, mestizo, indigenous, black or mulatto?  
 
White [1] Mestizo [2] Indigenous [3] Black [4] Mulatto [5] Mulatto     [7] Other  DK/DR [8] 
LENG1. What language have you spoken at home since childhood? (accept more than one option)  
(X01) Spanish     (X02) Indigenous language [NB; list  the name of the most common 
indigenous languages     (X04) Other (indigenous) (X05) Other foreign  (8) DK/DR 
[NB: WRITE THE FIRST THREE LETTERS OF  THE COUNTRY IN THE CODE OF 
THIS QUESTION. For example, for Peru, it should be PERLENG1A 
[Only to be used in Mexico, Guatemala and Peru] LENG1A. Was another language spoken  
in your house when you were a child?  Which one? (Accept one response) 
(1) Spanish (2) Indigenous language [NB: list the name of the most common indigenous 
languages]  (4) Other (indigenous)  (5) Other  foreign   (7)  None    DK/DR [8]     
[Use only in Mexico, Guatemala, and Peru] 
 LENG4.  Speaking about the language that your parents knew, your parents speak or spoke: 
(Interviewer: if one of the parents spoke only one language and the other two, mark 2.] [ 
Read the options] 
[1] Spanish only    [2] Spanish and indigenous language   [3] Indigenous language only  
[4] Spanish and foreign language [8] DK/DR  
 
WWW1. Talking about other things, how often do you use the internet? [Read options] 
1. Everyday or almost everyday 
2. At least once a week 
3. At least once a month 
4. Rarely 
5. Never 
9. DK/DR [Don’t read] 
 
R1. Television  (0) No (1) Yes 
R3. Refrigerator  (0) No (1) Yes 
R4. Conventional telephone 
(not cellular) 
(0) No (1) Yes 
R4A. Cellular telephone (0) No (1) Yes 
R5.  Vehicle (0) No (1) One (2) Two (3) Three or more 
R6. Washing machine (0) No (1) Yes 
R7. Microwave oven (0) No (1) Yes 
R8. Motorcycle (0) No (1) Yes 
R12. Indoor plumbing (0) No (1) Yes 
R14. Indoor bathroom  (0) No (1) Yes 
R15. Computer (0) No (1) Yes 
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OCUP4A. How do you mainly spend your time? Are you currently…[ Read the options] 
1. Working? [Continue] 
2. Not working, but have a job? [Continue] 
3. Actively looking for a job? [Go to MIG1/END] 
4. A student? [Go to MIG1/END] 
5. Taking care of the home? [Go to MIG1/END] 
6. Retired, a pensioner or permanently disable to work [Go to MIG1/END] 
7. Notworking and not looking for a job? [Go to MIG1/END] 
8. DK/DR 
OCUP1. What is your main occupation or type of work? [ Probe: what is your job about? ]  
[Don’t read the options] 
1. Professional, intellectual or scientist (lawyer, university professor, physician, engineer, 
architect, accountant, engineer, etc.) 
2. Manager  
3. Technical or mid-level professional (computer technician, school teacher, artist, athlete, etc.) 
4. Skilled worker (machine operator, mechanic, carpenter, electrician, etc.) 
5. Government official (member of government legislative, executive or judicial branches, or 
other government employee)  
6. Office worker (secretary, receptionist, cashier, customer service representative, etc.) 
7. Businessperson (entrepreneurs, salespeople, etc.) 
8. Food vendor  
9. Employee in the service sector (hotel worker, restaurant employee, taxi driver, etc.) 
10. Farmer 
11. Farmhand (works for others, does not own land) 
12. Artisan 
13. Domestic servant 
14. Servant 
15. Member of the armed forces or of the civil services (police, firefighters, etc.) 
88. DK 
OCUP1A. In this job are you: [Read the options] 
  1.  A salaried employee of the government or an independent state-owned enterprise? 
  2. A salaried employee in the private sector? 
  3.  Owner or partner in a business 
  4. Self-employed   
  5. Unpaid worker 
  8. DK/DR     
  9. INAP 
OCUP12A. How many hours do you normally work in your primary job? 
___________________________ [Mark number of hours]  (88)  DK/DR    (99) INAP 
OCUP12. Would you like to work more, less or the same number of hours? 
(1) Less   (2) Same     (3) More      (8) DK/DR    (9) INAP 
OCUP1C.  Do you have health insurance through your employer? 
(1) Yes  (2) No    (8) DK/DR   (9) INAP 
 
Now I Would like to ask you some questions about your work situation during December of 2006 
OCUP27. –During this time did you have the same job you have now?  
(1) Yes [Skip to MIG1 / END] 
(2) No [Continue] 
(8) NS/NR  [Continue] 
(9) INAP 
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OCUP28.   During this time period were you:[Read options]  
(1) Unemployed?  [Continue]  
(2) Working? [Skip to MIG1 / End] 
(3) Studying? [Skip to MIG1 / END] 
(4) Taking care of the home?  [Skip to MIG1 / END] 
(5)  Other (retired, etc.) [Skip to MIG1 / END]           (8)  DK/DR [Skip to MIG1 / END]          (9)  
INAP 
 
OCUP29. Why were you unemployed during this time period? [Don’t read options] 
(1) Voluntarily left previous job [Skip to OCUP31] 
(2) Ended temporary employment  [Skip to OCUP31]                                                        
(3) Was looking for a job for the first time [Skip to OCUP31] 
(4) The company where employed closed [Continue] 
(5) Laid off or fired [Continue]                                                                         
(8) DK/DR  [Skip to OCUP31] 
(9) INAP    
OCUP30.  Did you receive any type of unemployment compensation from the company where you 
worked?  
(1) Yes   [Skip to MIG1 / END] 
(2) No [Skip to MIG1 / END] 
(8) DK/DR   [Skip to MIG1 / END] 
(9)INAP  
OCUP31. During this time period were you looking for a job? 
(1) Yes [Continue]                         
(2) No [Skip to MIG1 / END] 
(8) DK/DR [Skip to MIG1 / END] 
(9) INAP   
OCUP31A During this time how long were you looking for a job? 
(1) Less than one month 
(2) Between one and three months 
(3) Between three and six months 
(4) More than six months 
(8) DK/DR 
(9) INAP                                                                                   
 
 
MIG1.  During your childhood, where did you mainly live? In the country? In a town? Or in a city?:  
   1.    In the country   2.  In a town    3.  In a city    8. DK/DR  
MIG2.  Where were you living 5 years ago? [Read options] 
 1.  In the same municipality [Go to TI]  2.  In another municipality in the country [Continue] 3.  In 
another country [Go to TI] 8. DK/DR [Go to TI] 
MIG3.  The place where you lived 5 years ago was: [Read options] 
(1) A town or city smaller than this one  
(2) A town or city larger than this one  
(3) A town or city like this one 
(8) DK 
(9) NA (did not migrate) 
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Time interview ended _______ : ______ 
TI. Duration of interview [minutes, see page # 1]  _____________ 
 
These are all the questions I have. Thank you very much for your cooperation.   
  
I swear that this interview was carried out with the person indicated above.  
Interviewer’s signature__________________ Date  ____ /_____ /_____  
 
Field supervisor’s signature _________________ 
Comments: 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Signature of the person who entered the data __________________________________ 
Signature of the person who verified the data _______________________________ 
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